The development of executive function in early childhood by Marcovitch, Stuart & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN EARLY CHILDHOOD  
By: Philip David Zelazo, Ulrich Muller, Douglas Frye, Stuart Marcovitch  
In Collaboration With: Gina Argitis, Janet Boseovski, Jackie K. Chiang, Donaya Hongwanishkul, Barbara V 
Schuster, Alexandra Sutherland 
 
Zelazo, P. D., Muller, U., Frye, D., & Marcovitch, S. (2003). The development of executive function in early 
childhood. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 68(3), Serial No. 274. 
 
Made available courtesy of Wiley-Blackwell: http://www.wiley.com/  
*** Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
Abstract: 
According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory, the development of executive function can 
be understood in terms of age-related increases in the maximum complexity of the rules children can formulate 
and use when solving problems. This Monograph describes four studies (9 experiments) designed to test 
hypotheses derived from the CCC theory and from alternative theoretical perspectives on the development of 
executive function (memory accounts, inhibition accounts, and redescription accounts). Each study employed a 
version of the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), in which children are required first to sort cards by one 
pair of rules (e.g., color rules: "If red then here, if blue then there"), and then sort the same cards by another, 
incompatible pair of rules (e.g., shape rules). Study 1 found that although most 3- to 4-year-olds failed the 
standard version of this task (i.e., they perseverated on the preswitch rules during the postswitch phase), they 
usually performed well when they were required to use four rules (including bidimensional rules) and those 
rules were not in conflict (i.e., they did not require children to respond in two different ways to the same test 
card). These findings indicate that children's perseveration cannot be attributed in a straightforward fashion to 
limitations in children's memory capacity. Study 2 examined the circumstances in which children can use 
conflicting rules. Three experiments demonstrated effects of rule dimensionality (uni- vs. bidimensional rules) 
but no effects of stimulus characteristics (1 vs. 2 test cards; spatially integrated vs. separated stimuli). Taken 
together, these studies suggest that conflict among rules is a key determinant of difficulty, but that conflict 
interacts with dimensionality. 
 
Study 3 examined what types of conflict pose problems for 3- to 4-yearolds by comparing performance on 
standard, Partial Change, and Total Change versions of the DCCS. Results revealed effects of conflict at the 
level of specific rules (e.g., "If red, then there"), rather than specific stimulus configurations or dimensions per 
se, indicating that activation of the preswitch rules persists into the postswitch phase. 
 
Study 4 examined whether negative priming also contributes to difficulty on the DCCS. Two experiments 
suggested that the active selection of preswitch rules against a competing alternative results in the lasting 
suppression of the alternative. 
 
Taken together, the results of these studies provide the basis for a revision of the CCC theory (CCC-r) that 
specifies more clearly the circumstances in which children will have difficulty using rules at various levels of 
complexity, provides a more detailed account of how to determine the complexity of rules required in a task, 
takes account of both the activation and inhibition of rules as a function of experience, and highlights the 







I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
THE "FUNCTION" OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
Executive function is a popular topic in contemporary research, but definitions of executive function differ 
widely. One approach treats executive function as a higher order cognitive mechanism or ability. Denckla and 
Reiss (1997), for example, followed an influential line of authors (e.g., Baddeley, 1996; Norman & Shallice, 
1986) when they suggested that "Executive function refers to a cognitive module consisting of effector output 
elements involving inhibition, working memory, and organisational strategies necessary to prepare a response" 
(p. 283, italics in original). Unfortunately, this approach essentially hypostatizes homuncular abilities and leaves 
unanswered questions concerning how executive function is accomplished (Parkin, 1998; Zelazo & Muller, 
2002b). 
 
Another approach to studying executive function involves devising comprehensive neuropsychological batteries 
for children and using factor analysis in an attempt to reveal the underlying structure of executive function (see 
Zelazo & Muller, 2002b, for a review). These studies generally reveal three or four factors a result that has been 
taken to suggest that there are dissociable dimensions of executive function, consistent with efforts to 
"fractionate" executive function based on lesion studies in nonhuman animals (e.g., Robbins, 1996). This 
approach can be used to generate hypotheses about processes involved in executive function that can then be 
tested experimentally. However, the results of factor-analytic studies are potentially misleading: Providing 
labels for factors may lead to the impression that researchers actually understand the cognitive processes 
underlying performance on various tasks, but this is rarely the case. Note that the same tasks are often clustered 
in different ways, and characterized by different labels. Thus, for example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test is 
considered by Levin et al. (199 1) to be part of a "Perseveration/ Disinhibition" factor but is considered by 
Pennington (1997) to be part of a "Set Shifting or Cognitive Flexibility" factor. In the absence of an 
understanding of underlying cognitive processes, it is unclear what this approach can tell us about the structure 
of executive function. For example, does set shifting rely on inhibitory control or is inhibition a consequence of 
set shifting? It is also impossible to determine the extent to which correlations among tasks are due to shared 
method variance or are influenced by differential sensitivity to individual differences at different ages. 
Another approach, following Luria (e.g., 1973), views executive function as a functional construct that makes 
reference to (but cannot be equated with) the psychological processes involved in goal-directed problem solving 
(Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Like all functions, executive function can be defined in terms of what 
it accomplishes. The various subfunctions of problem solving, from initially representing a problem to 
eventually evaluating the adequacy of an attempted solution, can all be seen as contributing to this outcome (see 
Figure 1). For example, when searching for a hidden toy, children need to represent the problem, select a plan 
for action, actually execute the plan, and then evaluate the outcome. Treating executive function as a functional 
construct does not explain executive function (it remains an explanandum), but it does lay the groundwork for 
an explanation by facilitating the formulation of specific hypotheses regarding the role of basic cognitive 
processes (e.g., attention, memory, action monitoring) in different aspects of executive function. Moreover, this 
approach (a) suggests relatively well-defined measures of executive function (e.g., measures of rule use for 
which problem representation, planning, and evaluation are not required), (b) clarifies the way in which diverse 
aspects of executive function work together, and (c) avoids conceptualizing executive function as a homuncular 
ability (e.g., as a Supervisory Attentional System; Shallice, 1988). 
 
INFLEXIBILITY AND PROBLEM SOLVING: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
Inflexibility has been recognized as an important impediment to problem solving at least since the 1940s, when 
psychologists working in the Gestalt tradition made problem solving a central topic of research. In Dunker's 
(1945) classic experiments on functional fixedness, for example, participants rigidly represented objects only in 
terms of their canonical functions. Another set of classic studies (Luchins, 1942) revealed that people frequently 
persisted in applying a particular problem-solving strategy (for adding and subtracting the contents of water 
jars) even when it was no longer efficient to do so. 
 
In contemporary research, inflexibility is often studied under the rubric of perseveration, which has been 
defined as the repeated production of an action or thought in the absence of an appropriate stimulus (e.g., 
Hauser, 1999; Sandson & Albert, 1984, 1987; Werner, 1946). Perseveration is a hallmark of various types of 
psychopathology and brain injury, including damage to prefrontal cortex. For example, when asked to draw a 
circle, patients with prefrontal cortical damage sometimes draw dozens of circles, as if they cannot inhibit a 
motor program once it has been activated (Luria, Pribram, & Homskaya, 1964). 
 
Patients with prefrontal cortical damage also perseverate on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. In this test (Grant 
& Berg, 1948), participants are presented with four target cards that differ on three dimensions (number, color, 
and shape), and asked to sort a series of test cards that match different target cards on different dimensions. 
Participants must discover the sorting rule by trial and error, and, after a certain number of consecutive correct 
responses, the sorting rule is changed. Patients with prefrontal damage often continue to sort according to the 
old rule, despite feedback indicating that the rule has changed (e.g., Milner, 1963; Stuss et al., 2000; but see 
Anderson, Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991). 
As these examples may suggest, inflexibility can occur at the level of representations (e.g., problem-solving 
sets), or at the level of responses (e.g., motor programs), or both (Goldberg & Bilder, 1987; Zelazo, Reznick, & 
Pinon, 1995). When performance fails because of difficulty inhibiting an incorrect problem representation and 
establishing a correct one, as in Dunker's (1945) study, this might be characterized as an error based on 
representational inflexibility. Representational inflexibility can be contrasted with failures of response control, 
which occur when one fails to inhibit an incorrect response despite establishing and maintaining a correct 
intention to act. 
Developmental research indicates that inflexibility occurs in different contexts at different ages. One of the most 
widely studied examples of infant perseveration is the A-not-B error. As originally described by Piaget (1954), 
the A-not-B error occurs when infants (typically between of 8 and 10 months of age) successfully retrieve an 
object at one location (location A), and are then allowed to search for it when it is conspicuously hidden at 
another location (location B). Remarkably, infants at this age often search at the first location despite having 
last seen the object at location B. The basic finding has proved to be robust (for a recent meta-analysis, see 
Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999). Whereas Piaget attributed the error to an immature understanding of the object 
concept, a popular contemporary interpretation of the error is that infants have difficulty using a representation 
of an object's location to override a prepotent response (e.g., Diamond, 1991)—that is, they exhibit a failure of 
executive function, or more precisely, a failure of response control. 
Studies with older infants and with preschoolers indicate that the development of representational flexibility and 
response control follows a protracted course. For example, DeLoache (e.g., 1987) observed changes between 
2.5 and 3 years of age in children's ability to use a three-dimensional model of a room to guide search for an 
object hidden in the room itself. In particular, DeLoache (1999; Sharon & DeLoache, 2003; see also O'Sullivan, 
Mitchell, & Daehler, 2001) observed that 2.5-year-olds often committed perseverative errors, searching for the 
object at the location where it had been found on a previous trial. Three-year-olds, in contrast, searched 
successfully. DeLoache (1995) suggested that the age-related changes observed in this task reflect an increase in 
representational flexibility: 2.5-year-olds persist in thinking of the model as a three-dimensional object (e.g., a 
toy room) rather than thinking of it in terms of the thing it represents (viz., the room). 
There is also a large body of research indicating that 3- to 4-year-olds have difficulty switching between 
incompatible perspectives on a single object—they perseverate in representing objects in a particular way even 
when it is no longer appropriate to do so. In tasks assessing understanding of appearance and reality, for 
example, children are shown a misleading object such as a sponge painted to look like a rock and asked about 
its appearance ("What does it look like?") and its true nature or function ("What is it really?"). Three-year-olds 
are much more likely than 5-yearolds to give the same answer to both questions (Flavell , Green, & Flavell , 
1986). 
Further evidence of representational inflexibility in 3- to 4-year-olds has been obtained in research on numerous 
topics, including understanding false beliefs (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001, for a meta-analysis), 
reasoning about physical causality (e.g., das Gupta & Bryant, 1989; Frye, Zelazo, Brooks, & Samuels, 1996), 
moral reasoning (e.g., Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996), reasoning about delayed representations (e.g., Povinelli, 
Landau, & Perilloux, 1996; Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 1999), predicting outcomes based on past 
experience (Kessen & Kessen, 1961), inferring word meanings (Deck, 2000), and generating multiple labels for 
a single object (e.g., Doherty & Perner, 1998; Markman, 1989; but see Deal( & Maratsos, 1998), among other 
topics. In each case, younger preschoolers seem to have difficulty switching between conflicting 
representations; they tend to perseverate on a salient representation, and there are age-related increases in 
flexibility between about 3 and 5 years of age. How best to interpret these increases in flexibility is currently a 
matter of debate, but there is a growing consensus that these increases may be usefully studied under the rubric 
of executive function (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Deak, 2000; Frye, 1999; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; 
Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, in press; Munakata & Yerys, 2001; Perner, Stummer, & Lang, 1999; Zelazo, 
1999; Zelazo & Frye, 1997; Zelazo & Muller, 2002b) . 
The Dimensional Change Card Sort 
One widely used measure of executive function in early childhood is the Dimensional Change Card Sort 
(DCCS; see Figure 2; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996). In this task, children are 
shown two target cards (e.g., a blue rabbit and a red boat) that vary along two dimensions (e.g., color and 
shape), and they are asked to sort a series of bivalent test cards (e.g., red rabbits and blue boats), first according 
to one dimension (e.g., color, for which they are told, "If it's blue it goes here; if it's red it goes there.") and then 
according to the other (e.g., shape, for which they are told, "If it's a rabbit it goes here; if it's a boat it goes 
there."). Regardless of which dimension is presented first, 3- to 4-year-olds typically perseverate by sorting 
cards by the first dimension. Moreover, they do this despite being told the new rules on every trial, despite 
having sorted cards by the new dimension on other occasions, and despite correctly answering questions about 
the postswitch rules (e.g., "Where do the flowers go in the shape game?"). In other words, 3- to 4-year-olds 
typically exhibit inflexibility on this task. In contrast, by 5 years of age, children typically perform well. 
 
Children's performance on the DCCS is correlated with their performance on a variety of measures of executive 
function—even after controlling for age and verbal ability (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Lang & Perner, 2002), and 
age-related changes in performance on the DCCS indicate that executive function develops rapidly during the 
preschool years. However, the cognitive processes underlying executive function in children (and by 
implication, what develops) remain unclear. This Monograph describes a series of studies in which different 
features of the DCCS are manipulated experimentally in order to elucidate these processes. By determining the 
circumstances in which children are susceptible to inflexibility on the DCCS, it should be possible to describe 
the development of executive function more precisely and reveal the way in which basic cognitive processes are 
orchestrated in order to fulfill the higher order function of problem solving. Four studies (including 9 
experiments) are described. These studies are interpreted in the context of four leading approaches to the study 
of executive function and its development, including complexity theories, memory accounts, accounts 
emphasizing inhibitory control, and accounts emphasizing the redescription of representations. These theories 
will now be reviewed in turn and described with reference to the assessment of executive function in young 
children. 
COMPLEXITY THEORIES 
Several theories of executive function and its development emphasize the importance of complexity. The 
importance of complexity has long been recognized in the developmental literature (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 
1964; Vygotsky, 1962) , and it is also starting to be appreciated in the neuroscience literature (Dias, Robbins, 
& Roberts, 1996; Stuss et al., 1999; Wise, Murray, & Gerfen, 1996). One influential complexity theory, 
proposed by Halford and colleagues (1998), suggests that as children develop they are able to understand 
increasingly complex relations among objects. Halford et al. defined complexity in terms of the number of 
relations that can be processed in parallel. According to these authors, each argument of a relation, such as "X" 
in the relation "X is greater than Y," represents a source of variation, or a dimension. Processing a single 
relation (i.e., a "unary" relation) is less complex than processing a binary relation, which is less complex than 
processing a ternary relation, and so forth. Although increases in relational complexity are related to experience 
rather than age on this account, Halford and colleagues have found that unary relations are processed at a 
median age of 1 year, binary relations at 2 years, ternary relations at 5 years, and quaternary relations at 11 
years. 
To date, Halford and colleagues (1998) have focused on explaining age-related increases in understanding, as 
opposed to executive function. However, the relational complexity framework has recently been extended to the 
study of prefrontal cortical function by Holyoak and colleagues (Robin & Holyoak, 1995; Waltz et al., 1999), 
who argued that relational complexity theory provides a useful framework for characterizing the deficits 
associated with prefrontal cortical damage. Moreover, Kroger et al. (2002) have recently shown using fMRI that 
regions of left prefrontal cortex appear to be selectively activated when solving nonverbal problems high in 
relational complexity. 
The Cognitive Complexity and Control Theory (CCC) theory (e.g., Frye, Zelazo, & Burack, 1998; Zelazo & 
Frye, 1998) also emphasizes the importance of complexity, and this theory is specifically intended to be a 
theory of executive function and its development. As will be explained, this approach defines complexity in 
terms of the hierarchical structure of children's rule systems, rather than the number of relations that can be 
processed in parallel. According to this theory, age-related changes in executive function—considered as a 
functional constructare due to age-related changes in the maximum complexity of the rules that children can 
formulate and use when solving problems. These age-related changes in maximum rule complexity are, in turn, 
made possible by age-related increases in the degree to which children can reflect on the rules they represent. 
On this account, rules are formulated in an ad hoc fashion in potentially silent self-directed speech. These rules 
link antecedent conditions to consequences, as when we tell ourselves, "If I see a mailbox, then I need to mail 
this letter." When children reflect on the rules they represent, they are able to consider them in contradistinction 
to other rules and embed them under higher order rules, in the same way that we might say, "If it is before 5 
p.m., then if I see a mailbox, then I need to mail this letter, otherwise, I'll have to go directly to the post office." 
In this example, a simple conditional statement regarding the mailbox is made dependent on the satisfaction of 
yet another condition (namely, the time). 
The tree diagram in Figure 3 illustrates the way in which hierarchies of rules can be formed the way in which 
one rule can be embedded under another higher order rule and controlled by it. Rule A, which indicates that 
consequent 1 (c1) should follow antecedent 1 (a1), is incompatible with rule C, which connects al to c2. Rule A 
is embedded under, and controlled by, a higher order rule (rule E) that can be used to select rules A and B, as 
opposed to rules C and D. This higher order rule makes reference to setting conditions (s1 and s2; e.g., Reese, 
1989) that condition the selection of lower order rules. Notice that in order to formulate higher order rules and 
deliberate between rules C and D, on the one hand, and rules A and B, on the other, children need to be aware 
of the fact that they know both pairs of lower order rules. 
 
Thus, increases in reflection on lower order rules are logically required for increases in embedding to occur. 
However, it is the increases in embedding that provide the metric for measuring the degree of complexity of the 
entire rule system that needs to be kept in mind (i.e., in working memory) in order to perform particular tasks. 
That is, complexity is measured as the number of degrees of embedding in the rule systems that children 
formulate when solving a particular problem. More complex rule systems permit the more flexible selection of 
certain rules for acting when multiple conflicting rules are possible. This allows for flexible responding, as 
opposed to perseveration; it allows for cognitive control, as opposed to stimulus control. 
According to CCC theory, several age-related changes in executive function occur during childhood, and for 
each developmental transition, a general process is recapitulated. Specifically, a rule system at a particular level 
of complexity is acquired, and this rule system permits children to exercise a new degree of control over their 
reasoning and their behavior. However, the use of this rule system is subject to limitations that cannot be 
overcome until yet another level of complexity is achieved. In particular, the rule system cannot be selected 
when there is a salient, conflicting rule system. Consequently, according to the CCC theory, abulic dissociations 
dissociations between having knowledge and actually using that knowledge—occur until incompatible pieces of 
knowledge are integrated into a single, more complex rule system via their subordination to a new higher order 
rule. On this account, reflection and higher order rule use are the primary psychological functions accomplished 
by systems involving prefrontal cortex (although different regions of prefrontal cortex are associated with 
reflection on different kinds of rules; e.g., abstract vs. motivationally significant; see Zelazo & Muller, 2002b). 
In terms of the DCCS, rule A might be, "If it's red, put it here," and rule B might be, "If it's blue, put it there" 
(see Figure 3). To sort flexibly by color, children would need to reflect on rule A and contrast it with rule B. 
According to the CCC theory, 2-year-olds typically only represent a single rule at a time (e.g., "If red ... here"), 
and hence have difficulty even on the preswitch phase of the DCCS (they perseverate on one of the rules). By 3 
years, children can easily consider a pair of rules simultaneously (e.g., "If red ... here" vs. "if blue ... there"). 
Indeed, on this account, 3- to 4-yearolds know both the first pair of rules (e.g., "If red ... here" vs. "if blue ... 
there") and the second pair of rules (e.g., "If rabbit ... here" vs. "if boat ... there"), and they can use either pair of 
rules if presented alone or in separate contexts, but because they typically fail to reflect on these rule pairs in 
relation to one another, the two pairs of rules remain unintegrated (see Figure 4). As a result, the particular pair 
of rules that underlies responding in a single context is determined by relatively local considerations, such as the 
way in which the question is asked or the way in which they have approached the situation in the past. In other 
words, they can exhibit knowledge of one pair of rules in one context, and knowledge of the other pair of rules 
in a different context, but they fail to recognize the incompatibility between rule pairs; therefore, the particular 
rule pair they end up selecting and using to sort test cards may be determined associatively rather than 
deliberately. In contrast, by 4 years of age, children typically represent a higher order rule (such as E) that 
allows them to integrate incompatible rules into a single rule system and appreciate that different rule pairs 
apply under different setting conditions. They can then use this higher order rule deliberately to select between 
two different pairs of rules ("If we're playing by color, then if red ... here, if blue ... there, but if we're playing by 
shape, then if rabbit ... here, if flower ... there"), and hence, to switch flexibly in response to situational 
demands. 
On this account, then, 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS might be described as a kind of 
representational inflexibility: During the postswitch phase, 3- to 4-year-olds persistently select the preswitch 
pair of rules. In terms of the problem-solving framework, performance breaks down during problem 
representation; in the absence of a change in context, children actually try to sort according to the preswitch 
dimension (Frye & Zelazo, 2003). 
 
Although CCC theory is similar in many respects to Halford's relational complexity theory, Halford and 
colleagues (Halford, Andrews, Dalton, Boag, & Zielinski, 2002) correctly note that an increase in the number of 
dimensions processed simultaneously is not the same as the creation of a hierarchical (if-if-then) relation 
between dimensions. The difference has implications for psychological processing. For example, CCC theory 
makes a distinction between the function of switching between dimensions, as in the DCCS, and the more 
difficult function of making simultaneous judgments according to two dimensions, as in matrix classification 
tasks (Frye et al., 1995, Exp. 3). According to CCC theory, the former function requires a hierarchical relation 
but does not require simultaneous consideration of two dimensions. Relational complexity does not distinguish 
between these functions because both are believed to involve the processing of two relations. 
CCC theory and relational complexity theory also postulate different mechanisms for the construction of 
increasingly complex knowledge structures (see Zelazo & Muller, 2002a, for further discussion of the 
differences between these approaches). According to CCC theory, a functional process of reflection (mediated 
by reprocessing of information in prefrontal cortex) is required in order to make a deliberate decision to use the 
postswitch rules in the DCCS, and it is largely through age-related changes in reflection that cognitive 
development unfolds. In contrast, according to relational complexity theory, age-related changes in complexity 
are attributed to increases in effective processing capacity brought about by experience in particular domains. 
MEMORY ACCOUNTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
An alternative approach to study of the development of executive function emphasizes the importance of 
memory, especially working memory. The term "working memory" is used in different senses by different 
authors but is most often taken to refer to the simultaneous manipulation and maintenance of a representation so 
that this representation can guide responding (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Daneman & Merikle, 1996). As Roberts 
and Pennington (1996, p. 109) put it, "Working memory is used not only for holding information online, but 
also for using that information along with contextual specifics to generate upcoming action." Consequently, 
measures of working memory typically require both processing and storage (Daneman & Merikle, 1996). 
Lesion studies (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Jacobson, 1936) as well as single-unit recording studies (e.g., 
Fuster, 1995) have demonstrated that the short-term storage of trial-unique information depends importantly on 
prefrontal cortex. Research with human participants has also implicated prefrontal cortex in the manipulation of 
information in working memory (e.g., Petrides, 2000). 
An influential account of both the processing and storage demands of working memory has been provided by 
Baddeley (1996, 1998). According to Baddeley, working memory comprises three components: a central 
executive, a phonological loop, and a visuo-spatial scratchpad. The latter two components are slave systems 
specialized for the processing and storage of limited amounts of information within specific domains: whereas 
the phonological loop operates on sound-based information, the visuo-spatial scratchpad operates on spatial 
and visual information. In contrast to these slave systems, the central executive is capable of coordinating and 
integrating information of either type. 
In terms of this account, the capacity of the phonological loop can be assessed by memory span tests such as 
digit span and other serial recall tests. These tests show that memory span (a measure of the maximum number 
of unrelated verbal items that can be remembered in correct sequence) increases from two to three items at 4 
years of age to about six items at 12 years (e.g., Cowan, 2001; see Gathercole, 1998, for a review). The span of 
the visuospatial scratchpad is measured in an analogous fashion (e.g., using a pattern span task; Gathercole, 
1998) and shows similar age-related improvements in childhood. 
In contrast to these relatively simple span tasks, which mainly measure storage, the capacity of the central 
executive is assessed by relatively complex working memory tasks such as reading and listening span. In these 
tasks, children need to process incoming information (either reading or listening to sentences) while 
remembering old information (e.g., the final words of the preceding sentences). Another complex measure of 
the central executive is backward digit span, in which children are asked to remember a list of digits and 
repeat them in the reverse order. Performance on these tasks also improves with age (Gathercole, 1998). 
Several theoretical accounts have suggested that the development of executive function and behavior related to 
executive function is made possible by the growth of short-term or working memory (e.g., Case, 1992, 1995; 
Demetriou, Christou, Spanoudis, & Plastidou, 2002; Gordon & Olson, 1998; Olson, 1993; Pascual-Leone, 
1970). It is possible that the growth of memory, perhaps particularly of the phonological loop 
(which would be required for rehearsing verbal rules), constrains the number of rules that children can use 
in the DCCS. For example, perhaps 3- to 4-year-olds can only hold two rules (i.e., a preswitch pair of rules) 
in mind (e.g., Gordon & Olson, 1998), and consequently fail the postswitch phase. 
A memory account of the development of executive function has also been suggested by Morton and Munakata 
(2002), who presented a connectionist model of children's performance on the DCCS. Morton and Munakata 
distinguished between active memory representations and latent memory traces. Active memory representations 
take the form of sustained activity in the prefrontal cortex, whereas latent memory traces are formed in more 
posterior cortex when processing a stimulus brings about a change in the subsequent processing of that 
stimulus. Because latent traces are instantiated implicitly as changes in the strength of connections between 
units, they are not accessible to other brain regions, although they influence the processing of these other 
regions via changes in the activation of subsequent stimuli. In contrast, active representations are accessible to 
other brain regions, and they can influence processing in these areas even if the stimulus is no longer 
perceptually available. 
The architecture of Morton and Munakata's (2002) network model of the DCCS consists of three input layers 
("Visual Features, Verbal Features, and Rule") for representing test cards, instructions, and the relevant 
dimension; an internal representation layer (i.e., a layer of hidden units); a prefrontal cortex layer that 
corresponds to active memory of the relevant dimension (shape or color); and an output layer corresponding to 
sorting trays. The units interact through connections of various types. For example, feedforward connections are 
established between input and hidden units and between hidden and output units, and the strength of these 
connections changes with experience according to a Hebbian learning rule (i.e., connections between units that 
are simultaneously active increase in strength). Consequently, when the network sorts by color, for example, the 
feedforward connections for color become stronger and the network develops a latent memory for sorting by 
color. There are also feedfoward connections to the prefrontal cortex units that change with experience, but 
these change at a much slower rate, such that the prefrontal cortex part of the model (which represents the 
relevant dimension) is less susceptible to bias than the rest of the system. 
Other connections include the recurrent excitatory connections that the prefrontal cortex units have to 
themselves. These connections allow the prefrontal cortex units to remain active even in the absence of 
external input. To examine the basis of developmental changes in behavior, the experimenters modeled age-
related improvements in active memory by increasing the strength of the recurrent connections. 
When tested on the DCCS with weak recurrent connections (i.e., at a young age), Morton and Munakata's 
model performed perfectly on preswitch trials (because the network became biased toward the preswitch rules 
as category exemplars were entered) and perseverated during the postswitch phase. When the recurrent 
connections were strengthened, the network switched appropriately on the postswitch trials, simulating the 
developmental progression observed in children. 
According to Morton and Munakata's (2002) model, age-related changes in performance on the DCCS are 
attributable to increases in the strength of active memory. However, the likelihood of perseveration is jointly 
determined by the strength of active memory and the strength of a conflicting latent bias. This approach is 
similar in some respects to the framework proposed by Roberts and Pennington (1996), according to which 
working memory demands and inhibitory control demands interact and jointly determine task difficulty. Like 
Gerstadt, Hong, and Diamond (1994), Roberts and Pennington (1996, p. 112) suggested that task difficulty can 
be increased either by increasing the inhibitory demands or by increasing the working memory demands of a 
task (see also Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003). Morton and Munakata's model differs 
from these proposals, however, in that inhibitory control (or, conversely, perseveration) is seen to be a 
functional consequence of memory (or the lack thereof). That is, Morton and Munakata see no need to 
postulate a separate inhibition mechanism. 
INHIBITION ACCOUNTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
Another possibility is to attribute the development of executive function to the growth of an inhibition 
mechanism—a mechanism for suppressing behavior (e.g., Dempster, 1993, 1995; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 
1993). Starting perhaps with Luria (1961) and White (1965), numerous authors have suggested that the growth 
of an inhibition mechanism occurs in parallel with the growth of prefrontal cortex. In terms of the DCCS, 3- to 
4year-olds may know perfectly well what they are supposed to do, and even try to do it, but still have 
difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses due to an immature inhibition mechanism. 
One class of inhibition accounts has emphasized lack of response control (e.g., Barkley, 1997; Carlson, Moses, 
& Hix, 1998; Cuneo & Welsh, 1992; Diamond & Gilbert, 1989; Gladstone, 1969; Kochanska, Murray, 
Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996; Luria, 1959, 1961; Perner et al., 1999; Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 1984; 
Tikhomirov, 1978; White, 1965). Following Luria (e.g., 1961), these accounts hold that children frequently fail 
to suppress overlearned, or otherwise prepotent, response tendencies despite representing an appropriate plan 
or rule (i.e., despite knowing what to do). Carlson and Moses (2001) and Perner et al. (1999) have specifically 
suggested that 3- to 4-year-olds acquire a prepotent response tendency, or action schema, during the preswitch 
phase of the DCCS, and then have difficulty inhibiting this response tendency during the postswitch phase 
despite knowing what to do. For Perner et al . (1999), this difficulty is overcome by the emergence of 
"executive inhibition," which depends on children's conceptual understanding of the unintended consequences 
of action schemata. 
In contrast to accounts emphasizing lack of response control, Kirkham, Cruess, and Diamond (in press) have 
interpreted 3- to 4-year-olds' perseveration in the DCCS as an example of representational inflexibility caused 
by an immature inhibition mechanism. On their account, "the problem for children is not in representing 
incompatible sets of rules," as claimed by CCC theory, but rather in shifting attention to the postswitch 
dimension, which "requires inhibiting the pull to the previously correct dimension" (p. 27 of the ms., italics in 
the original). They refer to 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty as one of "attentional inertia" that is eventually 
overcome by maturation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
REDESCRIPTION AND THE RELATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION AND 
CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY 
Perner, Stummer, Sprung, and Doherty (2002) recently developed a new account of the development of 
executive function—one with precursors in work by Flavell (1988) and Inhelder and Piaget (1964), among 
others. Although similar in many respects to Perner's earlier accounts (e.g., Perner et al., 1999), this new 
account suggests that 3- to 4year-olds exhibit representational inflexibility because they lack a concept of 
perspectives and, hence, cannot understand that a single stimulus can be redescribed in a different, incompatible 
way from two different perspectives. This account can be applied to the DCCS in a straightforward fashion. For 
example, in the preswitch phase of the DCCS, when sorting by color, children may describe a red rabbit as a red 
one. Then, in the postswitch phase, they may need to describe that same stimulus as a rabbit. If 3- to 4-year-olds 
fail to understand that it is possible to provide multiple descriptions of a single stimulus, then they will persist in 
describing the test cards in terms of the preswitch dimension, as suggested by Zelazo and Frye (1997) and Frye 
(1999). Another version of this account suggests that even 3-year-olds can, in principle, understand alternative 
descriptions in the DCCS, but that they become much more likely to do so at around 4 years of age (Perner & 
Lang, 2002). In either case, the changes occur at about 4 years of age because this is when children acquire the 
concept of perspectives, which allows them readily to appreciate that a single stimulus can be described in two 
different ways. 
Perner's redescription account can be distinguished from another account emphasizing redescription. 
According to Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) Representational Redescription model, knowledge is originally 
represented in an implicit, procedural format (called "level I"). Knowledge in this format is modular and 
inflexible: the procedures are data-driven and they must be "run off" in their entirety. With sufficient practice, 
behavioral mastery of these procedures is achieved and the knowledge is automatically redescribed into a more 
abstract, explicit format (called "E 1") that reveals the structure of the procedures. Although this newly 
redescribed knowledge is explicit, it is not conscious. At this level of redescription, separate aspects (or 
components) of the knowledge can interact with aspects of other explicitly represented knowledge, but they 
cannot be consciously manipulated. Consciousness comes with yet additional levels of redescription or 
"explicitation," that occur "spontaneously as part of an internal drive toward the creation of intra-domain and 
inter-domain relationships" (1992, p. 18). Level E2 is conscious but cannot be verbalized, whereas Level E3 is 
conscious and verbalizable. The Representational Redescription model would account for 3- to 4-year-olds' 
inflexibility on the DCCS by proposing that their knowledge of the rules is less than fully explicit (due to lack 
of experience, not age). For example, children's knowledge might be represented at Levels E 1 or E2 but not 
E3. 
REVIEW OF EXTANT RESEARCH ON THE DIMENSIONAL CHANGE CARD SORT 
The four approaches just described complexity theories, memory accounts, accounts emphasizing inhibitory 
control, and accounts emphasizing redescription—emphasize different aspects of the development of 
executive function and postulate different underlying mechanisms. Although all of these approaches can be 
applied in a straightforward fashion to the basic finding that 3- to 4-year-olds often perseverate on the DCCS, 
they make different predictions about the effects of experimental manipulations of features of the DCCS. The 
research reported in this Monograph will be discussed in terms of these accounts, but before describing this 
research we will first review the existing literature, starting with some background information regarding the 
rule-use paradigm. 
The DCCS is an example of the rule-use paradigm, which was developed during the 1920s by Vygotsky, 
Luria, and Leontiev in their work on the verbal regulation of behavior. Rules are statements (usually if-then 
statements) that specify relations between antecedent conditions and actions to be executed or inferences to be 
made. In any rule-use task, participants are presented explicitly with rules and required to use them to guide 
their behavior. For example, in one series of studies (Luria, 1961), children were told to squeeze a bulb when a 
red light flashed, but to refrain from squeezing when a green light flashed. To succeed on this task, it is 
necessary to keep the rules in mind (i.e., in working memory) and to follow them. The instructions may be 
represented as follows: "If the red light's on, press the bulb. If the green light's on, don't press it." In this 
example, the apodoses of the rules refer to actions to be (or not to be) executed. 
The rule-use paradigm is useful for studying executive function because it is relatively simple compared to 
many other paradigms. For example, unlike a variety of rule-learning tasks (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 
1956; Gollin, 1966; Grant & Berg, 1948; Kemler, 1978; Kendler & Kendler, 1959; Rudy, Keith, & Georgen, 
1993), rule-use tasks do not require participants to discover the relevant rules; rather, this information is 
provided explicitly. In rule-learning tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, young children could 
have difficulty at any one of the subphases of problem solving identified in Figure 1. As a result, the origin of 
errors on this task is relatively difficult to determine (e.g., see Delis, Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). 
Similarly, tasks designed to assess strategic problem solving (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi; Bidell & Fischer, 
1994; Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Welsh, 1991) require rule use in addition to other problem solving phases, 
such as planning, and error correction. On the other hand, because the rule-use paradigm isolates crucial steps 
in the course of problem solving, and is therefore relatively simple, this paradigm makes it easier to interpret 
children's errors. 
The Use of a Single Pair of Rules by 2.5- and 3-Year-Old Children 
Zelazo and Reznick (1991, Exp. 1) examined the use of rules to sort cards by children aged 31, 33.5, and 36 
months. One task was a deductive card sort in which children were required to sort cards according to a single 
pair of rules. Two target cards were affixed to each of two boxes (e.g., a garden hose and a truck, and a bed and 
a chair), and children were told two rules for separating test cards, such as, "If it's something found inside the 
house, then it goes in this box. If it's something found outside the house, then it goes in that box." On each of 10 
test trials, children were shown a card (depicting items such as a snowman, a telephone, and a swing set), which 
was labeled at the basic level (e.g., "Here's a snowman,"), and they were asked, "Where does this go?" A 
knowledge task was identical to the sorting task except that instead of being asked to sort items on each trial, 
children were simply asked which rule's antecedent condition each item satisfied. For example, children were 
shown a card, told, "Here's a snowman," and asked, "Is it something found inside the house or is it found 
outside?" The two tasks employed the same rules and the same items, but they differed in the extent to which 
they required children to use their knowledge to execute the actions prescribed by the apodoses of the rules. 
There were two main findings. First, 3-year-olds performed equally well (and better than chance) on both tasks. 
Because successful responding was underdetermined by the nonlinguistic aspects of the task (e.g., the 
perceptual similarity of the exemplars), one can be confident that the children were representing the rules and 
using them to govern their behavior. In fact, in an additional, unpublished experiment, Zelazo and Reznick 
confirmed that when children were given the cards in the same procedure but not told specific rules, 3-year-olds 
failed to create the categories. 
 
In contrast to the 3-year-olds, children in the two younger age groups (31 and 33.5 months) failed to use the 
rules despite possessing knowledge about the cards (i.e., correctly answering questions such as, "Does this [a 
snowman] go inside the house or outside?"). Across a variety of categories, children in the two younger age 
groups performed better on the knowledge task than on the sorting task, indicating that they failed to use their 
knowledge in the service of the rules. A later study (Zelazo, Reznick, & Pinon, 1995, Exp. 1) found that 32- 
month-olds had difficulty even when (a) cards were labeled at the superordinate level (i.e., in terms of the rule; 
e.g., as "something found inside"), (b) children were reminded of the rules, and (c) children were rewarded for 
responding correctly. In one condition, 32month-old children were told, "Remember, inside things go here, 
outside things go there. Look, here's something that goes outside, which box does it go in?" and then given a 
sticker for correct responding. Surprisingly, children in this condition were still unable to use the rules 
systematically to sort the 10 test cards. Analyses of errors revealed a tendency to repeat responses. Although 
children rarely put all the cards into the same box, when they made an error, it usually involved putting a card 
into the box in which they had put a card on the previous trial. These results were interpreted as evidence that 
2.5-year-olds represented the rules at some level, and actually started to use them, but were susceptible to 
perseverative errors and ultimately failed to sort systematically. The ability to use a pair of rules seems to be 
acquired rapidly at the end of the third year of life. However, the DCCS revealed lingering limitations in 3-year-
olds' rule use. 
 
The Standard Version of the DCCS 
In the first study using what is now considered the standard version of the DCCS, Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai 
(1995, Exp. 2) gave 3- to 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds a task like the one illustrated in Figure 2. The procedure 
was as follows. Target cards were affixed to two trays. On each of 5 preswitch trials, the experimenter told 
children the rules for separating test cards by one dimension (e.g., color: "All the red ones go here, but all the 
blue ones go there."), showed children a card, and asked them, "Where does this go in the ____________ (e.g., 
color) game?" Children were required to place the card face down into one of the trays. When they had 
completed 5 trials, children were told to stop playing the first game and to switch to a new game. They were 
then given 5 postswitch trials involving the same test and target cards. The procedure for these trials was 
identical to that for the preswitch trials except that children were told the rules for sorting by the other 
dimension (e.g., shape). In addition to color and shape, children were also tested using other dimensions, such 
as color versus size, shape versus number, and size versus number. The order in which dimensions were 
presented (e.g., color first) was counterbalanced. 
All children were correct on the preswitch trials. Children were classified as passing the postswitch phase if 
they sorted correctly on at least 4 out 5 trials. Children who sorted the same number of cards incorrectly were 
classified as failing. All children could be classified by these criteria (and in 89% of the cases, children were 
correct or incorrect on all 5 trials). The majority (65%) of 3- to 4-year-olds failed, whereas the majority (75%) 
of 5-year-olds passed. When these same children were administered a second DCCS involving two different 
dimensions, the results were nearly identical (70% of 3- to 4-year-olds failing; 70% of 5-year-olds passing). 
This initial study also tested the complexity of the reasoning involved in the DCCS. In Experiment 3, preschool 
children were presented with three versions of a task based on Fischer and Bidell (1991). In one version, they 
were required to sort objects by a single dimension (e.g., red ones here, blue ones there). In another version, 
children were required to switch between dimensions, as in the DCCS (e.g., sorting objects first by color and 
then by shape). Finally, in the third version, children were required to sort using two dimensions simultaneously 
(e.g., locate an object by both shape and color in a 2 x 2 matrix; cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 1964). Results revealed 
that the three versions were ordered in difficulty, with matrix classification being the most difficult (as predicted 
by CCC theory, but not, for example, relational complexity theory). 
Experimental Manipulations of the Standard DCCS 
In several subsequent studies, researchers modified aspects of the standard DCCS in an effort to discover the 
determinants of 3 - to 4-yearolds' difficulty. Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus (1996, Exp. 1) asked 3 - to 4-yearolds who 
were perseverating on the preswitch rules questions designed to determine whether they understood what they 
were supposed to be doing. For example, children who were supposed to be sorting by shape were asked, 
"Where do the boats go in the shape game? And where do the rabbits go?" Almost invariably, children 
answered these knowledge questions correctly, pointing to the correct box. Nonetheless, when children were 
told to go ahead and sort the cards according to these rules ("Okay, good, now play the shape game: Where does 
this rabbit go?"), nearly all of them perseverated (e.g., they sorted by color). In other words, children correctly 
answered an explicit question about the new rules, showing that they knew these rules in some sense, but then 
they immediately persisted in using the old ones. This finding makes it unlikely that perseveration on the DCCS 
can be attributed to the use of specific rule representations that are less than fully explicit. That is, this finding 
would seem to indicate that 3- to 4-yearolds persistently select inappropriate rules despite conscious, 
verbalizable knowledge of both the pre- and postswitch rules. 
This study also showed that 3- to 4-year-olds perseverated even after a single preswitch trial (Zelazo, Frye, & 
Rapus, 1996, Exp. 2), which makes it unlikely (although not impossible) that their difficulty was in inhibiting 
an overlearned pattern of responding or in overcoming latent memory traces. Further experiments revealed 
perseveration even when verbal rather than manual responses were required (Exps. 3 & 4), which suggests that 
children's inflexibility can be observed in multiple modalities (i.e., it is not dependent on a particular type of 
motor persistence; Luria, 1961). In one experiment (Exp. 4), familiar figurines were attached to each of the 
boxes and the boxes were labeled as "Ernie's box" and "Big Bird's box." Children were told rules such as, "If it's 
red, then you have to put it over here in Ernie's box; blue ones go there in Big Bird's box." Then they were 
presented with a test card, which was labeled by the relevant dimension only, and they were asked, "Whose box 
does this go in?" Children were asked to place their hands on hand prints (to prevent manual responding) and to 
refer to the boxes by name only. Nearly all children failed to switch. These same children, however, answered 
knowledge questions correctly. This produced exchanges between experimenter and child in which the 
experimenter would ask, "Whose box do the rabbits go in, in the shape game?"; the child would answer, 
"Ernie's"; the experimenter would say, "Okay, now, play the shape game. Here's a red rabbit. Whose box does 
this go in, in the shape game?"; and the child would say, "Big Bird's." 
Jacques, Zelazo, Kirkham, and Semcesen (1999) sought to determine more directly whether 3- to 4-year-olds' 
inflexibility on the DCCS, coupled with their success on the knowledge questions, could be attributed to lack of 
response control—difficulty inhibiting an overlearned motor response. Instead of having children sort cards 
themselves, these authors created a Puppet version of the DCCS in which they asked children to evaluate the 
sorting of a puppet on the DCCS. Thus, the response execution requirement was removed from the task 
altogether, so there was no overlearned motor response to inhibit. Results indicated clearly that when 3- to 4- 
year-olds watched the puppet perseverate, they judged the puppet to be correct. When they saw the puppet sort 
correctly, they judged the puppet to be wrong. They also judged the puppet to be wrong when the puppet 
switched sorting rules gratuitously (i.e., incorrectly in the absence of being told to do so). Moreover, children's 
judgements of the puppet were highly correlated with their own performance on the DCCS. These findings 
show that 3- to 4-year-olds have difficulty formulating what should be done and not just difficulty doing it. Poor 
response inhibition cannot account for the findings from the Puppet version, although it remains possible that 3- 
to 4-year-olds have difficulty inhibiting attention to particular aspects of the target cards (e.g., Kirkham et al., in 
press). 
A study by Munakata and Yerys (2001) also speaks to the question of response inhibition. Munakata and Yerys 
sought to explore further the nature of the knowledge-action dissociation observed by Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus 
(1996). On the surface, this dissociation would seem to suggest that children intend to sort by the postswitch 
rules and simply fail to act on the basis of their intention—a failure of response control. As Munakata and Yerys 
noted, however, the knowledge questions only make reference to the relevant dimension (e.g., "Where do the 
trucks go in the shape game?"), whereas the test cards possess both dimensions, and hence require children to 
select postswitch rules as against preswitch rules. When the knowledge questions were made more complex 
(e.g., "Where do the red trucks go in the shape game?"), 3- to 4-year-olds often had difficulty on the knowledge 
questions too (and hence, there was no dissociation between knowledge and action). This finding demonstrates 
limits to children's knowledge in the postswitch phase, and it shows that it is the complexity of the inferences 
required that is important, not the modality of the required responses. 
Towse, Redbond, Houston-Price, and Cook (2000) also tested children's performance on modified versions of 
the DCCS. In Experiments 1 and 2, the experimenter not only explained the postswitch rules, but also 
demonstrated them by sorting test cards. This change to the procedure appeared to scaffold 3- to 4-year-olds' 
use of the postswitch rules, resulting in improved performance. In contrast, in Experiment 3, no 
demonstration was provided, and children 42 months and younger frequently failed. Children's difficulty with 
the postswitch phase of the DCCS evidently consists in formulating what to do on the basis of verbal 
information (i.e., the postswitch rules) alone. 
Experiment 4 of the study by Towse et al. (2000) yielded particularly interesting results. In this experiment, 
children who failed the postswitch phase of the standard version were encouraged (one way or another) to 
label the test cards correctly. That is, these children were shown a test card, and asked, "What is this?" If 
they 
did not answer in terms of the postswitch dimension only, then they were asked a specific contrast question (for 
example), "Is it a red card or a green card?" Some of these children (about 40%) answered the first question in 
terms of the postswitch dimension only, and the remaining children correctly answered the specific contrast 
question. All children were then asked to sort, and roughly a third of them now sorted correctly. According to 
these authors, most 3- to 4-year-olds fail to sort correctly during the postswitch phase because they think of the 
card in terms of its preswitch attributes (Towse et al., 2000, p. 361), an interpretation also proposed by Frye 
(1999, p. 123) and Zelazo and Frye (1997, p. 145). 
Kirkham et al. (in press) also found that when required to label the stimuli, 3- to 4-year-olds (who normally 
failed) tended to pass (78% of 3- to 4-year-olds passed), and when cards were left face up in the sorting trays (as 
opposed to the usual practice of putting them face down), 4-year-olds (who normally passed) tended to fail. The 
authors suggested that these two manipulations helped and hindered (respectively) children's efforts to inhibit 
attention to a previously useful aspect of the stimulus, and refocus on another, conflicting aspect of the same 
stimulus. Leaving the test cards face-up may have increased the salience of the preswitch dimension, whereas 
labeling the test cards may have helped children to refocus their attention to the currently relevant dimension. 
In a final study to be considered, Perner and Lang (2002; see also Brooks, Hanauer, Padowska, & Rosman, 
2003) found that children performed well on two new versions of the DCCS. In one version, called the Reversal 
Shift version, all cards (test and target) varied only in shape, and children were not, in fact, required to make a 
"dimensional change." Rather, children were first asked to play the "correct" animals game ("All the horses go 
to the horse. And all the fish go to the fish."), and then, during the postswitch phase, children were asked to play 
the "wrong" game ("Now, all the horses go to the fish. And all the fish go to the horse."). These authors also 
found that children performed well in a version of the DCCS in which (a) no target cards were used, and (b) the 
switch was explained in terms of a change in desires. Instead of target cards, each sorting tray was associated 
with a picture of a boy or a girl. During the preswitch phase, each target character was described as wanting all 
the cards of a particular color (e.g., "The girl wants all the green ones"). Then, during the postswitch phase, 
children were asked to switch from sorting by color to sorting by shape, and this switch was justified by a 
change in the children's desires (e.g., "The girl now wants all the fish."). To account for their findings, Perner 
and Lang (2002) suggested that their new versions of the DCCS provide more explicit clues than the standard 
version to the fact that an alternative description is required. 
Correlational Studies 
A growing number of studies have found that performance on the DCCS is correlated with individual and group 
differences. For example, several studies, starting with Frye et al. (1995), have found that performance on the 
DCCS is correlated with performance on tasks assessing theory of mind (e.g., understanding false beliefs), even 
when controlling for age and vocabulary (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner et al., 2002). These findings 
support the suggestion that the DCCS provides a marker of relatively domain-general aspects of executive 
function. 
Similar results have also been found in studies with clinical samples known to have impairments in theory of 
mind and executive function. Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, and Frye (2002) found relations between executive 
function (including DCCS performance) and autism in a small group of moderately high functioning individuals 
with autism-spectrum disorders. Colvert, Custance, and Swettenham (2002) replicated this finding in a larger 
sample, and also found that this group exhibited impairments on the DCCS (and theory of mind) relative to two 
mental-age matched comparison groups. Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, and Frye (1996) reported similar findings 
for a group of individuals with Down syndrome, suggesting that correlations between theory of mind and 
performance on the DCCS are robust across a range of individual and group differences, and that several 
different types of developmental disorder may result in impaired executive function as measured by the DCCS. 
Finally, a study by Bialystok (1999) suggests that performance on the DCCS tasks may be related to 
bilingualism. In this study, a group of Chinese-English bilingual children (tested in Toronto) were better at the 
DCCS than were non-Chinese monolingual children, although the basis for this advantage remains to be 
determined. One possibility considered by Bialystok is that experience switching between different languages 
improves children's cognitive control. 
THE CURRENT STUDIES 
The CCC theory and the various alternative theories of the development of executive function make different 
predictions about the circumstances in which perseveration on the DCCS ought to occur. The present studies 
subject several predictions to an empirical test by presenting 3- to 4year-old children with different, 
experimental versions of the DCCS. Study 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that 3- to 4-year-olds' poor 
performance on the standard version of the DCCS can be attributed to limitations on short-term or working 
memory. In three experiments, children were given new versions of the DCCS in which they were told to match 
test cards to four target cards according to four separate criteria (either 4 colors, 2 shapes and 2 colors, or 4 
superordinate rules). Thus, these versions required children to use the same total number of rules as in the 
standard version, but the rules were not in conflict in the sense that children did not need to apply different rules 
to the same stimulus under different circumstances. Consequently, according to CCC theory, because these new 
versions do not require the use of a higher order rule they should be easy for 3- to 4-year-olds. Contrary to what 
would be expected if perseveration resulted from memory capacity limitations alone, children performed 
remarkably well on all three new versions. It may also be noted that one of these versions required sorting by 
bidimensional rules (2 shape rules and 2 color rules), so bidimensionality per se does not appear to be the source 
of children's difficulty either. 
Study 2 was designed both to sharpen our understanding of the circumstances in which 3- to 4-year-olds 
perseverate on the DCCS and to explore more directly the role of conflict among rules. To this end, three 
experiments examined the roles of rule dimensionality (bidimensional vs. unidimensional) and various stimulus 
characteristics (one vs. two test cards; integrated vs. separated stimuli) that might be expected to affect task 
difficulty. In these experiments, bidimensional rules always involved conflict among rules, whereas 
unidimensional rules did not. Results revealed an effect of rule dimensionality qua conflict among rules, but 
not the stimulus characteristics tested. These experiments also showed that 3- to 4-year-olds were able to treat a 
single stimulus in two different ways when doing so did not require consideration of two different dimensions. 
Study 3 examined further what types of conflict pose problems for 3- to 4-year-olds by asking what it is that 
children are perseverating on when they perseverate on the standard version of the DCCS. According to the 
CCC theory, children perseverate on a pair of rules such as, "Red ones go here; blue ones go there." That is, 
children represent and continue to use the preswitch rules even though they know the postswitch rules. 
Alternatively, children could perseverate on the preswitch dimension per se (e.g., they may attend selectively to 
the color of the stimuli while ignoring shape), or they could perseverate in their responses to particular stimulus 
configurations (e.g., putting the red boat in the left-hand box). Results showed that children often perseverated 
on a Partial Change version in which only the values of the dimension that was relevant on the preswitch phase 
were retained during the postswitch phase (e.g., children sorted red and blue rabbits and boats by color during 
the preswitch phase, and red and blue flowers and cars by shape during the postswitch phase). In contrast, they 
usually did not perseverate in a Total Change version in which values of both dimensions were changed on the 
postswitch phase (e.g., children sorted red and blue rabbits and boats by color during the preswitch phase, and 
yellow and green flowers and cars by shape during the postswitch phase). These findings suggest that children 
exhibit effects of conflict at the level of specific rules (e.g., "If it is red, then put it there."), consistent with the 
hypothesis that the preswitch rules are activated when selected during the preswitch phase and that this 
activation persists during the postswitch phase, creating a bias toward their selection and use. 
 
Study 4 was designed to replicate these findings and consider whether negative priming, in addition to 
persistent activation of the preswitch rules, contributes to children's difficulty on the DCCS. Focusing on the 
relevant rules during the preswitch phase may result in inhibition of the competing rules (i.e., what will become 
the postswitch rules). As a consequence, the activation level of the postswitch rules may be suppressed below 
their baseline level during the postswitch phase and resist activation. Experiment 8 examined performance on a 
Negative Priming version of the DCCS, in which the values of the dimension that was relevant during the 
preswitch phase are removed during the postswitch phase (e.g., if children were required to sort red rabbits and 
blue boats according to color in the preswitch phase, they might be required to sort green rabbits and yellow 
boats according to shape in the postswitch phase). This version would allow negative priming, but not 
activation, of the preswitch rules to interfere with postswitch performance. Results indicated that the Negative 
Priming version was as difficult as the standard version, as would be predicted if the postswitch rules are 
negatively primed during the preswitch phase. Conversely, however, negative priming alone cannot account for 
children's difficulty on the Partial Change version because in this version the values of the dimension that was 
irrelevant during the preswitch phase (i.e., the values that would be negatively primed) are removed during the 
postswitch phase. Experiment 9 replicated this finding and also suggested that negative priming depends on the 
active selection of one pair of rules against a competing alternative. 
A summary of these experiments, describing the different versions and the results obtained, is presented in the 
Appendix. Considered together, the results of these experiments provide the basis for a revision of the CCC 
theory. This revised theory is designed to specify more clearly the circumstances in which children will have 
difficulty using rules at various levels of complexity, to provide a more detailed account of how to determine 
the complexity of rules required in a task, to take account of the simultaneous processes of activation and 
inhibition, and to underscore the importance of taking intentionality seriously in the study of executive function. 
This revised theory is described in Chapter VI. 
A NOTE REGARDING THE STANDARD VERSION 
In the experiments reported in this Monograph, the effects of various experimental manipulations were assessed 
by comparing 3- to 4-year-olds' performance on new versions of the DCCS to their performance on the standard 
version. In order to control for certain aspects of the new versions, changes were sometimes made to the values 
of parameters on the standard version. When a defining feature of the standard version was changed, this 
change was reflected in the name of the version. Otherwise, if changes were made to parameters that do not 
appear (on the basis of previous research) to affect performance, then the parameter settings were simply noted. 
The defining features of the standard version are the following: (a) There are two target cards and two test 
cards. (b) Target cards and test cards both vary along two bivalent dimensions, such that the two target cards 
mismatch on both dimensions, as do the two test cards. (Consequently, each test card matches one target card 
on one dimension and the other target card on the other dimension.) (c) The same test and target cards are used 
throughout the task. (d) Target cards are displayed throughout the task. (e) Children are told the rules on every 
trial. (f) On the preswitch phase, children are provided with two demonstration trials, designed to show children 
how to place the test cards. (g) Test cards are sorted face down into the sorting trays. (h) Children are not given 
feedback on any test trials (they are simply told, "Let's do another."). (i) Children are told explicitly when to 
switch. (j) There are no demonstration trials on the postswitch phase. (k) Test cards are not removed from 
sorting trays between the pre- and postswitch phases. 
The following parameters are free to vary, but default values are noted: (a) The dimensions used may include 
color, shape, number, size, or pattern, among others. However, most studies have used color versus shape 
because these two dimensions appear to be approximately equally salient. That is, children generally do not 
show an a priori bias to sort by one dimension versus the other. (b) Equal numbers of pre- and postswitch 
trials are generally used, and these numbers have ranged from 1 to 10, although the modal value is 5. (c) Test 
cards may be labeled either by both dimensions or by the relevant dimension only. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
For each experiment, the results section is structured as followed. First, possible effects of stimulus type, sorting 
dimension, order, and gender were examined, using parametric and nonparametric analyses. Second, parametric 
analyses (e.g., analyses of variance [ANOVAs], independent t-tests, paired samples t-tests) were used to 
examine differences in performance on different versions of the DCCS. Third, because scores on the postswitch 
phase of the DCCS are usually bimodally distributed (i.e., children are often either correct on all postswitch 
trials or incorrect on all postswitch trials), children were classified as passing or failing the postswitch phase, 
and nonparametric tests (i.e., chi-square tests) were used to examine whether the number of children passing or 
failing differed for different versions of the DCCS. 
 
II. STUDY 1: MEMORYAND EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Three experiments explored the role of memory in children's executive function by asking whether 3- to 4-year-
olds' errors on the DCCS can be attributed to age-related limitations on memory. According to several theories, 
the development of short-term, working, or active memory is an important constraint on the development of 
executive function. If 3- to 4-year-olds fail to use the postswitch rules simply because they cannot remember 
four rules (i.e., the 2 postswitch rules in addition to the 2 preswitch rules), or keep the postswitch rules in active 
memory, then they should perform poorly on any version of the DCCS task that requires the use of four rules 
even those that do not require the formulation of a higher order rule and do not require the same test cards to be 
sorted in two different ways. In contrast, according to CCC theory, children should only have difficulty in cases 
where the same test card must be sorted first by one dimension and then by another because it is only under 
these circumstances that a dimension must serve as a setting condition and children must use a higher order rule 
first to select the appropriate setting condition and then to select the appropriate rule. In the absence of conflict 
among rules, all four can be represented at the same level in a hierarchy (see Figure 5). 
In Experiment 1, the performance of 3-year-old children was examined on three versions of the DCCS: the 
standard version, a 4-Rules (unidimensional) version, and a 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version. The two new 
versions were similar to the standard version in that four rules was presented to children. However, because the 
rules were unidimensional, the same test card did not need to be treated differently depending on which 
dimension was relevant (i.e., there was no conflict among the rules). As will be seen, the large majority of 
children performed well on the two modified versions, even though they typically failed to switch when 
performing on the standard version. 
Experiment 2 was designed to address the possibility that the two new versions used in Experiment 1 did not, in 
fact, require children to hold four rules in mind, and hence did not tax children's memory to the same extent as 
the standard version. It could be argued that rather than remember four rules, children really only needed to 
remember which dimension (shape or color) was relevant. To test this, another group of children was given a 2 
+ 2- Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version, in which they were required to sort two test cards by color and 
two different test cards by shape.  
 
This version required children to remember which test cards to sort by shape and which test cards to sort by 
color. Moreover, as in the standard version, children were asked to switch from sorting by one dimension to 
sorting by the other. However, as in the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version, there was no conflict among the 
rules, so, according to CCC theory, no higher order rule was required. As predicted by CCC theory, most 
children performed well on this version. 
 
Experiment 3 addressed the question of memory demand in a different way. In this experiment, children were 
given a new 4-Rules version, called the 4-Rules (superordinate) version, that required using four superordinate 
rules (described functionally: things that can walk, things one can wear, things one can ride, and things one can 
eat) to sort a heterogeneous series of items (e.g., a jacket, a truck, a fried egg). It was expected that the memory 
demand in the 4-Rules (superordinate) version would be even greater than that in the 4-Rules versions used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 because in the 4-Rules (superordinate) version children not only needed to keep four 
superordinate distinctions in mind, but they also need to determine which rule applied to each test card (i.e., 
there were storage plus processing demands). Nonetheless, because there was no conflict among the rules, this 
new version was expected to be relatively easy for 3- to 4-year-olds. As predicted, children performed better on 
the 4-Rules (superordinate) version than they did on the standard version of the DCCS. Clearly, children's 
difficulty with the standard version cannot be attributed in any straightforward way to a constraint on memory 
capacity. Instead, children seem to have difficulty when required to select among conflicting rules. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to assess the possibility that 3- to 4-year-olds fail the postswitch phase because they 
simply cannot keep the postswitch rules in mind. Two new versions of the DCCS were created: a 4-Rules 
(unidimensional) version and a 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version (see Figure 6). The new versions were 
similar to the standard version in that the same number of rules was presented to children (four rules in total) 
but different from the standard version insofar as there was no conflict among the rules. 
In the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version, children were told four rules and required to use them to sort a series 
of test cards by one dimension (e.g., color: "If it's blue it goes here, if it's orange it goes here, if it's white it goes 
here, and if it's brown it goes here."). The 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version was identical to the 4-Rules 
(unidimensional) version in all respects except that, although children were told four rules, they were only 
required to use two at a time, as in the standard version. This feature of the procedure was designed to 
correspond to the fact that in the standard version children first used one pair of rules and then used another, in a 
serial fashion. 
If children's difficulty with the standard version of the DCCS is one of limited memory capacity, then children 
should perform poorly on all three versions used in this experiment. However, if children's difficulty consists in 
using higher order rules, then they should fail only on the standard version, in which the two pairs of rules are in 
conflict. 
Method 
Participants and design. The sample comprised forty-one 3- to 4-yearolds (M = 42.2 months, range: 33 to 48 
months; 20 girls and 21 boys). Four additional children were tested but excluded from the final sample, either 
because of experimenter error (n = 1), refusal to complete the experiment (n = 2), or information from their 
daycare supervisor that the child was developmentally delayed (n = 1). Children were of mixed socioeconomic 
and ethnic backgrounds, although this information was not systematically collected. 
As in all of the experiments to be described, children were recruited from local daycare centers or from a 
database containing the names of parents who had expressed an interest in participating in research. Parents 
were provided with a written description of the experiment, and they granted informed consent allowing their 
children to participate. 
 
All children received three versions of the DCCS in a counterbalanced order: the standard version, the 4-Rules 
(unidimensional) version, and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version. In the standard version, children were 
first told rules for sorting according to one dimension (e.g., color) and then asked to switch and sort by the other 
dimension (e.g. shape). In the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version, 
children were only required to sort by one dimension (shape or color). Across versions, this yielded four phases 
(one each for the 4-Rules and 2+2-Rules versions and two for the standard version). Children were always 
required to sort by the alternate dimension on successive phases, with roughly half of the children starting with 
shape (e.g., shape, color, shape, color) and the remaining children starting with color. Thus, in the 4-Rules 
(unidimensional) and 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) versions, roughly half of the children were told to sort by 
shape and the remaining children were told to sort by color. In the standard version, roughly half of the children 
were first told to sort by color, and the remaining children were first told to sort by shape. 
Materials. As in previous studies (e.g., Frye et al., 1995), the items that children sorted were 10.75 cm x 7 cm 
color drawings on laminated cards. There were three sets of cards (see Table 1). A different set was used for 
each version, and the particular card set used was counterbalanced. Card set 1 included red, lime-green, black, 
and purple animals (rabbit, cat, dog, and monkey). Card set 2, included blue, orange, white, and brown vehicles 
(boat, bus, car, and plane). Card set 3 included pink, grey, dark green, and yellow household items (telephone, 
stove, table, television). Colors were chosen to be clearly discriminable within a set. 
Target cards were affixed to small sorting trays that were 11.5 cm long, 9.5 cm wide, and 2 cm deep. Small 
shelves above and behind each tray supported the target cards and allowed them to be displayed throughout the 
task. 
 
Procedure. Testing took place in a quiet area at children's day care center or in a university laboratory, and all 
procedures were videotaped. All children were tested individually in one 20- to 25-minute session. Children 
were given 5-minute breaks between the tasks in order to minimize any interference or carryover effects. After 
children were seated at the table and were comfortable with the experimenter and the setting, the experimenter 
told the children a set of rules for separating the test cards. 
In the standard version, two examples from a particular category (e.g., the brown car and the white plane from 
the vehicle category; see Table 1) were chosen as target cards and affixed to the two sorting trays. During the 
preswitch phase, children were first told one pair of rules (i.e., shape rules or color rules) for separating the test 
cards, which consisted of 10 white cars and 10 brown planes. Children who sorted by color during the 
preswitch phase were told: "If it's brown put it here, but if it's white put it there." In the course of explaining the 
game, the rules were stated repeatedly in different ways. For example, children were told, "All the ________ go 
here," "If it's __________ then it goes here," and "Only ____________ go here." 
 
The experimenter then sorted one test card face-down into each tray to illustrate what children were supposed to 
do. After these demonstration trials, preswitch test trials commenced. On each preswitch trial, the 
experimenter stated the relevant rules, randomly selected a test card, labeled the card by both color and shape 
(i.e., vehicle type; e.g., the experimenter said, "Here's a brown plane"), and asked, "Where does this go?" 
Children were required to place the card face-down in one of the trays. No feedback was provided; after 
children sorted each card, the experimenter simply said, "Let's do another one," and then proceeded to the 
next trial. Children sorted 10 cards in this manner. 
After the preswitch trials, children were told to switch to a different pair of rules (e.g., shape rules) for 
separating the remaining 10 test cards. The preswitch test cards were left in the sorting trays, but the transition 
to the new rules was marked explicitly by saying, for example, "Now we're going to play a new game. We're 
not going to play the color game anymore. No way. This game is different." The experimenter then told children 
the postswitch rules. No demonstration trial was provided during the postswitch phase. Postswitch trials were 
exactly like preswitch trials except that on each trial the experimenter stated the postswitch rules instead of the 
preswitch rules. 
The 4-Rules (unidimensional) version was identical to the standard version except that four target cards were 
displayed and children were told four rules for sorting all 20 test cards. For example, children who were 
required to sort colored animals according shape (i.e., type of animal) were told: "If it's a rabbit it goes here, if 
it's a cat it goes here, if it's a dog it goes here, and if it's a monkey it goes here." Also, during the 
demonstration trials, the experimenter sorted one test card face-down into each of the four trays (instead of 
just two). 
The 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version was identical to the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version except for the 
order in which test cards were presented. As in the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version, children were shown four 
target cards and on each trial they were told four rules for sorting the 20 test cards according to one dimension 
(color or shape). However, the first 10 test cards that children were required to sort all corresponded to two of 
the four rules. The second half of the test cards all corresponded to the remaining two rules. For example, in the 
household objects category, children told to sort by color might first be shown 10 pink and grey test cards, and 
then be shown 10 yellow and (dark) green test cards, which corresponded to the pre- and postswitch phases of 
the standard version. No demonstration trial was provided after the first 10 trials. 
Results 
Performance on all versions was scored as the number of trials on which children sorted correctly. In contrast to 
the standard version, the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version do not 
have two phases. In order to compare children's performance on the different versions, separate scores were 
computed for the first and last 10 trials of each task. Preswitch trials of the standard version were thus included 
in the analysis, even though children generally perform well on those trials. By using both pre- and postswitch 
trials of the standard version, performance on the different tasks could be compared without imposing an 
arbitrary scoring criterion for the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version. 
Separating children's performance into two halves made it possible to examine whether children's performance 
on the second half of the standard version was significantly worse than their performance on the second halves 
of the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version. In addition, separation of 
children's performance into two halves made it possible to examine practice effects and the role of fatigue in the 
4-Rules (unidimensional) version and the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version. 
Group analyses. Examination of the data indicated that some of the cells created by crossing dimension order 
(color or shape first) with half (first vs. second half of each task) had no variance. Therefore, to assess the effect 
of dimension order, data were collapsed across levels of half. A two-way (Version x Dimension Order) 
ANOVA on number correct revealed no significant effect of order and no Version x Dimension Order 
interaction. Therefore, dimension order was excluded from subsequent analyses. 
A three-way mixed ANOVA with sex as a between-subject variable and version and half as within-subjects 
variables revealed a main effect of version, F(2, 78) = 16.27, p <.0001 (effect size f = .65), a main effect of half, 
F(1, 39) = 47.47,p < .0001 (effect size f = 1.10), and a Version x Half interaction, F(2, 78) = 53.7, p <.0001. 
There were no other significant effects. (Note: Due to departures from homogeneity of variance, probability 
values were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.) The Version x Half interaction was analyzed by 
examining the simple effects of half separately for each version. As expected, the effect of half was significant 
for the standard version, F(1, 39) = 54.36, p < .0001 (effect size f = 1.18); children performed poorly on the 
second half of the task. The difference between first and second half approached significance for the 4-Rules 
version, F(1, 39) = 3.72, p <.07 (effect size f = .31), indicating that children performed slightly better on the 
second half of the task for this version. Children's mean scores and standard errors on each half of the tasks are 
depicted graphically in the first six bars in Figure 7. 
Furthermore, a 2 x 3 ANOVA with sex as between-subjects variable, version as within-subjects variable, and 
performance in the second test half as dependent measure revealed a significant effect for version, F(2, 78) = 
40.16, p < .001 (effect size f = 1.01). Newman-Keuls post hoc tests (p <.05) indicated that children performed 
worse on the standard version (M = 1. 85, SD = 3.66) than on both the 4-Rules version (M = 9.02, SD = 2.47), 
p <.05, and the 2+2-Rules version (M = 8.15, SD = 3.58), p < .05. The latter two versions did not differ from 
each other. A similar 2 x 3 ANOVA, with sex as a between-subjects variable, version as within-subjects 
variable, and performance in the first test half as dependent measure did not reveal any significant effects. 
 
Five children (out of 41; i.e., 12.2%) failed to sort at least 8 of 10 cards correctly on the preswitch phase of the 
standard version. Eight of 10 cards exceeds the number that would be expected based on random responding 
(binomial distribution, p < .05). Two of these children showed a clear bias by putting all 10 cards in one of the 
two boxes, the other three sorted the cards on the wrong dimension (e.g., color instead of shape). Because these 
children failed the preswitch phase of the standard version, their performance on the postswitch phase was 
difficult to interpret, and comparisons with the other two versions were compromised. When analyses were 
repeated excluding these five children (i.e., with N = 36), the same pattern of results emerged, except that there 
was no effect of half for the 4-Rules (unidimensional) version. 
Individual analyses. For children who passed the preswitch phase of the standard version, success on all 
versions was defined as at least 8 out of the last 10 cards sorted correctly. The probability of success based on 
random responding was even lower for the 4-Rules (unidimensional) and 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) versions 
than it was for the standard version (i.e., there was a .25 probability of sorting correctly by chance on any given 
trial vs. a .5 probability). Hence, the criterion of 8 provided a more conservative estimate of children's 
performance on these versions. 
On the standard version, only two children (out of 36) performed better than would be expected based on 
random responding; for the 4-Rules (unidimensional) and 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) versions the numbers of 
children were 34 and 31, respectively. Twenty-eight of the 36 children (78%) showed a characteristic pattern of 
performance: They succeeded (i.e., performed better than chance) on the two modified versions and failed the 
standard version. 
Discussion 
Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Frye et al., 1995; Jacques et al., 1999; Zelazo et al., 1996), the majority 
of 3- to 4-year-olds in this study perseverated on the preswitch rules in the standard version of the DCCS. 
However, these same children succeeded on two new versions in which children were told four rules 
simultaneously but the rules were not in conflict. These findings suggest that children's difficulty with the 
standard version of the DCCS cannot be attributed in a straightforward fashion to a constraint on memory 
capacity, and hence memory development may not be the primary determinant of the development of executive 
function. 
Several aspects of the experiment require further explanation, however. For example, although the three 
versions were reasonably well matched in that all required the children to use four rules to sort a series of 20 
test cards, the standard version differed from the other two versions in at least two ways. First, only the standard 
version contained conflicting rules. That is, in the standard version, but not the other two versions, the same test 
cards had to be sorted one way according to one pair of rules (e.g., the preswitch rules) and a different way 
according to the other pair (the postswitch rules). According to the CCC theory, this is the key difference 
between versions, because it is this feature of the standard version that makes it necessary to use a higher order 
rule (i.e., children must first select the appropriate rule pair before deciding which particular rule applies to the 
test card). 
The standard version also differed from the other two versions in that the rules in the standard version were 
bidimensional (i.e., two of the rules were based on color and two were based on shape), whereas in the 4-Rules 
and 2+2-Rules versions the rules were unidimensional. It is possible that bidimensionality per se poses a 
problem for children. Moreover, because the rules were unidimensional in the two new versions, it is possible 
that children did not, in fact, need to keep four rules in mind on these versions. Rather, children may simply 
have needed to remember the relevant dimension, and then deduce what went where in a given trial. 
To address this concern, two additional versions of the DCCS were created. In Experiment 2, a group of 3- to 4- 
year-olds was given a 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version of the task in which they were shown four 
target cards and asked to sort test cards first by two rules based on shape and then by two rules based on color. 
In this version, children needed to remember which cards to sort by shape and which cards to sort by color, but 
they still did not need to use a higher order rule because each test card was uniquely associated with a single 
rule. In Experiment 3, a different approach was used to increase the likelihood that children would need to keep 
four rules in mind. In this experiment, a group of 3- to 4-year-olds was given a 4-Rules (superordinate) version, 
in which they were told four relatively abstract, superordinate rules for sorting a heterogeneous series of 
test cards. It was expected that children would need to remember the rules and deduce on each trial which 
rule applied to each test card (cf. Zelazo & Reznick, 1991). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, a new group of 3- to 4-year-olds was given a 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version of 
the DCCS. In this version, children were required to sort conflicting test cards according to two color rules and 
two shape rules, but the shape rules and color rules did not overlap. Thus, children were shown four target 
cards: a blue rabbit, a red boat, a green flower, and a yellow car. They were told two rules for sorting by one 
dimension (e.g., color) and two rules for sorting by the other (e.g., shape; see Figure 8). In particular, children 
were told, "If it's blue it goes there, if it's red it goes there, if it's a flower it goes there, and if it's a car it goes 
there." On the first 10 test trials, they were asked to sort five blue boats and five red rabbits. On the second 10 
test trials, they were asked to sort five yellow flowers and five green cars. Notice that, as in the standard 
version, all test cards would be sorted differently if one were sorting by shape or by color. Also, children were 
asked to switch from sorting by one dimension to sorting by the other. However, any particular test card did not 
need to be treated differently depending on the game being played, so, according to CCC theory, no higher 
order rule was required. 
 
Method 
Participants. Sixteen 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 44.7 months; range: 37 to 50 months; 6 girls and 10 boys) were 
recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. None of these children had participated in Experiment 1. 
(Indeed, there was no overlap among participants in any of the experiments to be described except as noted 
in the Participants section of Experiment 6). 
Procedure. All children were administered the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version of the DCCS, 
which was administered in the same fashion as the 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) version in Experiment 1. 
Children were shown four target cards (a blue rabbit, a red boat, a green flower, and a yellow car), and told, "If 
it's blue it goes here, if it's red it goes there, if it's a flower it goes there, and if it's a car it goes there." The 
experimenter then sorted one test card face-down into each tray to illustrate what the children were supposed to 
do. On each trial, the experimenter stated the relevant rules, selected a test card, labeled the card by both color 
and shape, and asked children, "Where does this go?" The first 10 test trials included five blue boats and five 
red rabbits, presented in a random order (with the constraint that no more than two cards of the same type be 
presented in succession). The second 10 test trials included five yellow flowers and five green cars, presented in 
a similar fashion. The total procedure took approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. As in Experiment 1, performance was scored as the number of trials on which children sorted 
correctly, with separate scores for the first and last 10 trials. To assess the relative difficulty of the 2+2-Rules 
(bidimensional, no overlap) version, children's performance on this version was compared to children's 
performance on the standard version in Experiment 1. However, because the children in Experiment 2 were 
significantly older than the children in Experiment 1, this comparison was based only on data from the 35 
children in Experiment 1 who were older than 36 months (mean age = 43.34 months, SD = 2.64, which did not 
differ from the mean age of children from Experiment 2, t(49) = 1.32, p>.19). 
A paired sample t-test on scores from the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version showed that there was 
no significant difference between children's performance in the first (M= 9.3 1, SD= 2.50) and second half (M 
= 7.94, SD = 4.01) , t(15) = 1.08, p>.29 (see Figure 7). Next, children's performance on the 2+2-Rules 
(bidimensional, no overlap) version was compared with children's performance on the standard version from 
Experiment 1. A three-way mixed ANOVA with version (standard vs. 2+2 Rule) and sex as between-subjects 
variables and test half (first half vs. second half) as a within-subjects variable revealed significant effects of 
version, F(1, 47) = 42.21, p< .001 (effect size f = .95), and test half, F(1, 47) = 17.70, p<.001 (effect size f = 
.61), as well as an interaction between version and test half, F(1, 47) = 7.24, p < .05. The interaction was due to 
the fact that in the first half children performed equally well on both versions (standard version: M = 8.69, SD = 
2.96; 2+2-Rules [bidimensional, no overlap] version: M= 9.3 1, SD = 2.50), but in the second half, children 
performed poorly on the standard version (M = 2.17, SD = 3.88) and well on the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no 
overlap) version (M = 7.94, SD = 4.01). 
Individual analyses. As in Experiment 1, success on the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version was 
defined as 15 out of 20 cards sorted correctly. Thirteen (81%) of the 16 children in Experiment 2 succeeded on 
this version. All 3 children who failed sorted 10 cards correctly. Two of these children sorted by shape in both 
halves of the task, and the other child sorted by color in both halves. 
A chi-square test comparing performance on the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version to performance 
on the standard version in Experiment 1 showed that the numbers of children passing depended on the version, 
χ2(1, N = 51) = 18.21,p < .0001, with a greater proportion of children passing in the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, 
no overlap) version. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, the children performed well on the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version of the 
DCCS, which required them to sort some test cards by color and some test cards by shape. Compared to the 
standard version of the DCCS used in Experiment 1, significantly more children passed the 2+2-Rules 
(bidimensional, no overlap) version. 
Children's success on the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version supports the suggestion that memory 
limitations are not a primary determinant of children's difficulty with the DCCS. Moreover, the comparison of 
children's performance on this version with their performance on the standard version of the DCCS in 
Experiment 1 helps to isolate the source of children's difficulty on the standard version. These two versions 
were similar in that children were told a total of four rules, two for sorting by color and two for sorting by 
shape. In addition, in both versions, children were asked to switch from using two rules for sorting by one 
dimension to using two rules for sorting by the other. However, a key difference between the versions may be 
that in the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version, any particular test card did not need to be treated 
differently depending on the game being played. That is, there was no conflict among the rules. This issue is 
addressed further in Study 2. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the new versions all required children to sort a homogeneous series of test cards 
according to one dimension or another. Moreover, there were only one or two relevant dimensions (shape or 
color). It is possible, therefore, that these versions allowed children to chunk the information that they were 
required to remember, thereby reducing the demands on memory. Although it seems unlikely that the 
memory demands in the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version were lower than those in the standard 
version, Experiment 3 was conducted to address the question of memory limitations further, and in a different 
way. 
In Experiment 3, children were presented with a new version of the DCCS, the 4-Rules (superordinate) version, 
in which they were required to sort a relatively heterogeneous series of test cards according to four discrete 
superordinate categories. It was expected that the 4-Rules (superordinate) version would pose even greater 
memory demands than the new versions used in Experiments 1 and 2, and that children would not only need to 
remember the relevant rules but also make relatively difficult inferences to determine which rule was most 
appropriate for each test card. That is, in addition to a storage component, there was also a considerable 
processing component. Nonetheless, according to CCC theory, 3- to 4-year-olds should perform better on the 
4- Rules (superordinate) version than on the standard version of the DCCS because only the standard version of 
the DCCS requires the construction of a higher order rule. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 41.5 months; range: 37 to 47 months; 9 girls and 11 boys) were 
recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. An additional 3 children were tested but excluded from the 
final sample because they refused to complete the experiment (n = 1) or because of experimenter error (n = 2). 
Procedure. Each child received the standard version of the DCCS and a 4-Rules (superordinate) version, with 
half the children receiving the standard version first, and half receiving the 4-Rules (superordinate) version first. 
The standard version was exactly like the standard version in Experiment 1, except that on each trial, the 
experimenter labeled each test card by the relevant dimension only (e.g., "Here's a flower"). A yellow flower 
and a green boat were used as target cards, and green flowers and yellow boats were used as test cards. 
Dimension order was counter- balanced such that roughly half of the children within each version order were 
first told to sort by color. 
As in the 4-Rules versions used in Experiments 1 and 2, children in the 4-Rules (superordinate) version of the 
DCCS were shown four target cards and told four rules for sorting test cards. Target cards and test cards are 
shown in Table 2. 
The experimenter described each target card in terms of the functional, superordinate categories cited in the 
rules (i.e., things that can walk, things you can wear, things you can ride, and things you can eat). Then the 
experimenter pointed to each target card in turn and said, "Now we're going to play a card game. In this game, 
we put all the things that can walk over here [points to the dog]. If it is something that can walk, put it in this 
box. We put all the things you can wear over here [points to the sweater]. If it is something you can wear, put it 
in this box. We put all the things you can ride over here [points to the bus]. If it is something you 
can ride, put it in this box. We put all the things you can eat over here [points to the apple]. If it is something 
to eat, put it in this box." 
 
The experimenter then sorted one test card face-down into each tray to illustrate what children were supposed to 
do. After these demonstration trials, children received 20 test trials presented exactly like the 4-Rules version in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
The total procedure took approximately 15 minutes to administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of version order or dimension order, so these 
variables were excluded from subsequent analyses. In addition, all children performed perfectly on the first half 
of the standard version, so there was no variance in this cell. A two-way mixed ANOVA with sex as a between-
subjects variable and version (standard vs. 4-Rules [superordinate]) as a within-subjects variable was conducted 
on number of correct trials (out of 20). This analysis revealed that children sorted more cards correctly in the 4- 
Rules (superordinate) version (M = 17.25, SD = 4.98) than in the standard version (M = 14.3 5, SD = 4.64), 
F(1, 18) = 6.68, p< .05 (effect size f = .61). Similar results were found when only the last 10 trials were 
considered: children performed better on the second half of the 4-Rules (superordinate) version (M = 8.65, SD 
= 2.54) than they did on the second half of the standard version (M = 4.3 5, SD = 4.64), F(1, 18) = 17.22, 
p<.001 (effect size f = 1.05; see Figure 7). Finally, a Pearson correlation was used to determine that postswitch 
performance on the standard version was significantly related to overall performance in the 4-Rules 
(superordinate) version (r =.48, p< .05). 
Individual analyses. As in Experiments 1 and 2, children who sorted 15 or more cards on the standard version 
or the 4-Rules (superordinate) version were classified as passing. As shown in Table 3, more children failed the 
standard version than the 4-Rules (superordinate) version, χ2 (1, N = 20) = 4.09, p <.05. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 explored further the possibility that memory constraints are responsible for 3-year-old children's 
perseveration on the DCCS by comparing children's performance on the standard version to their performance 
on a new 4-Rules (superordinate) version. The 4-Rules (superordinate) version likely posed even greater 
memory demands than the previous 4-Rules versions because the rules were relatively abstract and the test 
cards were heterogeneous. Despite this, children performed significantly better on the 4-Rules (superordinate) 
version. This finding therefore provides further evidence against the suggestion that limitations on children's 
memory capacity play an important role in 3- to 4-year-olds' poor performance on the DCCS. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Study 1 involved three experiments that examined whether 3- to 4year-olds' errors on the DCCS can be 
attributed to age-related limitations on memory capacity. Several theories (e.g., Case, 1985, 1992; Gathercole, 
1998; Gordon & Olson, 1998; Morton & Munakata, 2002) suggest that age-related changes in short-term, 
active, or working memory are major determinants of children's performance on a wide variety of measures, 
including measures of executive function. In the DCCS, 3- to 4-year-olds may simply have difficulty keeping 
the postswitch rules in mind. Experiment 1 tested this memory account by comparing children's performance on 
the standard version of the DCCS to their performance on two new versions, the 4-Rules (unidimensional) and 
2+2-Rules (unidimensional) versions, that were similar to the standard version in that they required children to 
sort by four rules. If memory constraints are a major determinant of children's performance, then the two new 
versions should be at least as difficult as the standard version and possibly more difficult because children are 
told the four rules simultaneously. Results showed that performance was significantly worse in the standard 
version; indeed, most children failed the standard version but not the other two versions. 
Experiment 2 addressed the possibility that children did not really need to hold four rules in mind in order to 
succeed on the 4-Rules (unidimensional) and 2+2-Rules (unidimensional) versions. If children simply 
remembered the single relevant dimension, they could perhaps infer what went where in a given trial. In 
Experiment 2, children were given the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version, in which they were told 
to sort first by two rules based on one dimension (e.g., color) and then by two rules based on the other 
dimension (e.g., shape). In this version, children needed to remember which cards to sort by color and which 
cards to sort by shape. Results revealed that 3- to 4-year-olds performed well on the 2 + 2- Rules 
(bidimensional, no overlap) version. 
Experiment 3 presented children with the 4-Rules (superordinate) version, which likely posed even greater 
memory demands than the 4-Rules versions used in Experiments 1 and 2 because it involved superordinate rules 
and a heterogeneous series of test cards. Nonetheless, children performed significantly better on the 4-Rules 
(superordinate) version than on the standard version of the DCCS. Taken together, findings from the three 
experiments provide strong evidence against a memory account of performance on the DCCS. 
The findings also help isolate what may be a crucial determinant of difficulty. In each of the modified versions 
of the DCCS, there was no conflict among rules and children did not have to sort the same test card in two 
different ways. Because each test card was uniquely associated with a different rule, children arguably did not 
need to formulate and use a higher order rule for selecting among conflicting rules. The findings are thus 
consistent with the CCC theory, according to which it is higher order rule use and not memory that poses a 
problem for 3- to 4-year-olds. 
In a similar vein, using the Day-Night Stroop task, Diamond and colleagues (Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 
2002; Gerstadt et al., 1994) have also shown that it is the conflict between rules and not memory demands that 
creates difficulty for 3- to 4-year-olds. In the Day-Night Stroop task, children were instructed to say "day" when 
shown a line drawing of the moon and stars, and "night" when shown a line drawing of the sun. Gerstadt et al. 
found that 3-year-old children generally failed to comply with the task instructions, and that performance 
improved between 3.5 and 7 years (the percentage correct increased from 71 % correct to 92% correct). By 
contrast, 3- to 4-year-old children had few difficulties in a control condition in which children were instructed to 
say "day" and "night" in response to abstract line drawings; performance was already very good (91 % correct) 
by age 3.5 years. 
Although the findings reported in Study 1 suggest that 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty on the DCCS cannot be 
attributed to limitations on memory in any straightforward fashion, the findings do of course leave open the 
possibility that children's memory for the rules is limited in a way that permits them to succeed in some 
situations (i.e., those without conflict) but not others (those with conflict). Morton and Munakata's (2002) model 
is one such account (see also Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997) because it attributes 
improvement in performance to the incremental increase in graded active memory representations. Graded 
memory accounts have produced evidence that conflict can increase the memory demand of a task, potentially 
explaining how memory limitations can impair performance only in the presence of conflict. The implications 
of the findings from Study 1 for graded memory accounts will be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
The findings also leave open the possibility that working memory plays a necessary role in the DCCS and in 
other measures of executive function. In fact, this possibility is supported by the findings that the 4-Rules 
(superordinate) task and the standard version were significantly correlated, and that passing the 4-Rules 
(superordinate) task appeared to be a prerequisite for passing the DCCS. Indeed, according to CCC theory, the 
DCCS, like any measure of rule use, requires children to formulate explicit rules, maintain them in working 
memory, and then use them to guide their behavior. What the findings from Study 1 suggest is that 3- to 4-
yearolds' difficulty depends more on the conflict among rules than on the simple requirement that rules be 
remembered. Study 2 focuses on how children resolve this conflict, and when they are required to do so. 
III. STUDY 2: RULE COMPLEXITYAND STIMULUS CHARACTERISTICS IN 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The results from Study 1 suggest that 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty with the DCCS cannot be attributed in a 
straightforward fashion to limitations on short-term or working memory (i.e., difficulty keeping the 
postswitch rules in mind). Children performed well on several new versions of the DCCS in which they were 
required to sort according to four rules. In one version, the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version, 
children were required to sort some test cards by color and some test cards by shape. These results in 
particular show that neither memory nor bidimensionality per se appeared to be the source children's 
difficulty on the standard version. 
However, one possibility is that children have difficulty on the DCCS because they cannot treat the same 
stimulus (i.e., test card) in two different ways in the context of a single task. For example, children who match a 
red rabbit to a red boat by color may have difficulty matching the very same card by shape to a blue rabbit on 
subsequent trials. This hypothesis follows both from inhibition accounts of the DCCS (e.g., Kirkham et al., in 
press; Perner & Lang, 1999) and from Perner's redescription hypothesis (Perner et al., 2002). Inhibition 
accounts hold that preswitch responses and/or attention to the preswitch dimension become prepotent, and 3- to 
4-year-olds lack the inhibitory control to suppress them. The redescription hypothesis holds that 3- to 4-yearolds 
have difficulty appreciating that a single stimulus can be described in multiple ways. 
In contrast, CCC theory predicts that 3- to 4-year-olds can treat a single stimulus in two different ways under 
some circumstances—namely, whenever doing so does not require the use of a higher order rule. According to 
CCC theory, a higher order rule will be required whenever rules are nested under different setting conditions in 
a hierarchical tree structure like that in Figure 3. Under these circumstances, children need first to consider a 
setting condition and then to select the appropriate rule. 
Although it is sometimes supposed that higher order rules are required only when there are two pairs of 
conflicting rules (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002), we believe that they are required whenever there is "a conflict in 
at least two of the outcomes that span the width of the tree" (Frye, 2000, p. 154). This specification suggests 
that a higher order rule will be required even for a single pair of rules when the rules are nested under different 
major branches of a hierarchical tree structure. For example, in many standard measures of theory of mind, such 
as false belief tests, only a subset of the tree structure is relevant (e.g., "If Maxi, then red cupboard; if me, then 
blue cupboard"), but as long as two different rules must be nested under different setting conditions, then a 
higher order rule is required because children must consider both the setting condition and the rule when 
deciding what to do. Similarly, from this perspective, it should be possible to create a "pruned tree" version of 
the DCCS that continues to be difficult for 3- to 4-year-olds (see Figure 9). 
 
In Study 2, three experiments were designed to test the circumstances in which children can and cannot use 
rules to respond in two different ways to a single stimulus. In this study, conflict among rules was assessed both 
within and across dimensions. All versions in this study involved conflict among rules, but only bidimensional 
rules were nested under different setting conditions. This study also explored the effects of two types of sti-
mulus characteristic (one vs. two test cards; integrated vs. separated stimuli) that might be expected to affect 
children's performance on the DCCS. 
Experiment 4 involved a version of the DCCS in which (a) children were required to respond in two different 
ways to a single test card (i .e., there was conflict among the rules), (b) only a single pair of rules was 
required, and (c) these rules were nested under different setting conditions. In this Pruned Tree (single test 
card) version of the DCCS, only a subset of the four rules was used (i.e., there was one preswitch and one 
postswitch rule), and only one of the two possible test cards was used. Thus, for example, if the target cards 
were a green flower 
and a yellow car, then the test card might be a green car. During the preswitch phase, children were told to 
play the green game, and during the postswitch phase they were told to play the car game. Results suggested 
that when bidimensional rules are used, 3- to 4-year-olds have difficulty employing even a single pair of rules. 
In Experiment 5, 3- to 4-year-olds were tested on a version in which (a) there was conflict among the rules, (b) 
only a single pair of rules was required, but (c) these rules were not nested under different setting conditions. 
In this Unidimensional (split stimuli) version, children were told a pair of rules that focused on only one of the 
dimensions (e.g., color) and they were required to use these rules to sort a single split test card (see Figure 10). 
Thus, for example, children might first be told to play the green game, and then be told to play the blue game. 
Under these circumstances 3- to 4-year-olds performed well. 
 
Experiment 6 examined the effect of rule dimensionality together with a potentially important aspect of the 
stimuli used in Experiment 5. Rules were either bidimensional (as in Experiment 4) or unidimensional (as in 
Experiment 5), and the dimensions on the test cards were either integrated as in Experiment 4 or separated as 
in Experiment 5. As in Experiments 4 and 5, all versions involved conflict among rules, but only 
bidimensional rules were nested under different setting conditions. Results revealed that children were much 
more likely to perseverate on the bidimensional versions than they were on the unidimensional versions. 
However, there was no effect of whether the stimuli were integrated versus separated. Together, these findings 
show that 3- to 4- year-olds can treat a single stimulus in two different ways, and they further support the 
hypothesis that 3- to 4- year-olds' difficulty on the standard version of the DCCS can be attributed to the 
requirement that they use a higher order rule. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
In Experiment 4, children were given the Pruned Tree (single test card) version, in which they were required 
to use a pair of bidimensional rules to sort a single test card. Because only a single pair of rules was used, 
instead of two incompatible pairs of rules, and because only a single test card was used, it might be expected 
that 3- to 4-year-olds should do better on the Pruned Tree (single test card) version than on the standard 
version of the DCCS. This follows, for example, from the memory accounts considered in Study 1. According 
to CCC theory, however, 3- to 4-year-olds should have difficulty with this version because two conflicting 
rules are nested under different major branches of a hierarchical tree structure. To test these predictions, 
children's performance on this version was compared to their performance on the standard version and on a 
modified standard version in which only one test card was used. This last version, called the standard version 




Participants. Forty-eight 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 41.7 months; range: 35 to 52 months; 26 girls and 22 boys) 
were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. An additional 6 children were excluded from the 
final sample because of experimental error (n = 4), parental interference (n = 1), or refusal to complete the 
experiment (n = 1). 
Children were randomly assigned to receive one of three versions of the DCCS: the Pruned Tree (single test 
card) version, the standard version, or the standard version (single test card). There were two sets of 
cards, corresponding to two different pairs of dimensions. For set 1 (color and shape), the number of items 
depicted on each test card was held constant. Target cards were (one) yellow car and (one) green flower, and 
the test cards were (one) green car or (one) yellow flower. For set 2 (number and size), the shape of the items 
was held constant (all items were rabbits). Target cards were one big thing (i.e., one big rabbit) and two little 
things, and test cards were two big things and one little thing. Half of the children in each version received set 
1 and half received set 2. Within each set, the particular dimension presented first was counterbalanced. 
Procedure. The standard version was administered exactly as in the previous experiments, except that there 
were 5 preswitch trials and 5 postswitch trials. Also, on the second demonstration trial, children themselves 
were told to sort the test card (which was a different type of card than the card the experimenter sorted on the 
first demonstration trial), and children were corrected if necessary on this demonstration trial. During test 
trials, test cards were labeled by both dimensions. 
The standard version (single test card) was identical to the standard version, except only one of the two 
possible test cards was used on all pre-and postswitch trials. As a result, in the demonstration trials, both the 
experimenter and the children sorted the same type of test card. 
The Pruned Tree (single test card) version was administered like the standard version, except that children were 
told a pair of rules that spanned two dimensions. For example, the task was introduced, the rules were 
explained, and children who received the color and shape set (set 1) were shown the green car and told, "If it's 
the green game put it here, but if it's the car game put it here." Then children were given two demonstration 
trials, each illustrating one of the rules. On the first demonstration trial, the experimenter played the game that 
was eventually required in the postswitch phase. On the second demonstration trial, children played the game 
that was to be played in the preswitch phase. As in the two standard versions, there were 5 preswitch trials and 
5 postswitch trials. On each trial, children were told the rules, shown a test card that was labeled by both 
dimensions, told, "Play the (e.g., green) game," and asked, "Where does this go?" After the 5 preswitch trials, 
children were told explicitly to switch to the new game. The total procedure took approximately 10 minutes to 
administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. Performance was initially scored as the number of correct postswitch trials (out of 5). To 
assess the effect of the particular dimension pair used (color and shape [set 1] vs. number and size [set 2]), a 
two-way (Version x Dimension Pair) ANOVA was conducted. This analysis revealed no significant effects of 
Dimension Pair and no Version x Dimension Pair interaction. This analysis was followed by a series of one-way 
(Preswitch Dimension) ANOVAs that assessed whether the particular dimension (within each dimension pair) 
that was used in the preswitch phase was related to postswitch performance. These analyses were run separately 
for the children in the standard versions (who were told explicitly about both values of each dimension) and 
children in the Pruned Tree version (who were only told explicitly about one level of each dimension). No 
significant effects of preswitch dimension were revealed for either of the dimension pairs, except that children 
in the standard versions scored better when number rather than size was the preswitch dimension, F(1, 14) 
= 13.3,p <.O1 (effect size f = .25). 
 
Because all the versions were counterbalanced, we conducted the remaining analyses collapsed across 
dimension pairs and preswitch dimensions. A two-way (Sex x Version) ANOVA conducted on all participants 
failed to reveal any significant effects (see Figure 11, first three bars). The analysis was then repeated excluding 
those children (n = 13) who failed the preswitch phase (i.e., who scored fewer than 4 of 5 correct). Once again, 




Individual analyses. Because the main goal of the individual analyses was to determine whether individual 
children switched sorting criteria, only children who passed the preswitch phase (4 or 5 correct) were 
included. Children were classified as passing the postswitch phase if they scored at least 4 out of 5 correct (see 
Table 4). A chi-square test revealed that success on the postswitch phase did not depend on the version of the 
DCCS that they received, χ2(2, N = 35) = 4.02, p> .05. 
Discussion 
Three-year-olds in this experiment exhibited considerable difficulty using even a single pair of rules. In contrast 
to Experiment 2, in which children performed well when required to use four nonoverlapping bidimensional 
rules, the majority of 3- to 4-year-olds failed the Pruned Tree (single test card) version in Experiment 3. This 
finding underscores the importance of conflict among rules and is consistent with the suggestion that 3- to 4- 
year-olds have difficulty whenever they are required to use rules that span major branches in a hierarchical 
tree structure. According to CCC theory, when children are asked to play the "red game" and then the "rabbit 
game" with reference to a single stimulus, they must formulate a higher order rule, select a dimension (i.e., a 
setting condition), and then select the appropriate rule. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiment 4 demonstrated that 3- to 4-year-olds failed to switch flexibly even when they were required to use 
a single pair of rules (as opposed to two pairs of rules in the standard DCCS). According to CCC theory, failure 
on the Pruned Tree (single test card) version resulted from the inability to construct a higher order rule. 
However, it is also possible that young children are simply incapable of sorting the same test card in two 
different ways within an experimental context. 
Experiment 5 was designed to test this hypothesis directly by presenting 3- to 4-year-olds with a version of the 
DCCS in which only one dimension (e.g., color) was used: the Unidimensional (single test card) version. 
Although the wording of the rules in this version was identical to the wording in the Pruned Tree (single test 
card) version (i.e., "If it's the _______________ game put it here, but if it's the ________________ game put 
it here"), CCC theory predicted that 3- to 4-year-olds would perform well on this version because only one 
dimension, and therefore only one major branch of the tree in Figure 3, need be considered. In contrast, 
however, if children were unable to sort a single test card in two different ways, either because of weak 
inhibition or because of difficulty redescribing stimuli, then they would be expected to fail this version. 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixteen 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 41.7 months; range: 38 to 47 months; 7 girls and 
9 boys) were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. 
All children received two instances of the Unidimensional (single test card) version, one with color rules and 
one with shape rules, in a counterbalanced order. In this version, the target cards were unidimensional (e.g., a 
blue patch vs. a green patch, or an outline of a car vs. the outline of a flower). The test card, on the other hand, 
displayed both values of the relevant dimension only (see Figure 10). For color rules, the test card was half 
green and half blue. For the shape rules, the test card displayed the outline of a flower on one lateral side and 
the outline of a car on the other lateral side. For each task, half of the children were required to first sort by one 
level of the dimension (e.g., play the green game) and then switch to the second level (e.g., play the blue 
game). 
Procedure. The Unidimensional (single test card) version was administered in a similar fashion to the Pruned 
Tree (single test card) version in Experiment 4. On test trials, children were shown the green/ blue card and told, 
"If it's the green game put it here, but if it's the blue game put it here. Let's play the green (blue) game. Where 
does this one go?" After the first task, children were given a brief intermission (approximately 2 minutes). Then 
the second task was administered in an identical fashion (except with cards and rules from the other dimension). 
The total procedure took approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. An initial repeated-measures ANOVA failed to detect any differences in number of correct 
postswitch trials on the two sorts. Thus, to simplify the analyses and to keep them comparable to Experiment 4, 
the results were averaged across both tasks. A one-way (Order) ANOVA was then conducted to test for possible 
order effects. The analysis revealed no significant effect of order, and therefore this variable was excluded from 
further analyses. 
A one-way (Sex) ANOVA failed to reveal any effect of sex, F(1, 14) = 0.95, ns. In general, children performed 
very well on this task, averaging 4.2 out of 5 on the postswitch phase (SD = 2.4), significantly above the 
chance level of 2.5 out of 5, t(15) = 5.6, p < 0.01. These results remained significant even after excluding 
children who failed the preswitch phase (averaging fewer than 4 out of 5 correct; n = 4). 
Mean postswitch performance on the Unidimensional (single test card version) was then compared to 
performance on the Pruned Tree (single test card) version used in Experiment 4, using a one-way (Version) 
ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of version, F(1, 30) = 6.72, p < .05 (effect size f = .47), 
confirming superior performance on the Unidimensional (split stimuli) version (see Figure 11). 
Individual analyses. Those children who passed the preswitch phase were also classified as either passing 
(averaging 4 or more out of 5 correct) or failing (averaging fewer than 4 out of 5 correct) the postswitch phase. 
Eleven out of these 12 children passed the postswitch phase, which is significantly greater than chance, χ2 (1, N 
= 12) = 8.33,p < .01. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 5 indicate that children are capable of sorting the same stimulus card two different 
ways when only one dimension is considered. Although the wording of the rules was identical to the wording of 
the rules in the Pruned Tree (single test card) version in Experiment 4 (e.g., "If it's the _______ game it goes 
here and if it's the _________ game it goes here. We're playing the ___________ game. Where does it go?"), 
children performed much better on the Unidimensional (split stimuli) version. According to CCC theory, this is 
because only the Pruned Tree (single test card) version requires the use of a setting condition to bridge the two 
rules—because each rule corresponds to a different dimension. In contrast, no setting condition is needed by the 
Unidimensional (split stimuli) version because the rules correspond to levels within the same dimension. 
The results of Experiment 5 are inconsistent with both inhibition accounts of the DCCS (e.g., Kirkham et al., in 
press; Perner & Lang, 2002) and Perner's redescription hypothesis (Perner et al., 2002). If 3- to 4-yearolds' 
difficulty on the standard version is due to an immature inhibition mechanism—producing lack of response 
control or representational inflexibility, then children should perform poorly on the Unidimensional (single test 
card) version. Similarly, they should perform poorly on this version if they have difficulty appreciating that a 
single stimulus can be described in multiple ways. 
In contrast, CCC theory predicts that 3- to 4-year-olds can treat a single stimulus in two different ways under 
some circumstances—namely, whenever doing so does not require the use of a higher order rule. According to 
CCC theory, a higher order rule will be required whenever rules are nested under different setting conditions in 
the hierarchical tree structure shown in Figure 3. Under these circumstances, children need first to consider a 
setting condition and then to select the appropriate rule. 
However, in defense of Perner et al.'s (2002) redescription theory, it could be argued that in Experiment 5, 
children did not treat the unidimensional stimulus as a single entity or Gestalt, but instead focused on different 
aspects of the stimulus in the pre- and postswitch phase. If this were the case, then perhaps children did not need 
to coordinate alternative perspectives in Experiment 5. Experiment 6 examined this possibility by presenting 
children with a bidimensional version of the DCCS that involved spatially separated dimensions. Following the 
logic of this defense of the redescription theory, children should also do well on this version of the DCCS 
because it also allows them to focus on different aspects of the test cards without requiring them to coordinate 
these aspects. By contrast, CCC theory would predict that children do poorly on this bidimensional separated 
version because it requires them to cross major branches of a tree-like structure. 
EXPERIMENT 6 
Experiment 4 showed that 3- to 4-year-olds had difficulty sorting on a version of the DCCS in which they were 
required to sort a single test card in two different ways according to two different dimensions—the Pruned Tree 
(single test card) version. In Experiment 5, a group of 3- to 4-year-olds was able to sort a single test card in two 
different ways when doing so did not require sorting according to two dimensions. Experiment 6 was designed 
to test directly the prediction, made by the CCC theory, that 3- to 4-year-olds are able to treat a single stimulus 
in two different ways when doing so does not require crossing major branches of a tree structure like that in 
Figure 3. This experiment also assessed the effect of a potentially important difference in the stimuli used in 
Experiment 4 versus those used in Experiment 5—whether test cards were integrated versus separated. In this 
manner, Experiment 6 examined the possibility, raised in defense of the redescription theory, that when 
presented with separated stimuli, children serially alternate between focusing on different aspects of the 
stimulus, without coordinating two alternative perspectives. If children simply serially alternated between 
different perspectives in Experiment 5, then they should do well on a bidimensional version of the DCCS that 
involved separated stimuli. 
Shepp and colleagues (Barrett & Shepp, 1988; Shepp & Barrett, 1991; Shepp, Barrett, & Kolbet, 1987; but see 
Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997) have suggested that there are age-related changes in the 
way in which young children and adults perceive objects (e.g., colored rabbits). Whereas younger children 
perceive these stimuli holistically as integrated wholes, older children and adults are better at analyzing these 
stimuli into separate dimensions or features. Support for this suggestion comes from findings that in matching 
tasks, the performance of younger children (e.g., 5- to-6-year olds) is more closely related to whether the stimuli 
are spatially integrated or separated than is the performance of older children and adults. 
According to this separability hypothesis, children's performance on the DCCS should be related to whether the 
dimensions of the target and test cards are presented in an integrated or separated fashion. Indeed, children's 
difficulty with the DCCS may be due to difficulty analyzing the stimuli into separate attributes, located on 
different dimensions. 
In this experiment, four versions of the DCCS were created by crossing two variables, rule dimensionality 
(bidimensional vs. unidimensional) and whether the test cards were integrated or separated (see Figure 12). 
According to CCC theory, children were expected to perform well on both unidimensional versions because, 
although these versions involve conflicting rules, they do not require the use of rules nested under different 
major branches of the tree structure in Figure 3. In contrast, children were expected to perform poorly in the 
bidimensional versions because these versions do require the use of rules nested under different major branches. 
The separability hypothesis was tested by comparing children's performance on the two bidimensional versions. 
Method 
Participants and design. Forty-eight 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 42.8 months; range: 37 to 49 months; 23 girls 
and 25 boys) were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1, except that 13 of the children tested in 
this experiment also participated in Experiment 5. These 13 children were evenly distributed across the four 
experimental versions (4 children in one version, and 3 each in the other three versions), and removal of these 
children from the analyses did not alter the results. An additional 2 children were tested but excluded from the 
final sample because they refused to complete the experiment. 
Twelve children were assigned randomly to each of the four conditions: unidimensional separated (US), 
unidimensional integrated (UI), bidimensional separated (BS), and bidimensional integrated (BI). In each 
condition, children received two tasks (i.e., a replication of the version used in that condition), one involving 
color and/or shape, and the other involving pattern and/or size. The order in which rule pairs were presented 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
Materials 
Two sets of cards were used. The first set varied in color (red or blue) and shape (cars or flowers). The second 
set varied in size (large or small) and pattern (dots or stripes). In the unidimensional versions, separated test 
cards depicted the two possible response options (e.g., red and blue) adjacently on a single card, whereas the 
integrated test cards depicted the two aspects of a dimension in a single form, such as a red and blue rabbit. The 
target cards for such a version would be a red rabbit and a blue rabbit (see Figure 12). For the separated test 
cards, one level of the relevant dimension was presented on the left side of the card for half of the trials, and on 
the right side for the remaining trials. 
 
The bidimensional versions required sorting by two dimensions, such as size and pattern. In these versions, for 
the separated stimuli, both dimensions were presented adjacently on a single card (e.g., blue on one side and a 
rabbit on the other). The integrated stimuli consisted of both dimensions presented in a single form, such as a 
red rabbit. The target cards for this version consisted of a blue rabbit and a red boat (see Figure 12). For the 
separated test cards, one level of the relevant dimension was presented on the left side of the card for half of 
the trials, and on the right side for the remaining trials. 
In all four versions, the same test card (but with lateral side varied for separated test cards) was presented for 
all five preswitch trials and all five postswitch trials. 
Procedure. The procedure for all versions was identical to the procedure for the Unidimensional (single test 
card) version used in Experiment 5. However, for the bidimensional versions, children were told bidimensional 
rules (e.g., "if it's red it goes here, but if it's blue it goes there") on the pre- and postswitch phases. In all cases, 
test cards were labeled simply as "one" (e.g., "Where does this one go?"). Children were given a short break 
(approximately 5 minutes) between the two tasks. The total procedure took approximately 20 minutes to 
administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. As in Experiments 4 and 5, correct responding was scored as the number of correct postswitch 
trials. To assess the effects of the particular rule pairs used (i.e., the red/blue pair or the stripe/dot pair for the 
US and UI versions; the color/shape pair or the number/size pair for the BS and BI versions) and the order in 
which they were used, two mixed (Rule Pair x Order) ANOVAs were conducted, one for the unidimensional 
versions and one for the bidimensional versions. Rule pair was a within-subject variable and order was a 
between-subject variable. The only significant finding was that in the unidimensional versions, children 
performed significantly better on the red/blue rule pair than on the stripe/dot rule pair, F(1, 23) = 4.5 5, p < .05 
(effect size f = .45). These analyses were followed by a series of one-way (Preswitch Dimension) ANOVAs that 
assessed whether within each rule pair, the particular rule (or rules) used in the preswitch phase was related to 
performance. The only significant finding was that children performed better when the blue rule as opposed to 
the red rule was used in the preswitch phase, F(1, 22) = 5.0, p < .05 (effect size f = .48). Because all the versions 
were counterbalanced and in general there were few order effects, we conducted the remaining analyses 
collapsed across rule pair, order, and preswitch rule(s). 
 
An overall repeated measures ANOVA failed to detect any differences between number of correct postswitch 
trials for the first and second tasks that children received. Thus, to simplify the analyses and keep them 
compatible with the analyses of Experiments 4 and 5, the results were averaged across both tasks (see Figure 
13). A three-way (Sex x Dimensionality x Separability) ANOVA revealed that children performed better on the 
unidimensional versions than on the bidimensional versions, F(1, 40) = 29.0, p < .01 (effect size f = .78). Also, 
the interaction between sex and dimensionality was significant, F(1, 40) = 4.6, p <.05. Tests of simple effects 
indicated that the effect of dimensionality was significant for both boys, F(1, 23) = 26.7, p <.0001 (effect size f 
= 1.08), and girls, F(1, 21) = 6.77,p 6.77, p<.05 (effect size f = .56), although the effect was more pronounced 
for boys. The results did not change when those children who failed the preswitch phase (i.e., whose average 
score on the preswitch phase was fewer than 4 out of 5 correct) were excluded. 
Individual analyses. Children were classified as passing the postswitch phase if they averaged at least 4 out of 
5 correct (see Table 5). Analyses revealed that for those children who passed the preswitch phase, success on 
the postswitch phase depended on version, χ2 (3, N = 40) = 14.9, p <.01. As can be seen in Table 5, children in 
the unidimensional versions tended to pass the postswitch phase, whereas children in the bidimensional versions 






Experiment 6 demonstrates clearly that when there is conflict among rules, 3- to 4-year-olds perform well on 
unidimensional versions of the DCCS but poorly on bidimensional versions. These results replicate, in a 
single experiment, the key findings from Experiments 4 and 5, namely that 3- to 4-year-olds can sort a single 
test card in two different ways when doing so only requires the use of a single dimension (and hence, does not 
require crossing major branches of a tree structure like that in Figure 3). Taken together, the results of these 
experiments provide strong evidence against both inhibition accounts of the DCCS (e.g., Kirkham et al., in 
press; Perner & Lang, 2002) and Perner's redescription hypothesis (Perner et al., 2002). 
The results of Experiment 6 also assessed a potentially important difference in the presentation of the stimuli 
used in Experiment 4 versus those used in Experiment 5 -- whether test cards were integrated versus separated 
and showed that it had no effect. This finding suggests that children's difficulty on the standard version of the 
DCCS cannot be attributed to the fact that the stimuli are presented in a spatially integrated fashion. 
Finally, the results revealed a Sex x Dimensionality interaction indicating that the effect of dimensionality, 
although significant for both boys and girls, is more pronounced for boys. Insofar as this interaction also 
indicates that girls perform better than boys on the more difficult bidimensional versions, it raises the possibility 
that the cognitive processes underlying performance on the DCCS develop more quickly in girls. This issue will 
be addressed further in the Discussion of Experiment 8. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results of Study 2 show that 3- to 4-year-olds do not inevitably "lock in" on a single way of responding to 
(or representing) a specific test card. Three-year-olds are able to treat a single test card in two different ways 
when doing so does not require using bidimensional rules. In Experiments 5 and 6, children were shown target 
cards that differed only on one dimension (e.g., a blue rabbit and a red rabbit). They were then presented with a 
test card that could be matched to either target card (e.g., a blue-and red-striped rabbit) and were told to use one 
rule for sorting it (e.g., "If we're playing the red game, then put it here"). After several trials, they were told to 
switch and use a different, incompatible rule (e.g., "If we're playing the blue game, then put it there"). Under 
these circumstances, 3- to 4-year-olds effectively switched and ceased their old way of responding. In contrast, 
in Experiment 4, sorting by even a single pair of rules was difficult for 3- to 4-year-olds when the two rules 
spanned major branches in the hierarchical tree structure shown in Figure 3. Together, these findings 
demonstrate that perseveration is at least partly a function of rule complexity, and cannot be attributed solely to 
a problem with inhibitory control—either at the level of responses or at the level of representations. 
The results are also inconsistent with a version of Perner's redescription hypothesis (Perner & Lang, 2002) 
because children should perform poorly on the unidimensional versions if they have difficulty appreciating that 
a single stimulus can be described in multiple ways. As predicted by CCC theory, redescription in the context of 
the DCCS appears to be easy or difficult depending on whether or not the rules call for sorting within or across 
major branches in the tree structure in Figure 3. 
Finally, Experiment 6 also showed that whether stimulus dimensions are presented in a spatially integrated or 
separated fashion has little effect on performance. This finding contradicts the prediction derived from the 
separability hypothesis (Shepp & Barrett, 1991) that children may fail the DCCS because they process spatially 
integrated stimuli holistically and have difficulty attending selectively to particular dimensions or attributes, 
although further study of the effects of spatial integration versus separation in measures of children's executive 
function (e.g., the Stroop test; see Archibald & Kerns, 1999) is clearly warranted. 
Although the spatial separation of dimensional information was not related to children's performance on the 
DCCS, it remains possible that understanding dimensional structure is closely related to the cognitive changes 
indexed by the DCC S. Indeed, according to CCC theory, the ability to formulate higher order rules is necessary 
for the construction of the concept of dimensions, and for subsequent analytical processing of values on those 
dimensions. As Zelazo and Frye (1997) suggested, it is only by distancing themselves from discriminations 
within a dimension and considering two or more dimensions in contradistinction that children are able to 
conceptualize dimensions qua dimensions (see also Smith, 1989). This issue will be addressed further in 
Chapter VI. 
IV. STUDY 3: WHAT DO CHILDREN PERSEVERATE ON WHEN THEY PERSEVERATE? 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Study 1 indicated that memory per se does not appear to be the primary cause of 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty 
with the DCCS. Three-year-olds can use four rules to sort a series of cards when those rules are not in conflict. 
In Experiment 2, this success was found even for bidimensional rules (two shape rules and two color rules), so 
bidimensionality per se does not appear to be the problem either. Study 2 focused on cases where there was 
conflict among rules, and found that 3- to 4-year-olds had difficulty using bidimensional rules even when only a 
single pair of rules ("if red, then here; if rabbit, then there") was required. Taken together, the results of Studies 
1 and 2 support the claims of the CCC theory that 3- to 4-year-olds are able to represent and use pairs of lower-
order rules, at one level in a hierarchy, but have difficulty formulating and using a higher order rule. According 
to CCC theory, it may be possible to formulate a higher order rule in many situations, but it is necessary to do 
so when a single stimulus must be responded to in terms of more than one dimension. Under these 
circumstances, 3- to 4-year-olds will have difficulty resolving conflict between incompatible rule pairs. Study 3 
examined further what types of conflict pose problems for 3- to 4-year-olds by asking what it is that children are 
perseverating on when they perseverate on the standard version of the DCCS. 
The CCC theory predicts that when children perseverate, they are perseverating on specific lower order rules 
(e.g., "If red, then here; if blue, then there") a prediction that may be referred to as the specific rules hypothesis. 
Children select and use a pair of rules during the preswitch phase, these rules become activated, and this 
activation persists into the postswitch phase (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2000). In contrast, children who perseverate 
could be attending to stimuli solely in terms of the first dimension (i.e., the dimension hypothesis). This type of 
perseveration would seem to correspond to the attentional biases described by Zeaman and House (e.g., House, 
1989; Zeaman & House, 1963), and would result in centration on a dimension regardless of the particular values 
of that dimension. 
 
Single dimension centration is central to the Piagetian characterization of the preoperational child (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1964), and more recent work has provided evidence for its role in a variety of contexts, ranging from 
discrimination learning (Caron, 1969; Medin, 1973; Odom & Mumbauer, 1971; Smiley & Weir, 1966) to 
conservation (Gelman, 1969) to word learning (Baldwin, 1989). 
Another possibility, which might be referred to as the specific stimuli hypothesis, is that 3- to 4-year-olds' 
perseveration on the standard version of the DCCS reflects responses to unique stimulus configurations (or 
compounds) that are not conceptualized either as instances of dimensions or as values along dimensions (cf. 
Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971). If this were the case, then children should perseverate only in the presence of 
these particular stimuli. 
Experiment 7 was designed to test these three hypotheses by examining 3- to 4-year-olds' performance on two 
new versions of the DCCS (see Figure 14). In the Total Change version, the values of the dimensions were 
changed between the pre- and postswitch phases (e.g., children were required to sort red and blue rabbits and 
boats by color during the preswitch phase, but to sort yellow and green flowers and cars by shape during the 
postswitch phase). If 3- to 4-year-olds fail the postswitch phase of the standard version because they continue to 
attend to the preswitch dimension, then they should continue to perseverate during the postswitch trials in the 
Total Change version. However, if they perseverate on specific stimuli or specific rules, then they should not 
perseverate on the Total Change version because the specific stimuli are different and the preswitch rules no 
longer apply. 
The second new version involved a change in the specific stimuli that did not preclude the possibility of 
perseverating on the first pair of specific rules. In this version, called the Partial Change version, only the values 
of the dimension that was irrelevant on the preswitch trials were changed. For example, if children first sorted 
red and blue rabbits and boats by color during the preswitch phase, they would be required to sort red and blue 
flowers and cars by shape during the postswitch phase. This would still allow children to perseverate on specific 
rules, such as, "If it's red, then put it here, and if it's blue, then put it there," but it would prevent them from 
perseverating on responses to specific stimuli, such as a red boat. 
In addition to these two new versions, children were also administered a modified standard version, called the 
standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version. The standard version was modified to make it 
comparable to the two new versions. In both the Partial Change version and the Total Change version, the target 
cards had to be taken down and replaced between the pre- and postswitch phases. Therefore, in the standard 
(target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version, target cards were also taken down momentarily, and were 
then replaced as the experimenter proceeded to the postswitch phase. 
One other feature of the standard version was also modified (and was consistent with the procedure for the two 
new versions). Because the focus of this experiment was on the level at which children perseverate when they 
do perseverate, we wanted to increase the likelihood that children would indeed perseverate. Therefore, in the 
standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version, as in the Partial Change and Total Change 
versions, children were told whether or not they sorted cards correctly during the preswitch phase. Given that 3- 
to 4-year-olds rarely erred during the preswitch phase, this modification seems unlikely to have affected 
preswitch performance, although it is possible that it increased overall levels of postswitch preservation (this 
issue was addressed in Experiment 8, in which no feedback was provided during the preswitch phase). 
The three different hypotheses regarding what it is that 3- to 4-yearolds perseverate on in the standard version 
make different predictions regarding how children will respond on the Partial Change and Total Change 
versions of the DCC S. If children perseverate in their responses to particular stimulus configurations, then they 
should not perseverate on either new version. If children perseverate on a dimension, then they should 
perseverate on both new versions. If they perseverate on rules specifying values of a dimension (e.g., red), as 





Participants. Ninety-eight 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 41.0 months; range: 33 to 48 months; 50 girls and 48 boys) 
were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. Three additional children were tested but not included in 
the final sample because color names were not known (n = 1) or because English was not the child's first 
language (n = 2). 
Design. Children at each age were randomly assigned to receive one of three versions of the DCCS: the 
standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version (n = 31, 16 boys and 15 girls), the Total Change 
version (n = 34, 16 boys and 18 girls), or the Partial Change version (n = 33, 16 boys and 17 girls). For all 
versions, the dimension (color or shape) that was relevant during the preswitch phase was counterbalanced and 
crossed with the set of cards they received. Two sets of cards were used: (set 1) red and blue rabbits and boats, 
and (set 2) yellow and green cars and flowers. Roughly half of the children receiving the standard (target cards 
refreshed, preswitch feedback) version sorted one set of cards, and the remaining children sorted the other. In 
the Total Change version, roughly half of the children sorted one of these sets first, and then sorted the other set. 
Children receiving the Partial Change version also sorted one of these two sets of cards first. However, in the 
postswitch phase, they sorted one of the four sets of cards that were created by crossing the two pairs of colors 
and shapes used in the first two sets. Thus, for example, roughly one quarter of the participants receiving the 
Partial Change version first sorted yellow and green cars and flowers and then sorted yellow and green rabbits 
and boats. 
Procedure. All three versions of the DCCS were comprised of two phases, a preswitch and a postswitch phase. 
The standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version was administered exactly like the usual 
standard version (see Chapter I), with the following parameter settings and modifications: (a) Test cards (for 
both pre- and postswitch) phases were labeled only by the relevant dimension. (b) In contrast to the usual 
procedure, children were given feedback on the preswitch trials and preswitch trials were administered until 
children correctly sorted 5 consecutive cards. (c) After children correctly sorted 5 consecutive preswitch cards, 
the target cards were taken down momentarily and were then replaced as the experimenter proceeded to the 
postswitch phase. (d) There were 5 postswitch trials administered without feedback. The procedures for the 
Total Change and Partial Change versions were identical to that for the standard (target cards refreshed, 
preswitch feedback) version; only the cards to be sorted differed. The total procedure took approximately 10 
minutes to administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. Children were given feedback during the preswitch phase, and all children reached criterion. 
Ninety-one children (93%) reached criterion in the minimum number of trials. A preliminary two-way (Version 
x Dimension Order) ANOVA on the number of correct postswitch trials indicated no effect of dimension order 
and no Version x Dimension Order interaction. Consequently, dimension order was dropped from subsequent 
analyses. 
A two-way (Sex x Version) ANOVA on number of correct postswitch trials revealed only a main effect of 
version, F(2, 92 ) = 7.19, p < .01 (effect size f = .40). Newman Keuls post hoc tests (p <.05) showed that 
children receiving the Total Change version (M = 4.06, SD = 1.82) made more correct responses than children 
receiving the standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version (M = 2.03, SD = 2.39) and the Partial 
Change version (M = 2.67, SD = 2.35), which did not differ (see Figure 15). 
Individual analyses. On the postswitch trials, each child was classified according to whether he or she did or 
did not use the postswitch pair of rules (at least 4 correct out of 5). Table 6 presents the numbers of children 
in each response class by version. 
A chi-square test revealed that the number of children who passed the postswitch phase depended on the 
version, χ2 (2, N = 98) = 10.26, p<.01. For the Total Change version, but not for the other versions, the 
number of children who used the postswitch rules exceeded 50% (based on a binomial distribution, p < .05). 
Discussion 
Despite the changes made to the standard version for this experiment (target cards refreshed and preswitch 
feedback), the usual pattern of performance was observed: the majority of 3- to 4-year-olds perseverated on the 
postswitch trials. A comparison with the new versions was designed to determine whether perseveration on the 
DCCS reflects centration on a dimension, continued use of the preswitch rules (specifying values of a 
dimension), or responses to particular stimuli (e.g., blue rabbits). Children who received the Total Change 
version performed better than children who received the standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) 
version or the Partial Change version, and performance on these latter versions did not differ. 
 
If perseveration on the standard (target cards refreshed, preswitch feedback) version were due to perseveration 
on a dimension, then children would have perseverated on the Total Change version in which the particular 
values of the dimensions were changed between the pre- and postswitch phases. However, the majority of 
participants who received this version used the postswitch rules successfully: Only 21% of the participants 
continued to sort by the preswitch dimension during the postswitch phase. Thus, when there is no continuity in 
the specific stimulus values between pre- and postswitch, or when children cannot use the preswitch rules 
during the postswitch, children do well in the DCCS. This finding makes it likely that the majority of 3- to 4- 
year-olds do not perseverate on a dimension. However, a more conclusive test of whether children do or do not 
perseverate on a dimension would consist of a change in (at least one) dimension between pre- and postswitch 
phase (e.g., using shape and color during preswitch, and shape and number during postswitch). 
The relatively poor performance of the children who received the Partial Change version indicates that these 
children were continuing to use a single pair of rules (viz., the preswitch rules) during the postswitch phase. 
Children who received the Partial Change version often perseveratively applied the preswitch rules (e.g., "If it's 
red it goes here") to stimuli (standards and test cards) that they had never seen before. If children who failed the 
DCCS were simply perseverating on learned responses to particular stimuli, then children would not have 
perseverated in this version. Children's perseveration on the Partial Change version also confirms that a change 
in stimulus conditions per se cannot account for children's success on the Total Change version (e.g., by 
disrupting their set). 
 
Taken together, the results of Study 3 support the CCC theory insofar as they indicate that the conflict that 
poses a problem for 3- to 4-year-olds is conflict at the level of specific rules. Three-year-olds perseverate on the 
preswitch rules during the postswitch phase, consistent with the suggestion that the selection and/or use of rules 
during the preswitch phase strengthens the activation of these rules, thereby increasing the probability that they 
will be selected in the future (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2000). 
The findings might also generally be consistent with inhibition accounts. For example, attentional inertia theory 
(Kirkham et al., in press) suggests that 3-year-old children fail the DCCS because they cannot inhibit attention 
to the aspect of the stimulus that was relevant during the preswitch phase. Unfortunately, this theory is not 
specific about whether "aspect of the stimulus" refers to specific stimulus attributes, rules, or dimensions. 
However, if "aspect of the stimulus" refers to the specific values of the dimension that is relevant during the 
preswitch phase, then attentional inertia theory predicts that children should do poorly on the standard version 
and the Partial Change version, and that they should do well on the Total Change version. The role of inhibition 
in the DCCS will be examined further in Study 4. 
V. STUDY 4: NEGATIVE PRIMING AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Study 3 showed that although children often perseverated on the Partial Change version, they generally did not 
perseverate on the Total Change version. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that children 
perseverate on a particular pair of rules (e.g., "If it's red it goes here") rather than on a dimension or on a 
specific stimulus configuration. In other words, these findings indicate that the rules selected and used during 
the preswitch phase are also selected and used during the postswitch phase. This characterization of children's 
perseveration is consistent with CCC theory, according to which activation of the preswitch rules persists into 
the postswitch phase (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2000). To select the postswitch rules in contrast to activated 
preswitch rules would seem to require some type of higher order process that operates on these rules. CCC 
theory suggests one such process: reflection and the formulation and use of a higher order rule. 
Another possibility, which is not necessarily incompatible with the processes postulated by CCC theory, is that 
an inhibition mechanism could be used to help children disengage from the activated preswitch rules. Kirkham 
et al. (in press) have explicitly attributed perseveration in the DCCS to the failure to disengage attention from 
the preswitch dimension and shift attention to the postswitch dimension. They characterize this failure as a 
problem of "attentional inertia" and suggest that this inertia is eventually overcome by the development of the 
ability to inhibit attention to the aspect of the stimulus (e.g., redness) that was relevant during the preswitch 
phase. As they put it, "Having focused their attention on a particular dimension, their attention gets stuck, and 
they have extreme difficulty redirecting it" (Kirkham et al., p. 4). 
The results of Study 3 disconfirm this claim by showing that it is not attention to a dimension per se (e.g., color) 
that children get stuck on. Nonetheless, it is possible that children do get stuck in attending to the preswitch 
rules, or to the particular values of the preswitch dimension cited in the preswitch rules (e.g., red and blue). 
An alternative possibility, however, is that instead of difficulty inhibiting activated preswitch rules during the 
postswitch phase, children have difficulty activating the postswitch rules because these rules had been 
ignored during the preswitch phase. This possibility may be referred to as the negative priming hypothesis. 
A standard experimental paradigm used to examine negative priming consists of a two-part, prime-probe test. 
In the prime trial, a participant must respond to one stimulus (or aspect of a stimulus) and ignore another 
stimulus (or aspect). The subsequent probe trial requires the participant to respond to the previously ignored 
stimulus. Negative priming occurs when responding is slower than it would otherwise be to the previously 
ignored stimulus. Several different theoretical interpretations of negative priming have been offered (for 
reviews and discussions, see Fox, 1995; May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, & Seiffert, 
1998; Tipper, 2001). 
One possible explanation for negative priming is that ignoring a distractor stimulus involves inhibiting or 
suppressing attention to that stimulus, and that this inhibition persists into the probe trial (e.g., Houghton & 
Tipper, 1994; Tipper, 1985). A second possible explanation for negative priming is that the ignored stimulus 
is given an "ignore this stimulus" tag during the prime trial (e.g., Neill & Valdes, 1992). Then, during the 
probe trial, the previous processing episode (i.e., the prime display) is automatically retrieved. If there is a 
conflict in that an item that was coded as irrelevant during the prime trial is now coded as relevant during the 
probe trial, slower reaction times will occur. These slower reactions times are assumed to occur because of 
the mismatch between processing episodes, and not because the irrelevant stimulus was inhibited during the 
prime trial. 
Both the inhibition account and the episodic retrieval account of negative priming are largely consistent with 
empirical evidence (e.g., see Fox, 1995; Tipper, 2001). However, neurophysiological evidence supports the 
inhibition account because single cell recording in the visual cortex has shown that cells increase their firing 
rate when a particular type of stimulus falls within their receptive field, but that the firing rate is suppressed 
when the same stimulus appears as an ignored distractor (Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997). According to 
Tipper (2001), the inhibition account and the episodic retrieval account of negative priming are not 
incompatible. Tipper (2001) proposed an integrative model in which selective inhibition and episodic retrieval 
are the product of forward and backward processes of the same mechanism: "[T]he observation of inhibition 
via negative priming is by necessity a bi-directional process involving initial inhibitory processing in which a 
target is selected from a distractor, and consequent retrieval processes activated while interacting with the 
probe, in which previous prime processing is reinstated/retrieved" (Tipper, 2001, p. 323). 
Very few studies have explored negative priming in children. In one study by Tipper, Bourque, Anderson, and 
Brehaut (1989), 7-year-olds and adults received a Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) under one of four conditions: (a) in 
the standard Stroop condition, participants were presented with a list of color words written in a conflicting 
color but there was no relation between successive items in a list, (b) in a neutral condition, participants were 
presented with colored X's, (c) in a Repeated Ignored condition, the distractor stimulus was always the same 
throughout (e.g., the word "blue" written in different colors), and (d) in the Ignored Repetition condition, the 
distractor on one trial became the target on the subsequent trial (e.g., the word "blue" written in yellow was 
followed by the word "orange" written in blue). Slowed reaction times in the Ignored Repetition condition could 
be attributed to negative priming because the distractor that needed to be inhibited on a previous trial became 
the target on a subsequent trial. Results showed that the amount of negative priming was substantially larger in 
adults than in children (and indeed, there was generally no evidence of negative priming in children), suggesting 
that negative priming develops, perhaps due to growth of prefrontal cortex (Stuss et al., 1999). A subsequent 
study by Tipper and MacLaren (1990), however, found that negative priming can be demonstrated in younger 
children using less complicated tasks. Thus, the presence or absence of negative priming appears to depend on 
the complexity of the task used to assess it. 
Negative priming in children has also been explored in Piagetian conservation tasks by Houde and Guichart 
(2001; see also Perret, Paour, & Blaye, 2003). Piagetian conservation involves the understanding that a 
change in the appearance of an object or group of objects (e.g., the length of a row of objects) does not 
necessarily signal a change in the quantitative value of the object or group (e.g., the number of objects in that 
row). Houde and Guichart had 9-year-olds judge the numerical equivalence of two rows of shapes when the 
use of a primed Piagetian length-equals-number strategy was either congruent or incongruent with the correct 
response. The authors found that children who were required to ignore the strategy that length is indicative of 
number subsequently took longer to use that strategy when it was required for the correct response. 
Perner and Lang (2002) discussed the possibility that negative priming (in the sense of persistent inhibition) 
may occur in the DCCS. That is, sorting by the preswitch rules may require children to inhibit the irrelevant pair 
of rules, and this inhibition may persist or be reinstated in the postswitch trials, decreasing the probability that 
these rules will be selected in the future (i.e., during the postswitch phase, when they become relevant). 
Negative priming in this sense may also explain results they obtained with modified versions of the DCCS. 
These authors found that when the target cards varied on only one dimension or when no target cards were used 
at all, 3- to 4-year-olds' performance improved. In both cases, they suggest, there was no need to inhibit the 
irrelevant rules during the preswitch phase. However, their results are also consistent with other hypotheses. For 
example, the lack of target cards could have made the preswitch rules less salient and therefore easier to forget 
when the rules changed (Perner & Lang, 2002, p. 101). Consequently, children may not have needed to 
construct a higher order rule to switch between rule pairs; they may simply have sorted according to two rule 
pairs in succession, without coordinating them. 
Although it is possible that negative priming contributes to children's difficulty on the DCCS, it cannot account 
for this difficulty completely. If negative priming alone were operative in the DCCS, then children should have 
performed well on the Partial Change version in Experiment 7, in which the values of the dimension that was 
irrelevant during the preswitch phase were replaced by new values. Because these values were replaced, 
performance on this version cannot reflect negative priming, only persistent activation of the preswitch rules (or 
some other process). 
Curiously, although negative priming may be a problem that children need to overcome (Perner & Lang, 2002), 
it is usually conceptualized as evidence of a developing ability that allows successful selective attention (e.g., 
Dempster, 1995; Houde & Guichart, 2001; Tipper et al., 1989). For this reason, the negative priming hypothesis 
is incompatible with inhibition accounts such as that proposed by Kirkham and colleagues (in press). Whereas 
inhibition accounts suggest that children fail to inhibit during the postswitch phase, the negative priming 
hypothesis suggests that children fail to disinhibit during this phase. Put differently, inhibition accounts suggest 
that children perform poorly on the DCCS because of too little inhibition, whereas the negative priming 
hypothesis suggests that children perform poorly because of too much inhibition. Perhaps for this reason, 
Kirkham et al. explicitly state that negative priming would not occur in the DCCS. They write that "children 
should be able to succeed if the previously-relevant values on the now irrelevant dimension are no longer 
present in the stimuli (and they do)" (p. 5). To our knowledge, however, this claim has not actually been tested. 
Experiment 8 was designed to test directly the role of negative priming in relation to other possible sources of 
difficulty on the DCCS. Children were given one of six versions of the DCCS: the standard version, the Total 
Change version, the Partial Change version, and three new versions (see Figure 16). In the Negative Priming 
version, the values of the dimension that was relevant during the preswitch phase were removed during the 
postswitch phase. This version should provide a pure measure of negative priming (vs. persistent activation of 
the preswitch rules) because performance on the postswitch phase would be sensitive to negative priming, but 
not to persistent activation. 
In the Partial-Partial Change (test cards) version, the values of the irrelevant dimension during the preswitch 
phase were removed from the test cards during the preswitch phase. For example, as shown in Figure 16, when 
the preswitch sorting dimension was color and target cards included a blue rabbit and a red boat, test cards were 
blue squares and red squares. However, in the postswitch phase, test cards were replaced by red rabbits and blue 
boats (i.e., the standard, cross-matched test cards were used). In contrast, in the Partial-Partial Change (target 
cards) version, the values of the irrelevant dimension during the preswitch phase were removed from the 
target cards during the preswitch phase (but not the postswitch phase). 
 
 
The Partial-Partial Change versions were designed to explore the circumstances in which persistent activation of 
preswitch rules interferes with postswitch performance. The primary prediction regarding these versions follows 
from CCC theory: 3- to 4-year-olds should perseverate in these versions because it is possible to persist in 
applying the (now-activated) preswitch rules. The versions differ from the Partial Change version, however, in 
that it was not actually possible to sort by the competing dimension during the preswitch phase because the 
values of either the target cards or the test cards were missing for that dimension. Therefore, if activation of the 
preswitch rules depends on the selection of those rules against a competing alternative, then these versions 
should be relatively easy for children. That is, persistent activation should be attenuated or eliminated. It should 
be noted, however, that these versions did not provide a pure test of this hypothesis because the values of the 
competing dimension were only partially removed during the preswitch phase. Under these circumstances, 
children may nonetheless need to attend selectively to the relevant values against the irrelevant values. The 
difference between the two Partial-Partial Change versions was included simply to explore both ways of 
partially removing values from the competing dimension during the preswitch phase. 
Negative priming was not expected to influence postswitch performance in the Partial-Partial Change versions 
because (a) there was no requirement that children select one pair of rules against an alternative pair, and (b) 
the values of the to-be-ignored dimension were missing either from the target cards or from the test cards 
during the preswitch phase. 
Results revealed that children performed well on the Total Change version, moderately well on the three 
Partial Change versions (including the two Partial-Partial Change versions), and poorly on the standard and 
Negative Priming versions. Indeed, these latter two versions were equally difficult, as would be predicted if 
the competing rules are inhibited during the preswitch phase. Clearly, an adequate explanation of performance 
on the DCCS needs to take account of both activation and negative priming. 
Given that Experiment 8 revealed a role for negative priming in performance on the DCCS, Experiment 9 
sought to determine more precisely the circumstances in which negative priming occurs. One possibility is that 
negative priming only occurs when children actively select one pair of rules against a competing alternative. If 
this were the case, then only mismatching (i.e., cross-matched) target and test cards would elicit negative 
priming (Perner & Lang, 2002). On the other hand, it is possible that negative priming in the DCCS does not 
depend on the selection of one pair of rules against a competing alternative. In this case, even irrelevant cues 
from dimensions that do not conflict with the relevant dimension may be negatively primed. 
Experiment 9 aimed to investigate these two possibilities using a new version of the DCCS (see Figure 17). In 
this version, the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, the test cards are identical to the target cards 
during the preswitch phase, and the values of the formerly relevant dimension are replaced during the 
postswitch phase, as in the Negative Priming version. As in the Negative Priming version, persistent activation 
of the preswitch rules would not affect postswitch performance. Unlike in the Negative Priming version, 
however, children do not need to select the preswitch rules against a competing alternative during the preswitch 
phase. Thus, if negative priming occurs when responses to mismatching cues must be selected against (and 
hence, actively inhibited), this new version of the task would not elicit negative priming, and performance on 
this version should be good. On the other hand, if attending to cues from one dimension (i.e., the relevant 
dimension) causes all unattended cues to be negatively primed, then the Negative Priming (redundant 
preswitch) version should be just as difficult as the standard version. 
 
Performance was also assessed on a Redundant version of the DCCS in which the test cards matched the target 
cards on both dimensions during the preswitch phase but standard, conflicting test cards were used during the 
postswitch phase. Performance on this version could be affected both by persistent activation of the preswitch 
rules and by negative priming, so this version allowed further assessment of whether both processes depend on 
the active selection of one pair of rules against a competing alternative. If both activation and negative priming 
depend on selecting against a competing alternative, then performance on this version should be good. In an 
unpublished master's thesis, Jacques (1995) found that 3- to 4-yearolds perseverated on this version. Jacques's 
finding needs to be replicated, but poor performance on this version would seem to indicate that activation 
and/or negative priming can occur even in the absence of direct interference from a competing alternative. 
EXPERIMENT 8 
According to CCC theory, 3- to 4-year-olds perform poorly on the postswitch phase of the DCCS because, in 
the absence of higher order rules, they have difficulty selecting the postswitch rules against competing rules that 
were activated during the preswitch phase. The circumstances in which difficulty occurs remain to be explored 
further. Moreover, another possible contribution to children's difficulty on the DCCS is negative priming: 
children may have difficulty attending to the postswitch rules because these same rules were ignored during the 
preswitch phase. 
Experiment 8 was designed to test these possibilities by comparing performance on the Negative Priming 
version, the Partial-Partial Change (test cards) version, the Partial-Partial Change (target cards), and the three 
versions used in Experiment 7. In contrast to Experiment 7, however, the standard, Partial Change, and Total 
Change versions, like the other versions used in Experiment 8, were administered without feedback during the 
preswitch phase (i.e., the procedure was modified to be more like the standard version used in most studies). 
Participants in Experiment 8 were, on average, somewhat younger than participants in other experiments. 
Children from a younger age range were selected in order to be able to detect possible differences between the 
Partial Change versions and the Negative Priming version. Because these versions were expected to be easier 
than the standard version, it seemed likely any differences would be best detected using a younger sample. For 
the same reason, a larger number of pre- and postswitch trials were administered than in Experiment 7. Use of 
a younger sample increased the likelihood that performance on the standard version would be poorer than in 
Experiment 7. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and five children (M = 38.34 months; range: 36 to 43 months; 46 girls and 59 boys) 
were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. Ten additional children were excluded from the final 
sample either because of experimenter error (n = 5), because they refused to complete the experiment (n = 4), or 
because they did not appear to understand English (n = 1). 
Design. Children at each age were randomly assigned to receive one of six versions of the DCCS: the standard 
(target cards refreshed) version, the Total Change (no preswitch feedback) version, the Partial Change (no 
preswitch feedback) version, the Negative Priming version, the Partial-Partial Change (test cards) version, and 
the Partial-Partial Change (target cards) version. For all versions, the dimension (color or shape) that was 
relevant during the preswitch phase was counterbalanced. Card sets were the same as in Experiment 7, and they 
were counterbalanced in the same fashion as in Experiment 7. 
Procedure. The procedure for all versions was identical; only the cards to be sorted differed. The general 
procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 7, except for two changes: (a) there were 8 preswitch and 8 
postswitch trials, and (b) children were not given feedback on the preswitch trials. Other than these changes, the 
Total Change (no pre-switch feedback) and Partial Change (no preswitch feedback) versions were the same as 
in Experiment 7. The Negative Priming version was essentially the reverse of the Partial Change (no preswitch 
feedback) version: the values of the dimension that was relevant during the preswitch phase (and irrelevant 
during the postswitch phase) were changed between the pre- and postswitch phases. In the Partial-Partial 
Change (test cards) version, the values of the dimension that was relevant during the postswitch phase were 
missing from the test cards during the preswitch phase. If children were required to sort by color during the 
preswitch phase, then the test cards during the preswitch phase consisted of color squares (see Figure 16). On 
the other hand, if the preswitch dimension was shape, then the test cards consisted of colorless outlines (e.g., 
outlines of rabbits and boats). During the postswitch phase, however, the standard test cards were used. 
Moreover, in this version, the same target cards were used in the pre- and postswitch phases. 
In the Partial-Partial Change (test cards) version, the values of the dimension that was relevant during the 
postswitch phase were missing from the target cards during the preswitch phase. For example, for children who 
were asked to sort red and blue rabbits and boats (standard test cards) by shape during the preswitch phase, the 
target cards during the preswitch phase were outlines of a rabbit and a boat. For children who were asked to sort 
red and blue rabbits and boats by color during the preswitch phase, the target cards during the preswitch phase 
were a red square and a blue square. During the postswitch phase, standard target cards were used and the test 
cards remained the same. 
The total procedure took approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
Results 
Group analyses. A preliminary two-way (Version x Dimension Order) ANOVA on number of correct 
postswitch trials indicated that there was no effect of dimension order and no Version x Dimension Order 
interaction. Consequently, dimension order was dropped from subsequent analyses. A two-way (Sex x 
Version) ANOVA on number of correct postswitch responses revealed significant effects of sex, F(1, 93) = 
5.32,p < .05 (effect size f = .24), and version, F(5, 93) = 3.19,p 3.19,p<.05 (effect size f = .41). The effect of 
sex was due to the fact that girls (M = 5.23, SD = 3.28) performed better in this experiment than boys (M = 
3.76, SD = 3.39). Newman-Keuls post hoc tests (p <.05) indicated that the standard version was significantly 
more difficult than the Total Change version, the Partial Change version, and the Partial-Partial Change (test 
cards) version (see Figure 18). There were no other significant differences among tasks. These results did not 
change after excluding children who failed the preswitch phase (fewer than 7 out of 8 correct). 
 
When performance on the different version was compared to chance performance (i.e., 4 out of 8 postswitch 
trials correct), children's performance on the standard version was significantly worse than chance, t(16) = 
2.89, p <.05, and their performance on the Total Change version was significantly better than chance, t(16) 
= 2.51, p < .05. However, performance on the other versions did not differ significantly from chance. 
Individual analyses. Eight children (2 in each of the Partial Partial Change version, and 1 each in the standard, 
the three Partial Change, the Total Change, and the Negative Priming versions) failed the preswitch phase 
(fewer than 7 out of 8 correct), and were excluded from further analyses. The remaining children were classified 
as passing the postswitch phase using the same criterion as in the preswitch phase. Table 7 displays the numbers 
(and percentages) of children who passed and failed the postswitch phase in each version. As can be seen, more 
than two-thirds of the children in the standard and Negative Priming versions failed. However, only about one 
third of the children in the Total Change version failed. The Partial Change and the two Partial-Partial Change 
versions were of intermediate difficulty, and performance on these three versions did not differ. Performance on 
the standard version was significantly worse than performance on the Total Change χ2 (1, N = 32) = 6.35, p < 
.05. There was also a trend for the Partial Change version and the Partial-Partial Change (target cards) version 
to be easier than the standard version, χ2 (1, N= 32) = 3.46, p < .07 (in each case), and for the Total Change 
version to be easier than the Negative Priming version, П
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 (1, N = 33) = 3.64, p < .06. Twelve children (75%) 
perseverated (7 or 8 incorrect) in the standard version, 6 (38%) in the Negative Priming version, 5 (31%) in the 
Partial-Partial Change (test cards) version, 4 (25%) in the Partial Change version, 3 (19%) in the Total Change 
version, and 2 (13%) in the Partial-Partial Change (target cards) version. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 8 indicate that as in Experiment 7, most children passed the Total Change (no 
preswitch feedback) version, providing further evidence that children usually do not perseverate on dimensions 
per se. The results for the Partial Change (no preswitch feedback) version also resemble the findings from 
Experiment 7 (50% passing in Exp. 8 vs. 52% in Exp. 7), and these results support the hypothesis, derived from 
CCC theory, that children perseverate on activated rules specifying values of a dimension. Perseveration on the 
Partial Change (no preswitch feedback) version cannot be accounted for by negative priming because the 
dimension values that were irrelevant (and possibly negatively primed) in the preswitch phase were removed 
during the postswitch phase. However, in contrast to Experiment 7, the Partial Change version in Experiment 8 
was significantly easier than the standard version. This discrepancy between Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 
could be due to procedural changes (feedback vs. no feedback during preswitch) or due to the fact that 
participants in Experiment 7 (mean age = 41 months) were younger than the participants in Experiment 8 (mean 
age = 38 months). Further explanations for the pattern of findings with respect to the Partial Change version and 
the standard version are discussed in the final chapter. 
In the Partial-Partial Change versions, persistent activation was possible, but the values of either the target cards 
or test cards were partially absent during the preswitch phase (potentially attenuating the need to select the 
preswitch rules against a competing alternative). The finding that performance was nearly identical (about 50% 
passing) on both Partial-Partial Change versions and on the Partial Change (no preswitch feedback) version 
suggests that performance on all three versions may have reflected comparable amounts of persistent activation 
of the preswitch rules. Activation may not depend on selecting against a competing alternative, although this 
possibility needs to be assessed further because irrelevant values were only partially removed during the 
preswitch phase. Under these circumstances, children may, nonetheless, attend selectively to the relevant values 
against the irrelevant values. 
The main new finding from Experiment 8 is that 3- to 4-year-olds exhibited considerable difficulty on the 
Negative Priming version. Although the findings from the Total Change (no preswitch feedback) and Partial 
Change (no preswitch feedback) versions lend support to CCC theory and the idea that children persist in 
applying activated preswitch rules (rather than perseverating on a dimension per se), CCC theory cannot explain 
why children perseverated on the Negative Priming version. Persistent activation would not interfere 
with performance on the Negative Priming version. 
Surprisingly, this experiment revealed a main effect of sex: girls performed better than boys across versions 
(there was no interaction). An effect of sex on the DCCS has also been reported by Carlson and Moses 
(2001; see also Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996), but was not found in any of the other experiments described in this 
Monograph (although there was a Sex x Version interaction in Experiment 6 reflecting the fact that girls 
performed better than boys on the more difficult versions). Therefore, it is possible that the effect is simply a 
Type I error. Alternatively, however, it may reflect a genuine difference. The effect size associated with the 
effect was f = .23, which is considered a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
A genuine sex difference favoring girls would not be entirely unexpected on this task insofar as it relies heavily 
on language and is likely to be heavily dependent on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Considerable evidence 
suggests that various aspects of language acquisition proceed more rapidly in girls (see Kimura, 1999, for a 
review), and these differences may (at least eventually) be reflected in patterns of functional neuroanatomical 
organization within prefrontal cortex (cf. Shaywitz, Shaywitz, Pugh, et al., 1995). 
There is no direct evidence for more rapid development of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in girls. However, there 
is evidence for reciprocal suppression between dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex (Drevets 
& Raichle, 1998), consistent with the view that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex stands in a hierarchical relation to 
orbitofrontal cortex and regulates it (Zelazo & Muller, 2002b). Moreover, there is evidence from monkeys (e.g., 
Clark & Goldman-Rakic, 1989) and from toddlers (Overman, Bachevalier, Schuhmann, & Ryan, 1996) that 
orbitofrontal cortex develops more rapidly in males than in females, and that this sex difference is under the 
control of gonadal hormones (Clark & Goldman-Rakic; Goldman, Crawford, Stokes, Galkin, & Rosvold, 1974). 
Together these findings prompt the speculation that whereas orbitofrontal cortex develops more rapidly in boys, 
perhaps dorsolateral prefrontal cortex develops more rapidly in girls. Clearly, however, this is no more than an 
intriguing possibility, and further work remains to be done simply to determine whether the sex difference in 
DCCS performance, however small in size, is a reliable effect. Pending such work, the effect of sex observed in 
Experiment 8 will not be discussed further. 
EXPERIMENT 9 
Experiment 8 revealed evidence of negative priming in the DCCS. In the Negative Priming version, 
performance during the postswitch phase could not depend on persistent activation of the specific preswitch 
rules because these rules could not be applied during the postswitch phase. Moreover, children's good 
performance on the Total Change version provides evidence that children are unlikely perseverate on a 
dimension per se. Taken together, these findings indicate that the rules that are irrelevant during the preswitch 
phase are negatively primed. Indeed, the finding that the Negative Priming version was not significantly easier 
than the standard version suggests that negative priming may make a major contribution to 3- to 4-year-olds' 
difficulty on the DCCS. However, the Negative Priming version did not significantly differ from the Partial 
Change versions, and it was only marginally different from the Total Change version, raising the possibility that 
the finding from Experiment 8 is not reliable and/or that the role of negative priming is relatively minor. 
Experiment 9 was designed to replicate the finding with respect to the negative priming version and to 
explore further the circumstances in which negative priming is elicited in the DCCS. One possibility is that 
negative priming is only seen when children are required to select the preswitch pair of rules against a 
competing alternative (Perner & Lang, 2002; cf. Houghton & Tipper, 1994). On the other hand, it is also 
possible that whenever children attend to the values from one dimension, everything else is negatively primed 
(or, alternatively, habituated to) in an automatic and relatively passive fashion. In this case, even irrelevant 
cues from dimensions that do not conflict with the relevant dimension may be negatively primed. Negative 
priming may be an emergent consequence of a discrimination process inherent in memory retrieval (Milliken 
et al., 1998) or a consequence of episodic retrieval (Neill & Valdes, 1992). 
Experiment 9 aimed to investigate these two possibilities using two new versions of the DCCS (see Figure 17), 
the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version and the Redundant version ( Jacques, 1995). In the 
Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, target and test cards were identical during the preswitch phase, 
and the values of the formerly relevant dimension were replaced during the postswitch phase, as in the Negative 
Priming version. In the Redundant version, target and test cards were identical during the preswitch phase, and 
conflicting target and test cards were introduced during the postswitch phase. 
If negative priming depends on active selection against a competing alternative, then performance on the 
Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version should be good. If it does not, then performance on this version 
should be poor. 
Errors on the postswitch phase of the Redundant version could reflect both negative priming and persistent 
activation, and this version was included to explore further the circumstances in which these potential 
influences occur. If negative priming depends on active selection against a competing alternative, then no 
negative priming should be observed on the Redundant version. Predictions regarding activation were less clear. 
In Experiment 8, errors were observed in the Partial-Partial Change versions even though it was not possible 
during the preswitch rules to sort by the alternative rules. This may indicate that activation occurs even in the 
absence of competing alternative rules. In the Redundant version, it was possible to sort by alternative rules 
during the preswitch phase, but the alternative rules prescribed the same responses as the preswitch rules (and 
hence, were not "competing"). Additionally, unlike in the Partial-Partial Change versions, in the Redundant 
version there was no conflict between target and test cards during the preswitch phase. If some mismatch 
between target and test cards is required to elicit activation of selected rules, then no persistent activation should 
be observed on the Redundant version. 
In addition to the Redundant version, performance on the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version was 
compared to performance on the standard (target cards refreshed) version, the Total Change (no preswitch 
feedback) version, and the Negative Priming version. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-seven 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 41.4, range: 36 months to 48 months; 44 girls and 43 
boys) were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1. Six additional children were excluded from the 
final sample because of experimenter error (n = 5) or for admitting to tricking the experimenter (n = 1). 
Design. Children at each age were randomly assigned to receive one of five versions of the DCCS: the standard 
(target cards refreshed) version, the Total Change (no preswitch feedback) version, the Negative Priming 
version, the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, or the Redundant version. For all versions, the 
dimension (color or shape) that was relevant during the preswitch phase was counterbalanced. Card sets were 
the same as in Experiments 7 and 8, and they were counterbalanced in the same fashion as in these experiments. 
Procedure. The standard (target cards refreshed), Total Change (no preswitch feedback), and Negative Priming 
versions were the same as in Experiment 8. The procedure for the remaining two versions was identical to that 
of the other versions except for the cards used. In the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, the 
target cards and test cards were identical during the preswitch phase, and the values of the dimension that was 
relevant during the preswitch phase were replaced during the postswitch phase. In the Redundant version, the 
target cards and test cards were identical during the preswitch phase; standard test cards were used during the 
postswitch phase. The total procedure took approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
 
Results 
Group analyses. A preliminary two-way (Version x Dimension Order) ANOVA on number of correct 
postswitch trials indicated that there was no effect of dimension order and no Version x Dimension Order 
interaction. Consequently, dimension order was dropped from subsequent analyses. A two-way (Sex x Version) 
ANOVA on number of correct postswitch responses revealed only a significant effect of version, F(4, 77) = 
2.74, p < .05 (effect size f = .38), and no effect of sex, F(1, 77) = .01. The Newman-Keuls post hoc test (p < .05) 
indicated that the Negative Priming version was significantly more difficult than the Redundant version, the 
Total Change (no preswitch feedback) version, and the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version (see 
Figure 19). These results did not change after excluding children who failed the preswitch phase (fewer than 7 
out of 8 correct; n = 7). 
Comparison of children's performance on the different versions to chance performance revealed that children 
performed significantly better than chance on the Redundant version, t(16) = 3.77,p < .0 1, the Negative 
Priming (redundant preswitch) version, t(16) = 2.6 1, p < .05, and the Total Change version, t(16) = 2.82, p< 
.05. Children's performance on the standard version and on the Negative Priming version did not differ 
significantly from chance. 
 
Individual analyses. Seven children (2 in the standard version, 2 in the Negative Priming version, and 1 each in 
the Total Change, the Redundant, and the Negative Priming [redundant preswitch] versions) failed the 
preswitch phase, using the same criterion as in Experiment 8 (i.e., at least 7 out of 8 correct, p < .05, binomial 
distribution). Children who passed the preswitch phase were classified as passing the postswitch phase by the 
same criterion (see Table 8). As can be seen, performance on the Negative Priming version was significantly 
worse than on the Redundant version χ2(1, N = 32) = 6.15, p < .05, on the Negative Priming (redundant 
preswitch) version, χ2(1, N= 32) = 6.15, p < .05, and on the Total Change version, χ2(1, N= 32) = 6.15, p < .05. 
There was also a trend for the Negative Priming version to be more difficult than the standard version, χ2(1, N = 
33) = 3.24, p <.08. Nine children (53%) perseverated (7 or 8 incorrect) in the Negative Priming version, 6 
(38%) in the standard version, 3 (19%) in the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, 2 (13%) in the 
Redundant version, and 2 (13%) in the Total Change version. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 9 replicated the finding from Experiment 8 that 3- to 4year-olds performed poorly on the Negative 
Priming version of the DCCS, in which persistent activation of the preswitch rules could not affect postswitch 
performance. Children performed significantly worse on the Negative Priming version than on the Total Change 
(no preswitch feedback) version, the Redundant version, and the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) 
version. Surprisingly, the Negative Priming version was also marginally more difficult than the standard 
version, and the standard version did not differ from the Total Change (no preswitch feedback) version. It 
should be noted, however, that for unknown reasons (possibly sampling error) children's performance on the 
standard (target cards refreshed) version was slightly better than is usually observed. 
 
 
These results further document and clarify the role of negative priming in the DCCS. In the DCCS, negative 
priming occurs when there is a conflicting mismatch between target and test cards during the preswitch 
condition. Under these circumstances, children need to attend to one dimension and ignore the alternative. In 
selectively attending to the values of the relevant dimension, children evidently need to inhibit the values of the 
interfering distractors from the irrelevant dimension. As a result, these values are suppressed and this 
suppression seems to persist into the post-switch phase, making it difficult for children to select and use the 
postswitch rules. When there is no conflicting mismatch between target and test cards during the preswitch 
phase, as in the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, children perform significantly better. 
These findings suggest that negative priming is due to an inhibitory selection mechanism that is only invoked 
when children are confronted with stimuli that can be sorted in two different ways. The findings argue against 
the position that negative priming will be operative even when conflicting stimuli are absent (Milliken et al., 
1998; Neill & Valdes, 1992) because if that were the case then children should have performed poorly on the 
Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) and Redundant versions. Similarly, the findings argue against the 
suggestion that negative priming can be accounted for by habituation of attention to irrelevant values. At the 
same time, however, it remains possible that habituation of attention plays a role children's performance on the 
DCCS. Any beneficial effect of introducing novel stimuli during the postswitch phase could perhaps be 
attributed to dishabituation. This possibility will be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
The Redundant version was included in an exploratory fashion to examine further the circumstances in which 
negative priming and persistent activation influence postswitch performance. In contrast to the 3- to 4-year-
olds in Jacques's (1995) study, the children in Experiment 9 performed well on the Redundant version: whereas 
about 2/3 of the children failed the Redundant version in Jacques's study, about 2/3 passed this version in 
Experiment 9. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear: The mean age of the 3- to 4-year-olds in Jacques's 
study was 43.1 months (SD = 1.71), versus 41.4 in Experiment 9, and the procedure was similar to the one 
used in Experiment 9. However, test cards were labeled by both dimensions in Jacques's study, and children 
received preswitch trials (with no feedback) until they reached a criterion of 5 consecutive correct trials 
(maximum 20 trials). Although one must be cautious in interpreting the findings of the Redundant version until 
further research confirms whether this version is easy or difficult for 3- to 4-year-olds, the good performance 
observed in this experiment provides converging evidence that negative priming is only observed when there is 
a conflicting mismatch between target and test cards during the preswitch phase, and, hence, when children 
must select against a competing alternative. 
Interpretation in terms of activation is less straightforward, and several possible interpretations exist. One 
possibility is that activation of selected preswitch rules only occurs when there is conflict between target and 
test cards during the preswitch phase. In Experiment 8, errors were observed in the Partial-Partial Change 
versions. Although it was not possible during the preswitch phase to sort by the alternative rules (because values 
of the alternative dimension were missing either for the target cards or the test cards), there was conflict 
between target and test cards in the sense that target and test cards did not match. Another possibility is that 
values of the irrelevant dimension were actually positively primed (i.e., more strongly activated) rather than 
negatively primed. Positive priming of unattended values has been observed in some circumstances in the adult 
literature on negative priming (e.g., Fox, 1995). These possibilities, along with others, will need to be explored 
further. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiment 8 replicated and extended the findings from Experiment 7 in the absence of feedback during the 
preswitch trials. Whereas about half of the 3- to 4-year-olds perseverated in the Partial Change (no preswitch 
feedback) version, nearly two-thirds passed the Total Change (no preswitch feedback) version. Experiment 8 
also revealed that negative priming plays an important role in the DCCS. In the Negative Priming version, the 
values of the dimension that was relevant during the preswitch phase were replaced by different values. 
According to CCC theory and one reading of Kirkham et al.'s (in press) attentional inertia account, children 
should have no difficulty with this version of the DCCS. However, 3- to 4-year-olds performed as poorly in the 
Negative Priming version as they did in the standard version. Finally, in the Partial-Partial Change versions, the 
values of the irrelevant dimension were removed during the preswitch phase on either the target cards or the test 
cards. Performance on the Partial-Partial Change versions was nearly identical to performance on the Partial 
Change version, raising the possibility that activation of the preswitch rules occurs even when it is not actually 
possible to sort by an alternative rule. 
Experiment 9 confirmed that 3- to 4-year-olds perform poorly on the Negative Priming version, and also 
clarified the conditions under which negative priming occurs. Evidence indicates that negative priming occurs 
only under conditions of conflict when it is possible to sort by values of another dimension. Negative priming 
was not observed in the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version or the Redundant version, in both of 
which target cards and test cards were identical during the preswitch phase. Both versions were significantly 
easier than the Negative Priming version. 
Experiments 8 and 9 suggest, therefore, that there must be a conflicting mismatch between target and test cards 
during the preswitch phase in order for negative priming to occur in the DCCS. Under these circumstances, 
suppression of the values of the interfering dimension persists into the postswitch trials, making it more difficult 
to switch to sorting by the previously irrelevant dimension. These findings support the hypothesis that negative 
priming occurs in the DCCS only when children must actively select the preswitch pair of rules against a 
competing alternative. 
Negative priming alone, however, does not suffice to explain 3- to 4-year-olds' performance on the DCCS. If 
negative priming alone were operative, the children would have no difficulty with the Partial Change version, in 
which the values of the dimension that was irrelevant during the preswitch phase were replaced by new values. 
However, in both Experiments 7 and 8, about half of the children failed the Partial Change version, and 
performance did not differ from the standard version in Experiment 7. 
Thus, neither the negative priming hypothesis nor CCC theory can fully explain the pattern of findings. 
Whereas the findings from the Partial Change version are consistent with CCC theory, the findings from the 
Negative Priming version are not. By contrast, the findings from the Negative Priming version are consistent 
with the negative priming hypothesis, but the findings from the Partial Change are not. In order to capture the 
full pattern of empirical findings, an alternative account is needed that includes both processes of activation and 
processes of inhibition. This alternative is described in Chapter VI. 
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION: COGNITIVE COMPLEXITYAND 
CONTROL-REVISED 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS ACROSS STUDIES 
The current Monograph consisted of four studies (9 experiments) designed to explore the development of 
children's executive function, as revealed by their performance on the DCCS. The DCCS is a widely used 
measure of rule use, and, as such, it provides a relatively well-defined window on the development of 
executive function during the preschool years. Executive function in general, and as assessed by the DCCS in 
particular, has been implicated in children's behavior in a variety of domains and in a variety of subject groups, 
including bilingual children, children with autism, and children with Down's syndrome. 
By experimentally manipulating features of the DCCS paradigm, we tested hypotheses about the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying executive function and its development. Results of this research have the potential to 
shed light not only on children's development in a variety of domains, but also on dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortical function especially during the preschool years. Performance on the DCCS almost certainly relies on 
neural systems involving prefrontal cortex. In particular, dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex have been 
implicated in a number of tasks quite similar to the DCCS (see Nagahama et al., 2001; Rogers, Andrews, 
Grasby, Brooks, & Robbins, 2000, for research using functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI] and 
positron-emission tomography [PET], respectively). 
Study 1 examined whether 3- to 4-year-olds' errors on the DCCS can be attributed to capacity limitations on 
memory. Three experiments showed that 3- to 4-year-olds performed well on four versions of the DCCS in 
which children were required to use four nonoverlapping rules (i.e., children were not required to treat the 
same test card differently depending on the relevant dimension). In Experiment 1, the two new versions were 
unidimensional. In Experiment 2, children were given the 2+2-Rules (bidimensional, no overlap) version, in 
which they were shown four target cards and asked to sort test cards first by two rules based on one dimension 
(e.g., color) and then by two rules based on the other dimension (e.g., shape). Although children needed to 
remember which cards to sort by color and which cards to sort by shape, there was no conflict among rules 
because each test card was uniquely associated with a single rule. Children performed well on this version, 
showing that bidimensionality per se does not cause children's difficulty on the DCCS. 
In Experiment 3, children performed well on the 4-Rules (super-ordinate) version, which likely posed even 
greater memory demands than the 4-Rules versions used in Experiments 1 and 2 because it involved 
superordinate rules and a heterogeneous series of test cards. Not only did children need to keep four 
superordinate distinctions in mind, but they also need to determine which rule applied to each test card (i.e., 
there were storage plus processing demands). Nonetheless, children performed significantly better on the 4- 
Rules (superordinate) version than on the standard version of the DCCS. Taken together, findings from the three 
experiments provide strong evidence against most memory capacity accounts of performance on the DCCS, and 
they point to the importance of conflict among rules. 
Study 2 was designed to explore further the role of conflict among rules by determining more precisely the 
circumstances in which children can and cannot treat a single test card in two different ways. Three experiments 
assessed the effects of rule dimensionality (bidimensional vs. unidimensional rules) and two types of stimulus 
characteristic (1 vs. 2 test cards; integrated vs. separable stimuli). Here, unlike Study 1, bidimensional rule sets 
always involved conflict among rules whereas unidimensional rule sets did not. Results revealed effects of rule 
dimensionality but no effects of stimulus characteristics. Sorting by even a single pair of rules was difficult for 
3- to 4-year-olds when the two rules spanned major branches of the hierarchical tree structure shown in Figure 
3. When the rules did not span major branches, however, even 3- to 4-year-olds were able to treat the same 
stimulus in two different ways. That is, under these circumstances, 3- to 4year-olds effectively redescribed the 
test card and inhibited their old way of responding. 
The third experiment in Study 2 (i.e., Experiment 6) replicated these findings in a single test, while also 
assessing whether the separated stimuli used in the unidimensional version in Experiment 5 might have 
accounted for children's success. According to Shepp and Barrett (1991), as well as work with adults (see 
MacLeod, 1991), the use of spatially separated stimuli may facilitate analysis of the stimuli into dimensions or 
attributes. The findings from Experiment 6, however, clearly indicate that conflict among rules, but not spatial 
separation of the stimuli, determines performance on the DCCS. 
Taken together, the results of Study 2 show that conflict among rules is a key determinant of difficulty, but that 
conflict interacts with dimensionality. 
Perseveration is, therefore, at least partly a function of rule complexity, and cannot be attributed to a general 
problem with inhibitory control—either at the level of responses or at the level of representations. Similarly, 
it cannot be explained by a general difficulty redescribing stimuli. The redescription hypothesis cannot 
account for the finding in Experiment 6 that children performed significantly better on the Unidimensional 
Separated version than they did on the Bidimensional Separated version. These two versions should be 
equally likely to alert children to the need to redescribe the test cards. From the perspective of CCC theory, 
however, a difference between these versions would be expected because only the Bidimensional Separated 
version 
requires children to use rules nested under different major branches of the tree structure in Figure 3. CCC theory 
holds that 3- to 4-year-olds fail to resolve conflict at a particular level of complexity at the level of specific 
rules—because they have difficulty formulating a higher order rule for selecting between dimensions. 
Study 3 examined further what types of conflict in typical executive function problems pose difficulties for 3- to 
4-year-olds by asking whether children who perseverate on the DCCS perseverate on specific rules as opposed 
to dimensions per se or particular stimuli. Although children perseverated on the Partial Change version (in 
which the values of the dimension that was relevant on the preswitch phase were retained during the postswitch 
phase), they performed well when the values of both dimensions were changed (Total Change version). These 
findings suggest that children perseverate on specific rules (e.g., "If red, then there"), consistent with CCC 
theory, according to which the selection and use of preswitch rules increases the activation level of those rules 
(Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2000) . 
Study 4 was designed to replicate Study 3 and also to examine the possible role of negative priming on the 
DCCS in relation to other possible sources of difficulty. In the Negative Priming version of the DCCS, the 
values of the dimension that was relevant during the preswitch phase were removed during the postswitch 
phase. Results indicated that this version was as difficult as the standard version, as would be predicted if the 
competing rules are negatively primed and thus inhibited during the preswitch phase. Further work suggested 
that negative priming depends on the active selection of one pair of rules against a competing alternative. In 
Experiment 9, children performed well on the Negative Priming (redundant preswitch) version, in which test 
cards were identical to the target cards during the preswitch phase so children did not need actively to select 
against competing rules. Children also performed well in the Redundant version, suggesting that persistent 
activation may also depend on attending selectively to the preswitch rules. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTION 
Memory Accounts 
Several influential accounts of development during the preschool years suggest that age-related changes in 
executive function will be limited by the development of children's memory (e.g., Case, 1992, 1995; Gordon & 
Olson, 1998; Olson, 1991; Pascual-Leone, 1970). It is possible that the growth of memory, perhaps particularly 
working memory, constrains the number of rules that children can use in the DCCS. For example, 3-year-old 
children may represent and remember the first two rules but then be unable to hold the second pair of rules in 
mind due to limited available processing space. 
In the standard version of the DCCS, children are told the postswitch rules on every trial, so prima facie it 
seems unlikely that an inability to remember the rules can account for 3- to 4-year-olds' failure to use them. 
Similarly, children correctly answer questions about the postswitch rules (Zelazo et al., 1996), suggesting that 
they have not forgotten these rules. Finally, some manipulations that might be expected to increase memory 
demands (e.g., removing target cards; Towse et al., 2000) actually appear to improve performance. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that capacity constraints and/or proactive interference (Keppel & 
Underwood, 1962) prevent children from keeping the postswitch rules in mind long enough to control 
responding. Also, Morton and Munakata (2002) were able to model performance on the DCCS in terms of 
competition between active and latent memory. 
 
The results of Study 1 showed that 3- to 4-year-olds performed well on versions of the DCCS in which children 
were required to use four rules but not required to respond in two different ways to the same test card. These 
findings clearly suggest that errors on the DCCS cannot be attributed in any straightforward way to limitations 
on memory. However, the findings from Study 1 leave open the possibility that 3- to 4-year-olds' memory for 
the rules is limited in a way that permits them to succeed in some situations (i.e., those without conflict) but not 
others (those with conflict), as suggested by Morton and Munakata (2002), and they leave open the possibility 
that memory plays a critical role in performance on the DCCS and in other measures of executive function. 
Indeed, according to CCC theory, children formulate explicit rules in self-directed speech, maintain them in 
working memory, and then use them to guide their behavior. What the findings from Study 1 suggest is simply 
that 3- to 4-year-olds' difficulty on the DCCS depends more on the conflict among rules than on the requirement 
that rules be remembered. It seems unlikely that age-related increases in memory capacity alone can explain 
age-related increases in performance on the DCCS. 
 
Inhibition Accounts 
Several accounts suggest that children perform poorly on measures of executive function because of poor 
inhibitory control (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 1998; Dempster, 1993, 1995; Diamond & 
Gilbert, 1989; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993; Luria, 1961; Perner et al., 1999; White, 1965). Perseveration 
seems to implicate inhibition by definition behavior is exhibited that should have been inhibited. In the DCCS, 
for example, children are not supposed to sort by the preswitch rules during the postswitch phase, and when 
they do this, they may reasonably be described as failing to inhibit sorting by the preswitch rules. But this is 
simply a description of their behavior, not an explanation of why they fail to inhibit sorting by the preswitch 
rules. 
An inhibitory control account of the DCCS gains leverage, however, when it implies that 3- to 4-year-olds 
understand everything they need to understand in order to perform correctly. On this type of account, 3- to 4- 
year-olds know perfectly well what to do during the postswitch phase of the DCCS, and even try to do it, but 
cannot inhibit a prepotent tendency acquired during the preswitch phase. Even when conceptualized in this way, 
inhibition accounts are problematic for a number of reasons (Zelazo & Muller, 2002b). One limitation of these 
accounts is their inability to support predictions regarding the specific situations that will pose problems for 
children at different ages. For example, they generally fail to explain in a noncircular way why children at a 
particular age perseverate in particular situations but not others (e.g., why 3- to 4-year-olds perseverate in the 
standard DCCS but not the standard A-not-B task). A second limitation of inhibition accounts is that the 
construct of inhibition fails to address how one decides what is to be inhibited, and when (Rapport, Chung, 
Shore, & Isaacs, 2001). A third limitation is that inhibition accounts do not explain how children acquire new 
levels of conceptual understanding: "Inhibitory-based accounts ... cannot explain knowledge level transitions 
per se" (Perret et al., 2003, p. 287). 
Do 3- to 4-year-olds understand everything there is to know regarding the DCCS? Do they try to sort by the 
postswitch rules but fail? Considerable evidence suggests that they do not. One finding (Zelazo et al., 1996, 
Exp. 2) suggests that 3- to 4-year-olds perseverate in the DCCS even after a single preswitch trial. In other 
words, sorting a card even once by one dimension prevents the majority of 3- to 4-year-olds from switching 
to the other dimension, so perseveration in this situation cannot be due to failure to inhibit an overlearned 
response. The findings by Jacques et al . (1999) that 3- to 4-year-olds judge a puppet's perseveration on the 
DCCS to be correct makes this point even more strongly. If 3- to 4-year-olds know what should be done in 
the task and are not required to make the response themselves, why is it still as difficult for them to evaluate 
another's performance? Taken together, these results show that 3- to 4-year-olds' have difficulty formulating 
what should be done and not just difficulty doing it (cf. Frye et al., 1996; Zelazo et al., 1995). 
It remains possible, however, that 3- to 4-year-olds have difficulty inhibiting attention to particular aspects of 
the target cards (Kirkham et al ., in press). CCC theory agrees with Kirkham et al. that inhibition and refocusing 
are required in the DCCS. That is, both accounts agree that, in the context of this task, 3- to 4-year-olds have 
difficulty inhibiting attention to a previously useful aspect of the stimulus, and refocusing on another conflicting 
aspect of the same stimulus. However, CCC theory attempts to explain how inhibition and refocusing occur, 
why failures of inhibition and refocusing occur in some situations and not others, and why there are particular 
age-related changes in inhibition and refocusing. According to CCC theory, inhibition and refocusing are made 
possible by (a) reflection on rules and (b) formulation of a higher order rule for selecting the appropriate setting 
condition. In the absence of reflection and the formulation of a more complex rule system, children cannot 
properly be said to understand what to do on the DCCS. Although they know the relevant rules, these rules 
remain unintegrated and children cannot appreciate the relation among them. 
The findings from Study 2 show that children are indeed capable of inhibition and refocusing when pre- and 
postswitch rules are not nested under different major branches of the hierarchical tree structure in Figure 3. This 
finding was expected based on CCC theory, but it is unclear how it could be accounted for in terms of Kirkham 
et al.'s (in press) approach. Further, unlike CCC theory, Kirkham et al. do not differentiate between persistent 
attention to a dimension and persistent activation of specific rules. The results of Experiment 7, which showed 
that children were more likely to perseverate on the preswitch sorting rules than the preswitch sorting 
dimension, clearly favor CCC theory in this regard. Finally, Experiments 8 and 9 show that 3- to 4-year-olds 
have difficulty disinhibiting the postswitch rules, a finding that is at odds with the suggestion that children fail 
the DCCS because of too little inhibition. 
It could be argued, however, that the combination of inhibition and working memory can account for the 
findings presented in this Monograph. In fact, working memory plus inhibition accounts have been proposed by 
a variety of researchers (e.g., Diamond, 2002; H ala et al., 2003; Roberts & Pennington, 1996) . A working 
memory plus inhibition account would predict that children will only encounter difficulties in versions of the 
DCCS that involve conflict because conflict pits a prepotent but incorrect response against a weaker but correct 
response. The joint development of working memory and inhibition would then be responsible for children's 
eventual success on versions of the DCCS that involve conflict. Thus, for example, on this account, the finding 
that children performed well on unidimensional versions and 4-Rule versions of the DCCS may be attributed to 
the lack of conflict in these versions. 
Although clearly both working memory and inhibition play a role in the DCCS, a working memory plus 
inhibition account by itself encounters some of the same problems that undermine the appeal of simple 
inhibition or working memory accounts. That is, children encounter conflict at many different levels, and they 
fail tasks that involve conflict at different ages. A working memory plus inhibition account lacks a clear metric 
that can be used to order these different tasks in an a priori fashion. For example, the 4-Rule and 2+2-Rule 
version used in Study 1 likely do involve conflict in the sense that children must inhibit a motor tendency to 
put the test card into the same tray on trial n+1 that they put it into on trial n —a perseverative pattern exhibited 
by children under the age of 3 years (Zelazo et al., 1995). Clearly, the a priori specification of different kinds 
and degrees of conflict remains a major task for working memory plus inhibition accounts. 
In a sense, the neural network model by Morton and Munakata (2002) can also be considered a working 
memory plus inhibition model, although the inhibition component is seen to be a consequence of increases in 
the strength of active memory. Because the strength of active memory increases gradually, the model can 
explain why children are more likely to succeed on versions of the DCCS with less conflict. In addition, 
because the model incorporates lateral inhibitory connections among units within the prefrontal cortex, hidden, 
and output layers, the model might be able to simulate children's performance on the Negative Priming version 
(although this needs to be established). Thus, a major advantage of the model by Morton and Munakata is that it 
captures the dynamic interplay between activation and inhibition, which has been demonstrated in the DCCS 
and is probably also characteristic of other measures of executive function. 
It might be noted, however, that it is unclear how the Morton and Munakata (2002) model would account for 
the earlier finding that 3- to 4year-olds perseverate even after a single preswitch trial (Zelazo et al., 1996). In 
addition, one wonders whether Morton and Munakata's model provides a satisfactory account of development 
and developmental mechanisms: The setting conditions and the differentiation between setting conditions are 
simply built into the prefrontal component of the model. In contrast to CCC theory (e.g., see Marcovitch & 
Zelazo, 2000), therefore, this model does not explain, but rather simply stipulates, older children's ability to 
differentiate between setting conditions. 
Redescription Accounts 
The redescription hypothesis (Perner et al., 2002) predicts that 3- to 4year-olds will have difficulty 
appreciating that a single thing can be labeled in multiple ways. According to Perner and colleagues, this 
difficulty, which has been noted in the context of research on word learning (e.g., in terms of the mutual 
exclusivity constraint; Markman, 1989) and theory of mind (e.g., Flavell, 1988), derives from an inability to 
appreciate multiple perspectives on an object, and this difficulty is not overcome until children acquire the 
concept of perspectives. 
In support of their redescription approach, Perner and colleagues propose that task manipulations that improve 
children's performance on the DCCS (e.g., asking children to label the test cards; Kirkham et al., in press; 
Towse et al., 2000, Exp. 4; or demonstrating correct sorting in the postswitch phase; Towse et al., Exp. 1) help 
children to understand that test cards can be redescribed. They also refer to independent evidence that 3- to 4- 
year-olds have difficulty with redescription. For example, in work by Doherty and Perner (199 8) using the 
say-something-different task, children are told a name for something (e.g., rabbit) and then asked to generate 
an alternative description (e.g., bunny). Three-year-olds have difficulty with this task whereas 4-year-olds do 
well. 
Perner et al. (2002) offer a test to specify when using two labels will be particularly difficult for children. 
Basically, if two descriptions can be joined by "and," as for example when the descriptions "dog" and 
"beautifully spotted" can be combined into "beautifully spotted and a dog," then young children will be able, 
in principle, to use both descriptions. However, if two descriptions cannot be joined by "and" without 
producing an apparent conflict, then young children will accept only one description. For example, when one 
person sees "object A in front of object B" and another person from the other side sees "object B in front of 
object A," joining these two descriptions yields "object A is in front of object B and behind object B." 
Resolving the apparent discrepancy requires understanding the concept of perspectives. 
Of course, Perner et al.'s (2002) "and" test predicts that 3- to 4-year-olds should be able to pass the standard 
version of the DCCS because the test cards can be easily described as "green and a car." However, as Perner 
and Lang (2002) note, even if 3- to 4-year-olds can, in principle, understand alternative descriptions in the 
DCCS, they become much more likely to do so at around 4 years of age, when they discover the concept of 
perspectives. Therefore, this account can be applied to the DCCS in a straightforward fashion. For example, in 
the preswitch phase of the DCCS, when sorting by color, children may describe a red rabbit as a red one. 
Then, in the postswitch phase, they may need to describe that same stimulus as a rabbit. If 3- to 4-year-olds 
fail to understand that it is possible to provide multiple descriptions of a single stimulus, then they will persist 
in describing the test cards in terms of the preswitch dimension, as suggested by Zelazo and Frye (1997) and 
Frye (1999). 
As Zelazo and Frye (1997, p. 145) noted, "Higher order rules allow children to understand that the shape rules 
and the color rules both apply to a single task under different descriptions (or setting conditions)." Using a 
higher order rule to select a particular setting condition in effect determines how to describe a single thing for 
the purpose of deciding how to respond to it. In the DCCS, children may first have to describe a test card in 
terms of its color and then in terms of its shape. Although 3- to 4-year-olds are capable of either description, 
they have difficulty switching flexibly between them. Therefore, despite disagreement about the mechanisms 
underlying age-related changes in children's flexibility, CCC theory is similar in many respects to Perner's 
redescription account, and it makes many of the same predictions. 
However, CCC theory also differs from Perner's account in important ways. For example, CCC theory predicts 
that redescription in the context of the DCCS will be easy or difficult depending on whether or not switching 
between rules requires appeal to a setting condition. As the results of Study 2 establish, children can treat a 
single test card in two different ways whenever rules are not nested under different setting conditions in the 
hierarchical tree structure in Figure 3. According to CCC theory, a higher order rule will be required when 
children need first to consider a setting condition and then to select the appropriate rule. Thus, CCC theory can 
account for the results of Study 2 in a straightforward fashion, whereas Perner's redescription hypothesis cannot. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPLEXITY THEORIES 
Circumstances in Which 3- to 4-Year-Olds Perseverate 
The results reported in this Monograph add to our understanding of the conditions in which 3- to 4-year-olds 
exhibit difficulty on the DCCS. As these results show, the key conditions appear to be that (a) there is conflict 
among at least two rules such that children are required to respond in two different ways to the same stimulus 
and (b) the conflicting rules are nested under different major branches in the hierarchical tree structure depicted 
in Figure 3. These conditions apparently must occur jointly for perseveration to be observed; when either (a) or 
(b) occurs alone, children perform well. Together, these conditions imply that conflict occurs at the level of 
specific rules, not at the level of dimensions per se or at the level of specific stimulus configurations. 
Difficulty under conditions (a) and (b) appears to derive both from activation of rules selected during the 
preswitch phase and from inhibition of the rules selected against during the preswitch phase. Inhibition seems to 
depend on the presence of competing alternative rules during the preswitch phase, and activation may depend 
on the presence of some degree of mismatch between test and target cards during the preswitch phase. 
In addition to these conditions, it is likely that interference between pre-and postswitch phases is context 
dependent to some extent. For example, 3- to 4-year-olds may be able to sort by either pre- or postswitch 
rules in the standard version when these rules are presented in very different contexts (e.g., on different days), 
although the limits of this likely context dependency remain to be determined. 
Criteria for Determining When a Higher Order Rule Is Required 
The conditions outlined above help to clarify the criteria for determining when a higher order rule is required. 
CCC theory provides guidelines for determining the rule complexity—the number of degrees of rule 
embedding—required in any particular situation. The basic strategy is to calculate the simplest possible rule 
structure, or structures, necessary to control variations in responding to a stimulus or set of stimuli (these rule 
structures being formulated in an ad hoc fashion in order to solve the problem). A new degree of embedding is 
only required (although it may be allowed) in cases where at least two rules apply to a single stimulus with 
respect to different dimensions (e.g., in the Pruned Tree [single test card] version of the DCCS, both the red rule 
and the rabbit rule apply to the red rabbit, in different dimensions, viz., color and shape). When this happens, a 
dimension must serve as a setting condition in order to permit selection of, first, the appropriate setting 
condition and then of the appropriate rule. 
This approach predicts that 3 - to 4-year-olds will have difficulty whenever they are required to formulate a 
single rule system that spans major branches in a hierarchical tree structure like that depicted in Figure 3. A 
higher order rule will not be required, although it may be allowed, when switching between specific rules that 
are not in conflict (e.g., within a dimension or between nonoverlapping rules) and when using conflicting rules 
in different contexts. 
Color and shape are paradigmatic instances of dimensions, but they are not the only possibilities. A dimension, 
on this view, corresponds to any relatively abstract, superordinate category of variation, in contrast to a more 
direct, concrete representation of a stimulus. Recall Vygotsky's (1929) description of a "primitive" boy (i.e., one 
who lacks formal education) who is asked to reflect on knowledge that he represents: 
Another example: a primitive boy is asked, "What is the difference between a tree and a log?" He 
answers, "I have not seen a tree, nor do I know of any tree, upon my word." Yet there is a lime-
tree growing just opposite his window. When you ask him, "And what is this?" he will answer, 
"This is a lime-tree." (Vygotsky, 1929, p. 417) 
From the perspective of the CCC theory, the concept of tree is an abstract, superordinate concept, and this boy 
has not coordinated his knowledge of a lime-tree into a general dimensional system that captures his 
knowledge of trees; he has not reflected on trees per se. Reasoning about a tree in this example involves 
reasoning about a dimension because the concept of tree corresponds to a category of variation that has to be 
considered as such. Zelazo and Frye (1997) suggested that it is only by distancing themselves from 
discriminations within a dimension and considering two or more dimensions in contradistinction that children 
are able to conceptualize dimensions qua dimensions (see also Smith, 1989). 
 
Other examples include different personal perspectives (Frye et al., 1995; Zelazo & Frye, 1997), as in tests 
assessing understanding of false belief. In these tests, for example in judging the identity of an ambiguous 
object that only the child has seen, the reasoning required may be as follows: "If you're asking me, then the 
answer is it's a sponge not a rock, but if you're asking my friend, then the answer is that it's a rock and not a 
sponge." That is, children may be required to formulate and use a higher order rule. Similarly, as discussed by 
Zelazo and Sommerville (2001), children must consider temporal perspectives as such (i.e., as distinct from 
objective time: before vs. later) when they are asked to reason about their own past false beliefs. For example, 
3-year-olds typically fail Gopnik and Astington's (1988) representational change task, where they must 
appreciate that they themselves changed from thinking Smarties to thinking sticks, even while the contents of 
the box did not change. According to CCC theory, they fail this task because the task requires them to 
differentiate between the history of the self (one category of variation) and the history of the world (another 
category of variation). Instead, children assimilate the subjective series to the objective series and reason within 
a single dimension. Notice that when similar tasks only require reasoning within a single dimension, 3-year-olds 
perform well. For example, in a control task used by Gopnik and Astington (Exp. 1), most 3-year-olds were able 
to judge that now there is a doll in a closed toy house but before there was an apple. 
 
The notion of higher order rule use bears some resemblance to the construct of mediation, as it was used in 
research on discrimination learning. A variety of neobehaviorist approaches explored the possibility that, with 
age, children acquire the ability to make covert responses to stimuli that mediate between environmental stimuli 
and overt responding (e.g., H. H. Kendler & T. S. Kendler, 1962). Regardless of whether the mediational 
responses were hypothesized to be verbal or attentional (e.g., Zeaman & House, 1963), it was argued on the 
basis of research on discrimination learning that children under about 6 years of age fail to mediate their 
responses to environmental stimuli. Discrimination-learning research was directed mainly at the question of 
when children conceptualize specific stimuli (or cues such as "red") to be values of a general dimension (e.g., 
color). Dimensional responding was taken to reflect mediation and was inferred from the relative ease of 
intradimensional (and reversal) versus extradimensional (and nonreversal) shifts in rule learning (as opposed to 
rule use) tasks, and from the results of optional shift studies (T. S. Kendler & H. H. Kendler, 1966). 
The results of this research are far from straightforward (see Esposito, 1975, for a review), and mediation theory 
(T. S. Kendler, 1979) is not directed toward explaining changes in rule use in the preschool period because it 
maintains that children in this age range cannot represent and use rules (which is a form of mediation). It is now 
well established that 3year-olds can use rules (Zelazo & Reznick, 1991). However, results from the DCCS 
suggest that in the absence of a higher-order rule for selecting between dimensions, 3- to 4-year-olds cannot be 
said to understand a dimension qua dimension. Although 3- to 4-year-olds do use rules for sorting by a 
dimension, such as color, it is not until children can reflect on these rules and contrast them with rules for 
sorting according to a different dimension, such as shape, that the dimension itself becomes an object of 
consideration for children. Being able to reflect on color rules as color rules that contrast with shape rules (or 
rules from any other dimension) would seem to be required to comprehend the way in which different colors 
form a coherent category of variation (i.e., a dimension). 
Activation and Inhibition Processes 
The results reported in this Monograph clearly indicate that both activation and inhibition play roles in 
performance on the DCCS. This outcome suggests the following account of performance on the standard 
version of the DCCS. During the preswitch phase, the preswitch rules are selected against competing alternative 
rules, which are ignored. For example, based on the experimenter's instructions, children may select two 
specific shape rules against two specific color rules. Then, in terms of this example, the activation level of the 
shape rules is increased whereas the color rules are inhibited. Performance during the postswitch phase requires 
that children overcome the inhibition of the values of the formerly irrelevant dimension and, at the same time, 
deactivate the values of the formerly reinforced dimension. 
The Negative Priming version is slightly (but not significantly) more difficult than the Partial Change version, 
and to the extent that these versions provide pure measures of inhibition and activation, respectively, this may 
indicate that the ignored rules are inhibited to a greater extent than the selected rules are activated. However, 
there are good reasons to believe that these are not pure measures. New values are introduced in the postswitch 
phase and these are likely to attract attention because attention to novelty appears to be a basic design feature of 
the human attentional system (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Attention to novel values would undermine 
switching in the Negative Priming version because the new values introduced in the postswitch phase need to be 
ignored. In contrast, attention to novel values would facilitate switching in the Partial Change version because 
the new values are precisely those to which children need to attend. This difference may explain why the 
Negative Priming version is more difficult than the Partial Change version. However, further empirical research 
will be required to assess the relative influences of inhibition, activation, and novelty, and whether these 
influences change with age. Further research will also be required to map out whether these influences interact, 
and, if so, how. 
 
Experiments 8 and 9 also raise a number of important questions about the processes underlying negative 
priming. The findings from Experiment 9 suggest that negative priming in the DCCS is only operative when 
children must select a pair of rules against a competing alternative. Negative priming thus appears to reflect 
mechanisms that play an instrumental, inhibitory role in the selection of relevant rules in the presence of 
competing distractors (see also Levy & Anderson, 2002). It is possible that in other tasks and/or at different 
ages negative priming may occur in the absence of conflicting information (see Milliken et al., 1998), but this 
does not appear to be the case for 3- to 4-year-olds in the DCCS. Certainly, further investigation is warranted 
regarding the question of whether negative priming is a unitary process or whether different mechanisms 
underlie negative priming in different tasks and at different ages. 
 
Negative priming has rarely been investigated from a developmental perspective. However, Tipper and 
colleagues (1989) have shown that, compared to adults, evidence of negative priming is weak in 7-year-olds in 
a Stroop task. How can negative priming play such an important role in the DCCS if it is difficult to observe 
even in middle childhood? One possible answer to this question is that the influence of negative priming is 
dependent on task complexity; it may be observed first in less complex tasks and later in more complex tasks 
(see Tipper & McLaren, 1990; Stuss et al., 1999, for related arguments). Another possibility is that children 
failed to exhibit negative priming in previous studies simply because they failed to attend selectively during the 
prime phase. Clearly, however, these questions need to be addressed empirically. 
Future research might also explore more fully the variables that are related to negative priming on the DCCS 
(e.g., see Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995, for reviews). For example, the spatial separation of target and distractor 
has been found to be related to the magnitude of negative priming in adults. In order to examine the effect of 
spatial separation on negative priming in the DCCS, the Negative Priming version could be administered with 
spatially separated stimulus values (analogous to Experiment 6). Similarly, research on negative priming in 
adults shows that when more distractors have to be ignored, any single one of them is less strongly inhibited 
(Fox, 1995). In the DCCS, the effect of number of distractors could be tested by adding dimensions to the 
stimuli. Further, the adult literature on negative priming suggests that negative priming can be long lasting and 
persist despite intervening trials (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Fox, 1995). It is unknown whether and under what 
circumstances negative priming is persistent in 3- to 4-year-olds in the DCCS. The time course of negative 
priming during the preswitch phase is also unknown. We assume that negative priming builds up gradually in 
the course of the preswitch. However, it is possible that negative priming reaches maximum strength even after 
a single preswitch trial. In order to examine this question, the number of preswitch trials could be manipulated 
in the Negative Priming version, as was done in the standard version by Zelazo et al. (1996), who found that 3- 
year-old children perseverated after one preswitch trial. 
 
Future studies could also examine the role of negative priming in other measures of executive function, such as 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Chelune & Baer, 1986), the Flexible Item Selection Task ( Jacques & Zelazo, 
2001), and the Day-Night-Stroop task (Diamond et al., 2002; Gerstadt et al., 1994). For example, in the Day-
Night Stroop task, children are instructed to say the word "day" when shown a picture of the moon and stars, 
and "night" when shown a picture of the sun. Three- to 4-year-old children's difficulties in the Day-Night Stroop 
task are commonly attributed to their lack of inhibitory control (Diamond et al., 2002). Specifically, it is argued 
that these children have a difficult time inhibiting a word (e.g., "night" when shown the picture of the moon) 
that is semantically related to the word they are supposed to say (e.g., "sun"). However, it is also possible that 
children have difficulty overcoming the negative priming that occurs when they respond correctly. Using 
various measures of executive function should allow researchers to track the development of negative priming 
across a wide range of ages. This research could also be extended to include phenomena such as retrieval-
induced forgetting (Anderson & Bell, 2001; Levy & Anderson, 2002), understanding homonyms (Gernsbacher 
& Robertson, 1995), and task switching (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2002). 
 
Finally, it should be noted that this account points to a reconceptualization of the concept of negative priming 
and its development. Negative priming is often conceptualized as evidence of an inhibition mechanism that 
allows successful selective attention (e.g., Dempster, 1995; Houde & Guichart, 2001; Tipper et al., 1989). 
However, the approach outlined here suggests that the suppression of attention resulting in negative priming 
may also be a problem to be overcome in the course of development. This characterization contrast sharply with 
most inhibition accounts of executive function (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Kirkham et al., in press; Luria, 
1961; Perner et al., 1999; White, 1965). Whereas inhibition accounts suggest that children perform poorly on 
the DCCS because of too little inhibition, the current account suggests that children perform poorly in part 
because of too much inhibition. In the Negative Priming version of the DCCS, children evidently have difficulty 
disinhibiting the postswitch rules. 
 
The task dynamics of increasing activation and inhibition explain why 3-year-old children fail in the DCCS, but 
they do not explain why children pass. According to the CCC theory children pass the DCCS because the 
development of reflection and higher order rule use allows them to control their behavior in a relatively top-
down fashion, so that this behavior is not determined associatively by task dynamics and the relative activation 
levels of pre- and postswitch rules. Higher order rules allow children to select inhibited postswitch rules against 
activated preswitch rules, just as an adult would switch flexibly on the DCCS even after (say) 100 preswitch 
trials (although there may well be a cost in reaction time). Higher order rules are likely represented in a 
linguistic format (e.g., Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Goschke, 2000; Luria, 1961; Vygotsky, 1962), and this 
emphasis on higher order rule use underscores the important role that language plays in the flexible, top-down 
control of behavior. Research with brain-injured adults also suggests that language plays an important role in 
flexible task switching (Mecklinger, von-Cramon, Springer, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999). Furthermore, there 
is evidence of significant correlations between performance on the DCCS and verbal ability (Lang & Perner, 
2002; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). Clearly, however, the precise role of language in the development of 
executive function deserves more empirical attention. 
Taking Intentionality Seriously 
The CCC theory suggests that (a) executive function corresponds to goal-directed problem solving (i.e., it is a 
function, not a mechanism), (b) children accomplish executive function by formulating rules in potentially silent 
self-directed speech, and (c) there are age-related constraints on the complexity of the rules that children are 
able to formulate and use. This approach makes specific, testable hypotheses regarding the psychological 
structures that underlie children's behavior in different situations and at different ages, and makes specific 
predictions about the circumstances in which children at different ages will exhibit failures of executive 
function. 
An important implication of CCC theory, with its emphasis on goal-directed processing and the way in which 
children construe particular problems, is that executive function is closely tied to intentionality (Frye, 1999; 
Frye & Zelazo, 2003). Intentionality is a complex concept that is often traced back to Brentano's (1973) book, 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (published in German in 1874)although its history is longer still. 
Brentano used the notion of intentionality to mark the difference between mind (which he considered to be 
coextensive with consciousness) and matter. For Brentano, "intentionality," from the Latin intendere (meaning 
"to stretch," as in an archer's bow), or "mental in-existence" captured the fact that any conscious experience, no 
matter how minimal, is an experience of something it has content existing in it, and it aims at or is directed 
toward that content, whether that content is simple pain or pleasure, or something more complex, such as a 
desire or a belief. The same cannot be said of things that are merely physical. Brentano's intentionality can thus 
be viewed as a ground-level characteristic of consciousness, which any adequate psychological theory or 
philosophy of mind will need to address. 
 
In contrast to this philosophical sense, the term "intentionality" is also used in an everyday sense to mean 
"purposeful" or "goal-directed." We talk about doing something intentionally, and we mean doing it in a goal-
directed fashion, doing it purposefully, or doing it deliberately. The everyday sense of intentionality is closely 
related to Brentano's sense, both etymologically and conceptually, because intentional actions are directed at 
goals in the same way that mental states are directed at their objects (i.e., what they are of; see Crane, 1998, for 
a discussion of common misunderstandings of Brentano's notion of intentionality). Moreover, the two senses 
are definitionally dependent because, for many authors, intentional action is goal-directed behavior that is 
accompanied by (or motivated by) a particular type of intentional statenamely, an intention (e.g., Adams, 1986). 
Research on executive function is properly concerned with intentionality not only in Brentano's (1874/1973) 
sense, but also in the everyday sense. Executive function is simply goal-directed problem solving, and in 
understanding the psychological processes that underlie executive function and bring it about, one needs to take 
account of the content and directedness of an agent's intentional states (e.g., beliefs, desires, goals, intentions). 
Although approaches to executive function and related phenomena have long recognized a distinction between 
effortful, controlled processes, on the one hand, and automatic, stimulus-driven processes, on the other (e.g., 
Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Logan, 1988; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Ponser & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), it is only recently that researchers have begun to address controlled processes in terms of broader 
conceptions of intentionality. Examples can be seen in the adult literature on task switching (Allport & Wylie, 
2000; Goschke, 2000). In the task switching paradigm, participants alternate between performing one task (e.g., 
naming the color in which a word is printed, as in a Stroop task) and performing a second task that requires 
competing responses to the same stimuli (e.g., reading the color word; see Allport & Wylie, 2000). A common 
finding is that reaction times increase in the trial following the switch (i.e., there is a switch cost). To explain 
these switch costs, researchers have suggested that intentional, goal-directed processes formed on the basis of 
an experimenter's instructions interact with automatic, involuntary response tendencies to produce goal-directed 
behavior. For example, Goschke has presented a number of empirical findings that suggest switch costs are 
influenced by intentional processes (e.g., active preparatory processes) and proposes that "intentions modulate 
or 'configure' automatic processes for voluntary action, whereas the selection of responses, though dependent on 
prior intentions, is influenced by various forms of involuntary processing" (p. 350). 
In a similar vein, Hommel (2000, pp. 266) suggested that response selection occurs automatically once a goal 
has been set: "Once a task set is implemented (and automatic routes enabled) ... the whole system is prepared to 
act in an automatic fashion and this may sometimes produce undesirable side effects." Despite these unwanted 
side effects, intentions usually accomplish their goal, so Hommel (p. 267) concluded on a positive note, stating 
that "with sufficient time, no subject in a Stroop task would ever name the color word." 
Switch costs and involuntary side effects are also characteristic of preschoolers' performance on the DCCS. In 
this sense, Kirkham et al. (in press) are correct in drawing parallels between adults' performance on task 
switching and preschoolers' performance on the DCCS. However, the qualitative difference between these cases 
is that children, unlike adults, do not give the correct response, even when given sufficient time. Even though 
preschoolers are not subjected to any time constraints in the DCCS, they fail to sort the postswitch cards 
correctly. 
What differs between children and adults is the ability to form more complex intentional representations (Frye 
& Zelazo, 2003). Three-year-old children adopt the correct goal representation and select the appropriate rules 
for acting when doing so does not require them to bridge major branches in a tree structure like that in Figure 3. 
For example, 3- to 4-yearolds can switch flexibly between lower order rules during the preswitch phase of the 
DCCS (e.g., they first sort a red card and then sort a green card). Three-year-olds fail to switch, however, when 
the instructions call for the use of a higher order rule to select a setting condition. CCC theory suggests that 
there are age-related improvements in the complexity and scope of children's intentional, top-down processes. 
With the construction of higher order rule systems, children's intentional representations become more complex. 
These intentional representations structure children's reasoning and behavior, and affect what kind of meaning 
children will make of a situation (Overton, 1994, 1998, 2003). 
One implication of this intentionalistic approach to executive function is that the representation of a problem is 
necessarily subjective, and differs with developmental level. Which stimuli are relevant and what they mean is 
determined by a motivated agent in a particular context. The relevant context, in turn, is also subjectively 
defined. Constraints on complexity such as those identified by CCC theory operate on rules formulated in an ad 
hoc fashion in response to particular problems and always in light of children's own goals. Rules can be 
characterized objectively in the context of a well-defined paradigm such as the DCCS, but the rule systems that 
children formulate and use in their everyday behavior will be much more difficult to interpret. And as Deak 
(2000) pointed out, even in the DCCS children need to understand the experimenter's intention to signal that the 
rules have changed. 
To date, theories of executive function have focused almost exclusively on the processing of information 
defined objectively from a third-person perspective. Eventually, however, if we are to take seriously the 
suggestion that executive function corresponds to consciously controlled behavior, we must attempt to reconcile 
our third-person descriptions of cognition and behavior with first-person, intentional characterizations of 
meaningful thought. Although this objective has largely been lost since the days of Baldwin (1897) and Piaget 
(1963), it is increasingly being rediscovered, both in developmental psychology (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996; 
Bloom & Tinker, 2001; Deak, 2000; Overton, 2003) and in other areas of psychology (e.g., Thompson & 
Varela, 2001; Varela, 1996). 
REVISED CCC THEORY 
The findings from this Monograph support a revision of the CCC theory in which the key claims of CCC theory 
are retained. These claims include the following: (a) Executive function is best viewed functionally, as an 
outcome, not an explanatory construct. (b) Children's plans are assumed to correspond literally to rules, 
formulated in potentially silent self-directed speech. (c) In response to particular problems, children formulate 
rule systems in an ad hoc fashion and use these rules systems to regulate their inferences and action, and select 
particular pieces of information for maintainence in working memory. (d) There are several age-related 
increases in the highest possible complexity of children's rule systems, and these increases can be observed in 
many domains of behavior. (e) Complexity is measured by the number of levels of embedding in children's rule 
systems. (f) Age-related changes in complexity are made possible by age-related changes in reflection that in 
turn might be dependent on the experience-dependent maturation of prefrontal cortex. Based on evidence from 
animal studies (e.g., see Huttenlocher, 2002), it is very likely that the maturation of prefrontal cortex is 
influenced by environmental stimulation. Moreover, there is evidence that parents' verbal scaffolding of 
children's play is related to their executive function skills (Landry, Miller-Loncar, Smith, & Swank, 2002), and 
training studies designed to improve children's executive function have been successful (e.g., Dowsett & 
Livesey, 2000; Kloo & Perner, in press). Clearly, the role of the environment in general, and parent-child 
interaction in particular, on the development of executive function needs to be examined in more detail. 
The revised CCC theory (the CCC-r) adds to the original theory in several ways. It specifies more clearly the 
circumstances in which children will have difficulty using rules at various levels of complexity, and it provides 
a more detailed account of how to determine the complexity of rules required in a task. It takes account not only 
of the activation of rules as a function of experience but also the inhibition of rules. Finally, insofar as the CCCr 
theory takes intentionality seriously, it represents an integration of the CCC theory with the Levels of 
Consciousness (LOG) Model (e.g., Zelazo, 1999, 2000; P. R. Zelazo & P. D. Zelazo, 1998). CCC theory shows 
how age-related changes in executive function—considered as a functional construct are due to age-related 
changes in the maximum complexity of the rules that children can formulate and use when solving problems. 
The LOC model shows how these age-related changes in maximum rule complexity are, in turn, made possible 
by age-related increases in the degree to which children can consciously reflect on the rules they represent (i.e., 
age-related increases in children's highest level of consciousness; Zelazo, 1999, 2000, in press). Together, the 
CCC theory and the LOC model provide a framework for an intentionalistic, but still scientifically tractable, 
account of executive function (Frye & Zelazo, 2003). 
The LOG model is an information-processing model designed to capture the development of consciousness and 
explain its role in executive function. As an information processing model, it traces the flow of information 
through a functional system—in this case, illustrating the way in which intentional objects (i .e., 
representations) are operated on as they come to figure in the conscious control of behavior. As a developmental 
model, the LOC model depicts the way in which this functional system changes in the course of ontogeny, and 
shows the consequences of these changes for executive function. According to this model, higher levels of 
consciousness are brought about by a functional process of reflection or reentrant signaling that allows 
subjective experiences at one level to become objects of reflection at a higher level (cf. reflective abstraction; 
Muller, Sokol, & Overton, 1998; Piaget; 2001; psychological distancing; DeLoache, 1993; Dewey, 1931/1985; 
Sigel, 1993). Each degree of reflection has specifiable consequences for the quality of experience, the potential 
for recall, the complexity of explicit knowledge structures, and the possibility of cognitive control (e.g., Zelazo, 
in press). 
REMAINING QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
We believe that CCC theory, and especially CCC-r theory, provides a comprehensive account of current 
research on the DCCS. However several researchers (e.g., Kirkham et al., in press; Munakata & Yerys, 2001; 
Perner et al., 1999; Towse et al., 2000) have challenged various aspects of the theory. It may be useful to 
consider the most common challenges in turn, as many of them are based on misconceptions regarding what it 
is that CCC theory claims. 
How Could Children Learn the Rules the CCC Theory Claims Children Use? 
Perner (2000; see also Perner et al., 1999) criticized the application of CCC theory to theory of mind tasks, 
suggesting that the rules identified by CCC theory "cannot be the rules that children bring to bear on the task, 
because these rules could only be known after a practice run or as a result of the child having figured out the 
problem" (p. 382). According to CCC theory, however, it is not that children must learn rules, but rather that 
they must formulate rules in an ad hoc fashion basically, they need to talk their way through the problem in a 
way that allows them to access the appropriate piece of knowledge at the moment of responding. For example, 
in a false belief task, children must say to themselves something along the lines of, "There are sticks in the 
box, not crayons, but I'm being asked about my friend, so the answer is crayons, not sticks." Developmental 
constraints on the complexity of one's rule formulations determine task difficulty. 
CCC Theory Analyzes Task Complexity in an Arbitrary Way 
Another objection to CCC theory concerns the apparently arbitrary way in which task complexity is analyzed. 
To illustrate this objection, Perner (2000) provided an alternative analysis of the false belief task according to 
which it requires a simple pair of rules, rather than a higher order rule for integrating two incompatible pairs of 
rules. It should be noted, however, that CCC theory does not attempt to provide a logically necessary analysis of 
the false belief task or any other task. Instead, it generates empirical hypotheses regarding the rules children 
formulate and use when solving a particular problem such as the DCCS. Any given two-choice discrimination, 
including the false belief task (i.e., false belief response vs. reality response), is amenable to analysis in terms of 
a simple pair of rules. However, the CCC theory holds that the psychological perspectives identified in this task 
(i.e., the child's correct perspective vs. the other person's false perspective) serve naturally as setting conditions 
for a higher order rule. Thus, the empirical claim is that, when solving the task, one first determines from which 
perspective to reason, and then determines which judgment to make from that perspective. This claim receives 
empirical support from the current findings together with previous research showing that performance on the 
DCCS is correlated with performance on false belief (e.g., see Perner & Lang, 2001), although further work on 
this topic is clearly required. 
The Abulic Dissociations Predicted by CCC Theory Are Only Apparent 
According to the CCC theory, there are several age-related increases in the complexity of the rules children are 
capable of formulating and maintaining in working memory. Each increase permits children to exercise a new 
degree of control over their environment and behavior, but children are subject to limitations that cannot be 
overcome until yet another level of complexity is achieved. Abulic dissociations occur (under certain 
conditions, such as when there is conflict among rules) until incompatible pieces of knowledge are integrated 
into a single, more complex rule system via another degree of reflection. In the absence of integration, the 
particular piece of conscious knowledge that controls behavior is determined by relatively local associations 
(e.g., the rules that are selected, stored, and used may depend on what children have done previously in that 
situation). 
 
Munakata and Yerys (2001) have suggested that these abulic dissociations are only apparent. These authors 
found that when the knowledge questions are made more complex (e.g., "Where do the blue flowers go in the 
shape game?"), so that they, like the postswitch sorting questions, require a higher order rule for selecting a 
setting condition, 3- to 4-yearolds often have difficulty with the knowledge questions too. Although Munakata 
and Yerys described their findings as if they were incompatible with CCC theory, the findings arguably provide 
support for it. That is, the findings arguably show that it is the complexity of the inferences required that is 
important, not the verbal versus manual modality of the questions (see also Zelazo et al., 1996, Exp. 4). 
Moreover, the fact remains that when the simpler (unidimensional) knowledge questions are used, an abulic 
dissociation is revealed between answers to those questions (correct) versus answers to the standard sorting 
questions (incorrect). 
CCC Theory Cannot Account for Task Manipulations That Improve Children's Performance 
It has also been suggested that CCC theory cannot account for the effects of various task manipulations that lead 
to improved performance. For example, Kirkham et al. (in press) suggested that both the beneficial effect of 
having children label test cards on DCCS and the detrimental effect of leaving already sorted test cards "face 
up" favor an inhibitory account, as opposed to CCC theory. 
Happaney and Zelazo (in press) addressed these points as follows. With respect to labeling, one should first 
note that the labeling effects are not completely consistent. In Towse et al. (2000, Exp. 4), children who failed 
the postswitch phase were encouraged (one way or another) to label correctly. However, two-thirds of these 
children then proceeded to sort the cards incorrectly. In any case, more generally, positive effects of labeling 
simply show that labeling helps children to refocus their attention perhaps by forcing them to use a different 
pair of rules. The results do not show that children now understand how the two dimensions are related, or that 
higher order rules are not important for this understanding, and they do not show that the typical development 
of this ability is not brought about by increases in self-reflection that allow children to better use higher order 
rules. For example, it is quite possible that labeling exerts its influence simply by changing children's bias 
without inducing the use of a higher order rule. If this is the case, children would exhibit "attentional inertia" 
on sorting by the postswitch dimension, and if asked to switch back to the preswitch rules, they may fail to do 
so. 
Unfortunately, Kirkham et al. (in press) did not assess whether improvements in performance generalized in this 
way, so the issue has yet to be resolved. However, it is also possible that labeling does, in fact, provide children 
with a more sophisticated conceptual structure. Labeling makes information explicit, and may well induce 
reflection on that information ( Jacques & Zelazo, in press). Finally, CCC theory claims that, in the normal 
course of development, switching is brought about by age-related increases in reflection and higher order rule 
use, but if labeling improved performance in some other way, this would not undermine CCC theory. There 
may be multiple ways to improve performance on the DCCS, and demonstrating that one way suffices has no 
bearing on whether there are others, and, most important, it does not reveal which ways are typically operative 
in producing age-related changes. 
The finding that leaving test cards face up in the trays impairs children's performance also fails to provide a 
substantive challenge to CCC theory. This finding only demonstrates that it is possible to increase the salience 
of one of two pairs of rules. The key issue, which remains to be assessed, is how children eventually are able to 
"resist the pull" of the conflicting dimension. 
 
Even Adults Have Difficulty With Task Switching and Surely They Can Use Higher Order Rules Kirkham et 
al. (in press) cited evidence that adults have difficulty with the DCCS and related tasks (such as measures of 
task switching; e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000). They suggested that because adults are capable of using higher 
order rules, difficulty using higher order rules cannot explain the costs associated with task switching, and 
hence cannot explain children's performance either. However, although CCC theory proposes that adults are 
capable of using high-order rules, it does not state that they always will. Indeed, just as inhibition 
can be expected to be effortful and have a cost in increased latencies, so reflection and higher order rule use is 
effortful and has a cost associated with it (Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, in press). 
Children Only Have Difficulty on the DCCS When There Is Conflict Between Rules 
Kirkham et al. (in press) claimed that children only have difficulty on the DCCS when they are required to shift 
their attentional focus from one dimension to another that conflicts with the first, and they suggested that this 
undermines the claim that children normally require a higher order rule to succeed. However, according to 
CCC theory, it is only when children must switch between incompatible rule pairs nested under different major 
branches in a hierarchical tree structure that a higher order rule is required. 
Another example of this same general criticism has been offered by Towse and colleagues (2000) and Perner 
and Lang (2002), who noted that target cards seem to be required to elicit 3- to 4-year-olds' errors on the 
DCCS. However, on the CCC account, it is only when there is conflict, as when there are target cards, that a 
higher order rule is going to be required in order to overcome the conflict. Otherwise no higher order rule is 
required by children in order to change their behavior. Simply using one pair of lower order rules and then 
another (i.e., in succession, without any need to reconcile them) will suffice. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The results of the research described in this Monograph answer several questions, but they also leave many 
questions unanswered. For example, theoretical questions remain regarding relations between CCC-r and other 
approaches to the development of executive function, such as Perner's redescription theory and accounts 
emphasizing the development of both working memory and inhibitory control. There are also many empirical 
questions. For example, future work should assess more directly some of the fundamental processes (e.g., the 
use of self-directed speech) postulated by CCC-r theory, and it would be worthwhile to do so using a variety of 
different measures of executive function, not just the DCCS. In this section, however, we describe in more 
detail just two of the ways in which future research might usefully continue to examine the development of 
executive function. 
Development of Executive Function in Older Children 
The research reported in this Monograph involved 3- to 4-year-old children, and inferences were made about 
age-related changes occurring between the ages of 3 and 5 years. However, it will be important in future 
studies to examine directly the development of performance on some of the new versions of the DCCS 
introduced here, especially given the possibility that age-related changes on some of these versions may be 
nonmonotonic. For example, it is possible that performance on the Total Change version actually declines as 
children begin to construe the stimuli in terms of dimension. Similarly, although CCC-r theory predicts that 
performance on the Negative Priming version will improve between the ages of 3 and 5 years, the fact that 
Tipper et al. (19 89) failed to find evidence of negative priming in 7-year-olds raises the possibility negative 
priming is a U-shaped function of age in early childhood. 
 
Development should also be assessed beyond the preschool years. Indeed, several studies suggest that the 
development of executive function follows a protracted course, and performance on executive function tasks 
such as the WCST (Chelune & Baer, 1986), the Tower of Hanoi (Welsh, 1991), and a variety of working 
memory measures (Luciana & Nelson, 1998) continues to improve at least until adolescence. For example, 
Welsh, Pennington, and Groisser (199 1) used a battery of relatively global measures of executive function tasks 
and found that children passed different tasks at a range of different ages. Interpretation of these results is 
difficult, however, because global measures of executive function depend on many different underlying 
processes (i.e., there are no process-pure measures) and because some sort of framework is required for making 
systematic comparisons across tasks that differ in difficulty in addition to which aspects of executive function 
they assess. Certainly it is problematic to compare performance on an easy measure of planning and a difficult 
measure of rule use and then conclude that planning develops before rule use. CCC-r theory provides a 
framework for making such comparisons that can be extended to account for age-related changes beyond the 
preschool years (e.g., through the emergence of higher levels of consciousness and the ability to formulate 
increasingly higher order rules; Zelazo et al., in press). 
In any case, however, in order to capture executive function at different ages in more detail, complex 
executive function tasks need to be broken down into more molecular processes and these processes need to 
be studied experimentally, as was done with the DCCS in the current Monograph. 
Development of "Hot" Executive Function 
A second direction for future research is to explore the relatively "hot" affective aspects of executive 
function associated with orbitofrontal cortex in addition to the more purely cognitive, "cool" aspects 
associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Zelazo & Muller, 2002b). Whereas cool executive function is 
more likely to be elicited by relatively abstract, decontextualized problems, hot executive function is 
required for problems that involve the regulation of affect and motivation (i.e., regulation of basic limbic 
system functions). 
This characterization of hot executive function in contradistinction to cool executive function is consistent with 
several recent proposals regarding the function of orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Rolls, 1999). For 
example, based on single-cell recordings of neurons in orbitofrontal cortex together with neuroimaging data 
and evidence that damage to orbitofrontal cortex impairs performance on simple tests of object reversal and 
extinction, Rolls (e.g., 1999) suggested that orbitofrontal cortex is required for the flexible representation of the 
reinforcement value of stimuli. A rather different theory has been proposed by Damasio (e.g., 1994). 
According to this theory, the somatic marker theory, orbitofrontal cortex is required for processing learned 
associations between affective reactions and specific scenarios, and this processing plays a crucial but often 
overlooked role in decision making. Despite their differences, however, both approaches capture the fact that 
the control of thought and action depends on different cortical systems, depending on whether or not it occurs 
in motivationally significant contexts. 
Traditionally, research on executive function in human beings has focused almost exclusively on cool 
executive function, using measures such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Recently, however, there has 
been growing interest in hot executive function as well, and in particular in what might be called affective 
decision making, or decision making about events that have emotionally significant consequences (i.e., 
meaningful rewards and/or losses). The hot aspect of executive function appears to be involved, for example, in 
theory of mind (Zelazo & Muller, 2002b), delay of gratification (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), and 
affective decision making (Damasio, 1994). It is currently unclear whether the development of hot executive 
function can be conceptualized in terms of a hierarchical model like CCC-r theory, and it remains to be seen 
whether and how the development of hot and cool aspects of executive function are related (for a discussion, 
see Zelazo & Muller, 2002b). An experimental approach to hot executive function using tasks such as delay of 
gratification or the children's gambling task (Kerr & Zelazo, in press) might usefully address this gap in the 
literature. 
CONCLUSION 
Considerable research has shown that most 3- to 4-year-olds perseverate during the postswitch phase of the 
DCCS, whereas most 4-year-olds switch flexibly. The DCCS provides a window on the development of 
executive function, and this Monograph described four studies that used variants of the DCCS to experimentally 
test hypotheses derived from different theoretical perspectives on executive function. Among the most 
important findings are the following: (a) Three-year-old children can use four rules to sort cards, showing that 
memory limitations per se do not constrain children's executive function on the DCCS. (b) Children can use 
bidimensional rules when these rules are not in conflict, indicating that switching between dimensions per se is 
not the problem either. (c) Children have difficulty using even a single pair of rules when these rules are in 
conflict but can use conflicting rules when doing so does not require switching between dimensions. This 
highlights the importance of rule conflict and supports the hypothesis that children have difficulty formulating 
and using a higher order rule for selecting between setting conditions and resolving the conflict. (d) Stimulus 
separation among test cards does not seem to be related to performance, indicating that the findings from the 
DCCS cannot be attributed to holistic versus analytic perceptual processing. (f) Children perform well on Total 
Change versions of the DCCS, suggesting that conflict at the level of dimensions does not pose a problem for 
most children. (g) Many children perform poorly in Partial Change versions, suggesting first that children do 
not perseverate in making particular responses to specific test cards, second that conflict at the level of specific 
rules does indeed pose a problem for children, and third that this conflict is due to persisting activation of the 
preswitch rules. (h) Many children perform poorly in the Negative Priming version, but well in the Negative 
Priming (redundant preswitch) version. This suggests that selecting the preswitch rules against a competing 
alternative results in inhibition of the competing rules that persists into the postswitch phase and makes it 
difficult for children to select those rules when required to do so. 
 
Considered together, the results of these studies provided the basis for revision of CCC theory to CCC-r, which 
(a) specifies more clearly the circumstances in which children will have difficulty using rules at various levels 
of complexity, (b) provides a more detailed account of how to determine the complexity of rules required in a 
task, (c) takes account of both the activation and inhibition of rules as a function of experience, and (d) 
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